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hpublications which are counter to the general
good are to be forbidden, Vve demand legal
prosecution of artistic and literary forms
which exert a destructive influence on our
national life, and the closure of organiza
tions opposing the above made demands."
In the Kational Socialist Year Book for 1938 the
follov;ing is said with respect to DIEThlCH as Heich Press
Chief of the NSDAF:
"The Reich Press Chief of the HSDAP
is, in addition to being the Fuehrer's personal
press chief, the competent Reichsleiter for
all Party agencies entiusted v.'ith political-
journalistic tasks which are subordinated to
him professionally and politically without
prejudice to their organizational subordina
tion. The most important of these are the
Pressamtsleiter and Referents of all offices
of the Reichsleitung, the editors-in-chief of
the Party Press, the Gau Press Offices of the
NSDAP, as well as all the rest of the press
political organizations of the WSDAP.
"The mouthpiece of the party as far as
the ¥/hole of the Press is concerned is the
National Socialist Party News Service, under
the direction of the Chief of the Press Poli
tical Office,
. .The entire press at home and abroad
obtains all Its information regarding the NSDAP
from the offices of the Reich Press Chief in
Berlin and in Munich."
In September 1935 DIETRICH delivered a speech at the
Party rally in Nurnberg, stating, among other things:
"The liberalistic age boasted of the
Press as a Seventh Povi'er. A power, therefore,
which was not of the people, but vjhich aspired
to govern them. In the National Socialistic
State the press constitutes the public con
science of the nation. A power destined to
serve, but not govern tho people, . .
" Since the press reflects tho course of
events dally, even hourly, It is natural that
its purification y/hicb was in tPie nature of
an introduction to the revolution, had to
manifest itself as one of its first and most
decisive operations, , ,
"in National Socialist Germany that
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ing:
kind of press was eliminated with lightning
speed hy the arm of the law. Afate which
it deserved a thousandfold, overbook it on
the first day of the revolution.
"The same article of our Party Program
further adds: -newspapers violating the com
munity interests are to be prohibited I
"And dear Party Members, we did our full
dutyby our'program in this respect also. InNa^oLl socialist .Germany, ene^es of .the State
and the pLple are not tolerated in the press;
they ore exterminated.
"The Program continues: 'In order to
facilitate the creation of a German press, we
demand that all editors and co-workers of news-
papers published in German must be Volksgonossen.
"In this respect clso vre can ascertain that
a complete job has been done. The.National social
ist Preaa Decree has eliminated ell parasites from
German journalism. Today there ore no more Jews
in the German press I
The speech abou ids vri-th phrases such as the follow-
"The Jewish liberal-profiteering press."
"We have eliminated the Jew from the press,
and since then - dear Party members - we do Indeed
feel freer and better in this fi Id,
.t„e have cleandd the Jews out of the Germanpress and therefore it is more than others the
target of their hatred.
On 4 October 1933 the Editorial Control Law was issued
which limited editors to those who possessed German citizen
ship, had not lost their civic rights, and qualified for a
tenure of public offices, were of Aryan descent and not
married to a person of non-Aryan descent, etc.
Not only were the German nev;spnpers under >.trict
control, but as the program of expansion and aggression
moved forward, it was made applicable to the new territories,
the Saar, Austria, sudetenland, Danzig, Occupied Eastern
Territories, Poland, Netherlands and Bohemia and Moravia.
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On 9 October 1934, DIEThIGH orficially informed the
editorial staff of the National Socialist press that he
made the district press leaders of the Party responsible
tothe Keich Press Office for all the nevjs in the papers
in the districts dealing with the Party, even if the
papers were not Party papers.
On 9 Iviarch 1939, Sundermann, DIETKIeiH'S Chief of
Staff, informed the Party Press offices ani referents that
dailv directives ^''ould thereafter be sent to the P^rty
o ^
press offices in order to efficiently control and guide
the press in forwarding its wishes in publication questions
immediately to the whole Gorman press in the same manner
as used by the press divisions of the governments.
Jev/ish Problem. The recorf is replete with Press and
Periodical Directives of a general anti-Semitic nature,
V\e relate only a fevj of those which v/ero directed toward
iowish persecution and the "Final Solution,"
On 15 February 1940 the Tagosparole issued the
follovi/ing directives
•'The foreign press declares that 1,000
Gorman Jews have been transported to the
Government General, The report is correct,
but is to be treated as confidential."
On 21 August 1941, as part of the secret information
in the Tagesparole, the press was Informed:
"it is to our interests that all Jev/ish
statements against Germany or the authoritarian
states should bo v;ell noted. The reason for
this v/ish is that measures of an inner-politi
cal nature may be expected,"
On 26 September 1941 this information in the TagesparoJe
is to bo found:
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"Vi/ith reforenc© to the marking of Jewry,
the opportunity Is offered to handle this theme
in the most varied ways, in order to make clear
to the G-crman people the necessity for these
measures, and especially to indicate the noxious
ness of the Jev/s. From tomorrow on the special
delivery service v/ill provide material to be used
as proof of the injuries which Jev/ry has inflicted
upon Gcrmmy, and the destiny it has envisaged for
her, past and present. This material is recom
mended."
On 3 I'ebruary 1944, the Tagesparole announced that the
"chr.nfTC in the rliplomatic status of the Soviet
Republics, , .ani^"' the applause with which it is
grootod by the Jewish, press throuorhout the ^^'orld ,
reveals a gigantic international Jewish conspiracy,"
and that
"The German press now has the task of energetically
taking up this theme of the change in the diplo
matic status of the Soviet Pvepublica, and to brand
this clumsy Jev/ish trick v/ith convincing words. • •
It can be seen that this whole maneuver is a Jewish
trick of gigantic proportions. The fact that the
Jewish ne\:spapors throughout the world welcome
this development clearly indicates that this is a
gigantic conspiracy of Judaism, a Jewish conspiracy
of international proportions,"
and that
"In these problems also v;o can recognize the truth
that the Jewish question Is the key to the history
of the world,"
On 2 March 1944 it is saidj
"The anti-Semitic campaign must be emphasized
still more than up till now as an important propa-
vandlstic factor In t^-e world strup-^le. Therefore,
at all possible occasions world Ji^d^lsm has to be
stigmatized as the one ¥-hose cunning machine" tions
are even opposed to the intorcsts of its hostess
nations. On top of all that these voices are to
be recorded, which show clearly the real Jewish
intentions of destruction and to make them the
subject of convincing exposures In this respect
German journalism has to aim at keeping awake in
the German people the feeling that Judaism consti
tutes a world danger on the one hand, and on the
other, above all, to carry the discussions abroad.
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On 27 April 1944, the Tagesparole stated
"One of the fundamental topics of the
German Press will remain the anti-Semitic
campaign. In this respect very useful
material has come to hand from Hungary,
When utilizing the reports on the measures
taken there against the Jews it has to be
kept in mind that they will not be repro
duced v;ithout extensive statements on the
crimes committed by the Jevjs, which caused
these measures. • .
"V'/hen, in treating the first point of the
Tagesparole, the nev/spapers will arrive at the
general tendency of their commentaries — Judaism's
guilt -- then just the second point of today's
Tagesparole must be the cause, taking -ij-ungary as
the pretext, to start again on a large scale the
anti-Semitic campaign, Thrs one principal topic
of the German press, on account of the present
reports from Piungary, must be principally reopened
once m,ore a t'owever, not only the mere reports on
the measures taken by the new Hungarian Government
against the Jevrs must be published, moreover the
present judaification of Hungary has to be shown
up, \diich has led to such measures. . .ViThbn this
Jevjish guilt has been extensively treated by the
Press, then the new anti-Semitic measures of the
Hungarian Government can be mentioned."
On 1 June 1944, a confidential information to the Tagesparole
contained the following statement;
"The treatment by the Press of the war alms,
the combat methods and the reign of terror, et(;,
of our enemies is incomplete and ineffective if,
in every case, and in the leading articles of the
newspapers, Germany's determination to oppose this
Jewish chaos and to fight for German victory with
bold resolution is not expressed."
We now come to the articles appearing in the periodicc
directives. Under the heading "If the Jew Comes into Power"
it is said;
"The Zeitschriften-Dlenst (Periodical Service)
has already referred severfl ti^ es to the necessity
for rousing all power to resist in the German people.
The 'Deutsche "Vocbendlenst' (German h'e'ekly Report)
shows what has happened to those nations "-hich have
become the victims of Judaism, In this connection
reference can be mrCde to Hitler'^ words that at the
end of this v/ar there will be onlv survivors and
annihilated. In pointing to the firm intention of
Judaism to destroy all Germans, the will for self-
assertion must be strengthened.
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Under the heading "Europe Protects Herself Against
the Jews" it is said:
"The declaration of war hy the Jews against
the European nations resulted in energetic mea
sures being taken against the Jews, not only in
Germany but also in many other European states.
The 'Deutsche V:ochendienst' recommends the
periodicals to issue comprehensive descriptions
and in this connection furnishes material and
suggestions for subject matter. It must be
pointed out that in the articles, as a result^
of their racial compoation, the Jews are hostile^
to anything constructive and any peaceful community
life, r'or reasons of self-preservation, the nations
must protect themselves against the Jev/ish destruc-
I!
tive forces. • •
"Let us avoid any criticism of the measures
taken against the Jews by individual countries,
and comment on their suitability and the extent
to ¥/hich they can be put into practical effect."
On 2 April 1943, it is said:
"Of equal value Vifith our anti-Bolshevist pro
paganda is that against Jev/ry. It must be a matter
for irrefutable certainty to every member of our
people that the Jev/s are the inexorable enemies of
our nation and are behind Bolshevism as well as^
behind the Plutocracies. • .The treatment of this
subject belongs in the framev/ork of the rousing of
feelings of hatred recently described here as
necessary. • •
, .In the works for which the ^Deutsche
Woohendienst* brings numerous suggestions and subject proposals, it must be emphasized that vi/ith
Jev;ry it is not the same as with other peoples,
that there are individual criminals,but that Jewry
as a v^hole springs from criminal roots and is
criminal by disposition. The Jews are not a nation
like other nations, but bearers of a hereditary
criminality. The criminal class of all lands
speaks a specialized Inna-uage, of the most
important elements are "^^ebraic. The annihilation
of Jewry is no loss to humanity, but as useful to .
the peoples of the earth as capital punishment or
security custody for criminal offendCK's."
On 22 April 1943 the Periodical Service stated that the
Jev/s were responsible for the Katyn mass murder of polish
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officers, and that the Jews wanted to murder the peoples
of Europe and that the Katyh incident was not alone a hate
ful outbreak of Jev>rs against Poles, but rather a hateful
policy of Jews against all non-Jews.
Under "Mariner of Treatment" is found:
"Emphasize: Every individual Jev/, wherever
he may be, and whatever he may do, shares the
guilt. There is no such thing as a 'decent Jevj'
but only a more or less cleverly designed camou
flage, The Jew is a notorious criminal,"
It is thus clear that a well-thoupht out, oft repeated,
persistent campaign to arouse the hatred of the German people
against Jev/s was fostered and directed by the press department
* and its press chief, DIETRICH, That part of much of this may
have been inspired by Goebbels Is undoubtedly true, but DIE-
f TRICE approved md authorized every release, as his own wit
nesses admit.
The only reason for this campaign was to blunt the sens!
bilities of the people regarding the campaign of persecution
and murder which was being carried out.
^ Hitler, on 30, January 1942, in a Y/idely published
speech, said:
"On the 1st of September 1939 X already
declared in the German heichstag, — and I am
careful about rash prophecies, -- that this
war v/ill not end as the Jews imagine, namely
with the destruction of the European Aryan
people, but rather that the result of this
war will be the destruction of Jewry. Por the
first time other nations will not bleed away,
but rather for the first time the old Jewish
lav/ will be applied; an eye for an eye, and a
tooth for a tooth.
"The longer this v/ar will continue, the
more world Jewry might just as v/ell know this,
-anti Semltism will spread. It v/ill find
encouragement in every prison camp, in every
family v/hlch v/ill come to know the real cause
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for their sacrifices. And the hour will come
when the most evil world enemy of all times
will have, at least for a thousand years, played
out his role
These Press and Periodical Directives were not mere
political polemics, they vrere not aimless expressions of
anti-Semitism, and they were not designed only to unite the
German people in the v/ar effort.
Their clear and expressed purpose v;as to enrage Germans
ncrainst the Jews, to justify the measures taken and to be
taken against them, and to subdue any doubts which might arise
as to the justice of measures of racial persecution to which
Jews v/ere to be subjected.
By them DIETRICH consciously implemented, and by fur
nishing the excuses and justifications, participated in, the
Crimes against Humanity regarding Jews charged in Count Five,
He is and v/e find him GUILTX.
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ERDMAW--DORFF joined the Foreign Office in 1918 end
by 19£8 had risen to the position of Embassy Councillor
(Botsohaftsrat) in China. After Hitler's rise to power in
1933 he was recalled to the Foreign Office and became Chief
of the Fast Asia Group. In 1937 he was sent to Budapest as
German Minister. He was recalled in June 1941 and became
Deputy Chief (Ministerial Dirigent) of the lolitical Division
of the Foreign Office,
Until 1943 he was subordinate to V/OEH^AM and there
after to the latter's successor, Hencke.
The Facts; The defendant did not take the witness stand
and offered no evidence in his behalf. It was stipulated by
the prosecution and the defense, and thereon the Tribunal
ruled, that only such evidence as had been admitted up to
the time the defendant rested his case, i.e., July 16, 1948,
should be considered against him. In its brief the prosecu
tion has referred to documents or er,hibits and oral testimony
received fubsepuent to 16 July. In most instances this evi
dence was offered against other defendants and apparently the
prosecution, due to e lapse of time and the size of the
record of this case, overlooked Its stipulation and the
order the Tribunal previously adverted to, Me shall not
consider such exhibits or testimony.
The political Division, except insofar as it vjas inter'
ferred with or by-passed by the Foreign Minister P.ibbentrop (
situation which quite often arose, not only with regard to
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Political bat otiier divisions of the Foreign Office), had the dut
to become thoroughly informed of the political situation
in foreign countries. This, of course, involved obtaining
both general and confidential information vhich might faci
litate a correct evaluation of foreign rolitioal situations.
The Political Department, or Division, had various
sub-divisions, headed by a staff of referents and other
employees, vho specialized on s particular nation or group
of nations. In theory, and quite generally in practice,
instructions on political matters and policy, and the
attitude to be taken by the German Diplomatic Corps abroad
vere given by the Political Division.
The Foreign Minister "was entitled to refer to and
obtain the opinion of the division on matters of foreign
policy. In principle, the functions and duties of this
division differed little from like departments in the
Foreign Office of other states, the heads of whiclx, of
necessity, rely largely upon the advice of men who have
long experience in and expert knowledge of political and
other conditions in a particular country or specialized
area.
Ribbentrop, however, motivated in part by a tremendous
egotism an(? vanity, and also burdened by a subconscious
realization of his inadequacies and ignorance which his
vanity forced him to conceal, resented and often ignored
or by-passed the experts of his political department or
airected them to transmit orders to his German representatives
abroad without having considered their opinions. It would
have been difficult to imagine a man less fitted by native
ability, experience, knowledge or temperament to guide the
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foreign policy and advise the head of any major state,
and it is not to be doubted that many of the fatal mis
takes and crimes of the Nazi foreign policy are directly
attributable to these factors, plus his-pride and slavish
adherence to Hitler.
That ERDMANNSDORFF had knov-ledge of the Crimes against
Humanity committed against the Jevs, and the persecution of
the churches, we have no doubt. But a careful examination
of the evidence reveals little or nothing more. It is far
from enough to justify a conviction. The Deputy Chief of
the political Division, particularly under the Ribbentrop
regime, had little or no influence. He was subordinated to
the Undersecretary of State of the Foreign Office, and he
was little more than a chief clerk.
V/e find ERDl^lANNSDORFF NOT GUILTY under Count Five,
and the prosecution having dismissed all other charges
against him, it is ordered that on the adjournment of the
Tribunal he be discharged from custody,
ESPPLER
The defendant ICEPPLER in 1932 became the Special
Advisor for Economic Affairs in the Party,. In 1933 he
became a member of the Reichstag. After the rise to power
he became Hitler's Plenipotentiary for Economic questions
and after the death of von Hindenburg his title was changed
to that of Plenipotentiary for Economic Q,uestions to the
Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor. When Goering became Plenipoten
tiary for the Four Year Plan, KEPPLER lost much of his power
although he remained one of its directors in charge, of the
Office for Soil Research, Oils and Fats.
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In the sumjner of 1937 he vie.s directed to t?:ke p^.rt
in Austrian r^roblems Rnd sent to Vienna to handle matters
relating to the prospectiYe Anschluss, and upon its accom
plishment he, for a time, acted as Reich Deputy for
Austria. In the spring of 1938 he became President of
the Reich Office for Soil Research in the Ministry of
Economics. When the DUT was organized, he became chair
man of its Aufsichtsrat and he also served in the Aufsichtsrat
of the Continental Oil Company.
Shortly after the inauguration of the Hitler regime
the ''Office for the Repatriation of Racial Germans" was
organized, which had, among other things, the function of
bringing into Germany and resettling within its borders
so-called.Ethnic Germans (citizens of other states), who
might desire, or by persecution or by force of other
treaties or other agreements with other states, vjere re- ^
quired to leave the* countries of v;hich they were nationals
and enter the Reich. We do not question that these func
tions were quite within the bounds of International Law.
There are, however, indications of certain other functions
of a different character, but as to them the defendant
KEPPLER is not involved and it is not necessary to discuss
them.
Early in October 1939, a little more than one month
after the invasion of Poland, Hitler appointed Hiflunler
Reich Commissioner of the Office for the Strengthening of
Germandom, which Vvas directed by Hitler,
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p(1) To bring beok those German citizens and
racial Germans abroad •'who were eligible
for permanent return to the Reich;
(2) To eliminate the harxaful influence of such
alien parts of the -population as constitute.d
a danger to the Reich and to Other German
communities; andj
(3) To create nev; German settlement areas, es
pecially by resettlement of German citizens,
and racial Germans coming back to the Reich.
It was intended at first to use for that purpose those
ortions of Poland which v>;ere attempted to be incorporated'
into the Reich, and which became kno'wn as the Incorpora'ced
Eastern Territories^ Later Alsace and. other territories
which were occupied by Germany "wrere utilized in this program,^
No attention "^was paid to the property rights of those
whose 'property "was confiscated or who were either e'vecuated
for labor services into the Reich or wjho were used as serfs
in the territories where they had formerly lived and had
their farms and property. In Poland not only were the lands
of the Polish state confiscated, but privately owned farms,
estates, or businesses as well. The property thus involved
was not only the property of the lews but that of Poles
as well.
On 7 June 1940, Dr. Hugo Berger, a member of the
Aufsichtsrat of the DDT (Doufache Umsiedlungs-Treuhandgesoil-
schaft), and who had been aprointed to this post upon the
recommendation of the defendant HSP'^LER, published an srt^icle
in the NS Landpost that nearly 5,000 large farms and hundreds
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of thousands of small Polish farms had been confiscated and
brought into the resettlement program; that the total area
thus involved amounted to almost one-fifth of the agricul
tural area of the ^Nhole Reich. These confiscations, evacua
tions and deportations were carried out vith coldly planned
and calculated brutality. They were contemporaneously des
cribed by Prank, aovernor of the Government General, who
was tried and sentenced to death by the International
Military Tribunal and thereafter executed.
in a communication addressed to Himmler in 1943 he
w^rote;
"If I may say so, the starting point for
my opinion in this question is the consciousness that
it is one of the most honorable and most urgent
tasks of the German leadership to create a home
in the Pastern territories, conquered by the German
sword j=»nd blood, for the Ethnic Germans who had been
withdrawn from the spaces, formerly underalien^
domination. But to me it seems necessary to weigh
carefully the question whether this aim should^be
realized in the middle of the fight for the exis
tence of the German people, . .or whether it^w/ould
not be more expedient to postpone the execution
of these measures to a date when it v.;ill be
possible to carry out the necessary, basic prepa
rations for the introduction of Ethnic German
settlers v«;ithout being hindered by difficulties
caused by the war and without the loss of important
economic contributions to be made by the territory
gj^visaged for re—settlement, to the detriment of
the Germ'^'n war effort.
"I refrain from discussing in detail smaller
settlement and resettlement measures such as^have
been nlanned and carried out several times without
sufficient contact '''ith the offxces of the general
administration; I shall limit myself to describe the
attempts, planned -nd carried out on a larger scale
in the district of Zrmosc since the end of last
year", to settle Ethnic Germans in this terri
tory; thej^G measures li^ve been carried out by
the offices of the Reich Commissar for Strengthening
of Germanism. . .
".According to my own conviction, the reason
for the complete destruction of oublic order is to
be found exclusively in the fact th^^t the expelled
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DorFons Y'BTG in some c^ses given only 10 minutes,
in no c^ses more thnn 2 hours to scrspe together
their most necess^='ry belongings to take v;ith them.
Men, Vw'omen, children ^nd old people "were brought
into m^ss camps, frequently vithout any clothing
or equipment; there they v;ere sorted into groups
of people fit for v^ork, less fit for iwork and
unfit for ^/ijork (especially children and aged per
sons), "Without regard to possible family ties, All
connections betvjeen the members of families "v^ere
thus severed, so that the fate of one group re
mained unknown to the other. It v;ill be understood
that these measures caused an indescribable ^panic
among the po'oulation affected by the expulsion, and
led to it that approximately half of the "population,
earmarked for expulsion, fled. They fled in their
despair from the expulsion district and have thus
contributed considerably to the increase of the
groups of bandits which existed for some time in
the Lublin district and Vi'hich act "Vvith continuously
increasing audacity and force. This movement has
extended, like waves in a. pond, also to the inha
bitants of those rur®l districts which were not
in any case not yet — intend.ed for expulsion. In
the course of these events it has even happened
that the newly settled Ethnic Germans, forced by
casualties inflicted on them by bandit actions,
frequently banded together into armed troops and
procured for themselves from the surrounding villages,
with alien population, on their own initiative and
by force of arms the necessary implcnlents for their
farms.
''This chaotic situation v;as further aggravated
by retaliatory measures by the constabulary in the
Lublin district to forestall additional attacks on
Ethnic German villages. These retaliatory measures
consisted, amor.g others, in mass-shootings of ^innocent
persons, especially of women and children, and also
of aged persons, betw-een the age of 2 and. over 80.
Experience t*^ught that these measures have only s
slight deterrent effect on these bandits who are
frequently under Bolshevist leadership. But they
increase the exasperation and the hatred of those
innocently affected, including those parts of the
population which are frightened that in future
they might be affected by similar measures, and
thus now, active followers for the resistance move
ment, led by the Polish intelligentsia, ^nd ample
propaganda material for the extremely active
Bolshevist agitation i.s played into their hands.
"The consequencea. of this semi-rebellious
state of affairs, caused by the expulsion measures
in the LU-blin district, especially in the Zamosc
area and vicinity, made themselves felt throughout
the whole of the territory entrusted to me. I am
proud of the fj^'ct that in three years of German
administration of this territory under my authoritative
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%influence, linrdly p.ny secrifices of C-ermpn
lives iipd to be xapde, in spite of the necessity
to carry out numerous measures necessitated by
circumstpnces. In the short period from the^
beginning of the expulsions, carried out pg^.inst
my 'Vvill, Gonsiderabie and deplorable casualities
have occurred among the G-erman people settled
here, among the police and the V/ehrmacht, as well
as among the civil administration personnel. • .
. 'rfl want to stress here only the single
fact that none of the foreign workers employed
for Germany's final victory have reached nearly
a.s low a nutritional level as the alien workers
used here. • 4
"In connection with the execution of the
resettlement plan described by me, the point of
view has often been maintained that all humani
tarian considerations must be completely neglected.
May I give the assurance that I, too, share this
view utterly and completely. .
After the close of the "Testern campaign there were
wholesale expulsions from Alsace and as found by the Inter
national Military Tribunal, "between July ^nd December
1940, 105,000 Alsatians were either deported from their
homes or prevented from returning to them."
The entire resettlement-repatriation program was
essentially- an SS enterprise. Hiamler was its chief snd
in carrying it out the various Reich ^^genoies were subor
dinated to him and he had the right to call upon them for
the necessary .assistance and cooperation. It involved many
phases:
(1) The oonfiacstion and evacurtlon of lands so
that they might be made availablefor resettle
ment;
(2) The selection of those Ethnic Germans who vjere
deemed fit for settlement in the East and
other occupied territories.(this fitness was
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determinea in pert by their poiitiCRl reliability);
(3) The selection of those who could not be trusted
in the border zones but were to be settled in *
the Reich where they could be re-educeted in
the German spirit;
(4) The rejection end assignment to labor or concen
tration camps of those politically unreliable
and those Yjho failed to show •willingness to
give up their citizenship and become citizens
of the Reich or otherwise displayed an anti-
German attitude;
(5) The registration ?='nd classification of the j^o-
callcd Ethnic Germans into various groups;
(6) Their transport either into the Reich or the-
nev-iy occupied territories, or to labor services
or to concentration camps, according to their
classification; '
f
(7) The custody, control and disposition of their
old homes, farms, businesses, property and
funds;
(8) The allocation and assignment of new homes,
f'^rms, and businesses in the area in which they
resettled; end,
(9) Financing f^nd supporting them until such time
r
as they became self-supporting, and making
'available to them the necessary furniture,
equipment, machinery and the like to enable them
to carry out their part of the program.
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Tiiese piipses of tiie progrpm were divided pmong a
number of agencies: Tbe Main Staff Office of the Reich
Commissar for the Strengthening of G-ermandom; The Volks-
deutsche Mittelstelle {VOh[I); The Main Race and Settlement
Office (RuSHA); the German Racial Registration Office (DVL);
and the German Settlement Trust Company (RUT).
It is of the latter that we are immediately con
cerned bec^^use of KEPRLER*S connection with it. It became
immediately apparent to Himmler that the financial problem
involved in this gigantic uprooting of peoples and shifting
them from old hones to new, financing them and settling them
in new homes, providing furniture, equipment, livestock,
and above all, taking custody and keeping an account of the
value of the old property and charging against the same the
funds advanced in order to put them into new surroundings and
to finance them until they were self-supporting, was of
prime importance to the program and complicated in nature.
The defendant SCIT'ffiRIF VOM EP.OSIGK, Reich Minister
of Finance, had suggested to Himmler that this be done
through an official office which could be set up, Himmler
approached KEPTLSR, who had acted as Hitler's economic
I
advisor, and asked his advice as to the advisability of
following TON FROSIGIC'S proposal.
The intricate problems involved not only skill in
handling but often immediate decisions. KEPTLER objected
to the bureaucratic idea, feeling that it would involve
too much red tape and proposed th^t a trust company be
set up to handle these problems. At Himmler's request
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4he consulted SCl^'.^SRIN YOF KRGSlGrK v.^ho recognized the
merits of KEPFLEH'S proposal '^nd agreed to it. It ^'e.s
under these circumstpnces th-st the German Settlement
Trust Coflipany (Deutsche Umsiedlungs-Treuhandgesellscheft)
>jas formed. FEPPIEH became Chairman of its Aufsichtsrat
and nominated the other members of the Bo^^rd as v-'ell as
the members of the Vorstand, — these Himmler confirmed.
KEPPLER rem^^ined in that position until some time
in 1943 TAihen, ,because of his membership in the Reichstag,
it became necessary for him to retire, hliile the DXJT was,
in form, a private, lifliited liability corporation, it was
in fact governmental agency. It vjas formed for ^^nd en
gaged solely in carrying out its prescribed part of the
program of resettlement. The Aufsichtsrat, or supervisory
board, included representatives from the ministry of
Finance, the Foreign Trade Office of the Foreign Organiza
tion of the party, a member of Himmler*s personal staff
(Greifelt), the Defendant KEHRL of the Ministry of Economics,
a member of the Foreign Office, p director of the Reichs-
bank, p director of the SB liaison Office for Ethnic Ger
mans, and a Vorstand member of the Official German Auditing
Com.a^ny, together'with two Ethnic German leaders. This was
done because, as KEPPLER himself says, he oesired the
various Reich offices affected by the problem to have
representatives on the boTd.
The conce'ot of forming corporations under general
corporate laws and utilizing them to carry out governmental
functions was not a new Oj..e; it had been used in other coun
tries as well as in Germany. This form of organization is
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adopted as a matter of convenienoe, as it is more elastic
and therefore more efficient than formal, governmental
agencies. Irrespective of form, such cor.orations are,
in fact, arms of the government carrying out governmental
functions. If these functions and the manner in which they
are administered constitute a violation of international
law, those resnonsihle for and connected with it are guilty•
The defendant KSPPLER ^nd the defendant KEHEL assert
that the actual executive and a.dministr^^tive duties of
the DUT were independently carried out by its Yorstand,
and if criminal responsibility e^'ists it is those men who
are responsible and not the members of the Aufsichtsrat«
The internal organization of German corporations is
somewhat different from that of incorporated con^anies in
the United States or Great Britain. The Yorstand is com
posed of those who have direct charge and control of execu
tive and administrative matters. It may be said that it is
comparable with those members of the Board of Directors of
a.n American or English company Vi?ho are the executive officials
of the company, while the Aufsichtsrat is composed of the
Directors who hold no such position. The DUT Aufsichtsrat
had a working committee composed, of KEPiDER, the defendant
KEHRL and Greifelt of Himjnler^s M^in Staff Office for the
Strengthening of Germandom. This working committee may
be likened to the executive committee of the Board of
Directors of an American corporation. That the Aufsichtsrat
of the DUT was not compo"ed of mere figure-heads vdthout
power or influence is evid.ent from the care which was
-422-
used by EEPPLER in selecting its members -'^ nd the interest
he took in himself selecting its executive sts.ff, Feither
ipny yjQ overlook the fact that tbis v;as, in f^^ct, e govern
mental corporation charged vith tbe performance of basic,
governmental tasks. It wa's ICSPPLERiS idea; its ^ufsichtsrat
and Vorstand as veil as the more important merabers of its
executive and administrative staff v.;ere chosen by him.
He knev its functions pnd he knev; vhat p^^rt it playeo in
the general scheme of resettlement. If the PUT had an
important part in a crime cognisable by this Tribunal, he
bears a pprt in the criminal responsibility thereto.
The resettlement of Ethnic aermans took place at least
in the following territories: In the -Jarthegau, a. part of
Pdland, in Besaaxabia, Bukovjine, "'.fhite Russia, the Dobrudje,
Southern Tyrol and Alsace, By the ena of 1942 it h^d opened
offices in Danzig, Innsbruck, XCattcwicz, M-'^ rburg, Posen,
Strassburg, Agrara, Bolzano, Bucharest, Paris, Belgrade,
Bl'^lstock, Lemhurg, Lublin, Reval, Rig^, Vienna, Fulnek,
Ke.uen, Rlagenfurt, Litzm^nnstadt, Luxembourg, Metz, Rann,
Zamosc, Zichenau, Cracow ^nd Prague. The tremendous scope
of its activities Is evidenced by the fact that it carried
250,000 f^ccounts on its books dealing with individu-^l property
tr'^nsaotions, that is, — those relating to the ?^mounts
re^^lized ,from the property taken from Ethnic Germans who
became settlers on farms an^, other property m^de available
to them in the ne'viy occupied territory; its dally mail
amounted to 6,000 pieces and its employees reached 1,800
in number.
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The defendant KBPPLER insists that the BUT had no
functions and took no part either in confisc^^tions and
evacuationa, or did it have anything to do vith the selec
tion of lands and properties in which the new settlers
were to be pieced. Nevertheless, we find in a report of
19 January 1944 addressed to RASCHE by the Allgemeine
Waren Einanz Gesellscha.ft a statement that the BUT had
already assigned 600 parcels of re^^l estate to Baltics
resettled in Posen.
That the BUT and its officials knew of the forced
nature of these resettlements, and contemporaneously v-?ork;ed
with it, is evident from the testimony of Ludwig Metzger,
head of its legal department Luzcembourg, who was present
at and had personal knowledge of the det-^ils of the forced
evacuation and resettlement of the people of Alsace to which
we have heretofore referred. These unfortunate people were
rounded up by other agencies, w:ho were part of this pro
gram, and the evening before they were deported, the BUT
obtained their names and interviewed them; on the next
morning they savj that the property was listed and that the
movable goods in their homes were registered. He states:
"There is no doubt that they did not go voluntarily."
Their homes and. businesses were t^ken over by Ethnic
Germans selected from other portions of areas occupied by
the German Government,
That lUSPPIER himself ke;^t in close touch and was
intimately acquainted with the major steps taken by the
BUT is shown by his testimony. He says;
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♦rFirst of all I had to reform the firm,
I had to select the Vorstand members and the
Main Staff for the most important positions.
Then I helped organize the firm and I vi/as in
formed of all major steps, but of course I
v;as not informed about details."
It may iA:ell be true that the DUT neither confiscated
the property of the victims in order to give living room to
"e thnic G-erm«^ns, nor took any physical part in the forced
emigration of those vho "were selected for resettlement, but
we deem this vjholly immaterial. Beyond question the DUT
was an essential part of the criminal scheme and without it
the crime could not be carried into successful eyecution.
The defendant TCEPPLSR asserts that so far as his
r'ctivities in the DUT ^re concerned, the Indictment is
insufficient and indefinite in its charges against him,
and that he offerer* testimony regarding the matter under
the impression that the evidence offered by the prosecu
tion under the same was addressed to Count Eight of the
Indictment — Membership in Criminal Organizatioxis. The
documents v>/ere offered and received under Count Five, and
the prosecution document books plainly so state,
Certj^in par^gra.'ohs of this Count state in general
terms the crimes with which the defendants are charged,
while subsequent paragraphs deal v;ith specific incidents
involved in the general charge.
The allegations of the Indictment follow the same
plan and pattern disclosed in the Indictment in the Inter
national Military Tribunal and in those of other Indictments
before these Tribunals, Many of the defendants, including
KSPPLBR and KSHRL, shortly after arraignment, filed motions
against the Indictment on the ground of insufficiency and
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indefiniteness. On 5 danaary 1948 vje overruled tiiis
motion and v-e refer to the memorandum filed -vuth our
order. The qusFtion of the insufficiency of Indictments
of this kind was considered by Tribunal III, Case 111,
(The Justices Case) and a like conclusion was reached,
(pages 10648-10649.)
In accordance with our order of 5 January, we there
fore received evidence of particular acts alleged to have
been committed by the several defendants which came within
the general allegations of the indictment, although not
among those specifically mentioned in the paragraphs which
followed•
The only purpose of specific allegp'tions is to enable
the defendant to prepare his defense, i\mole opportunity has
been afforded to the defendants so to do. The nrorecution
closed its case on S7 March 1948, ^nd at the time every
defendant had been advised, not only of the specific acts
upon which conviction was sought, but of the evidence
offered in support thereof. The court recessed until 4 May
1948, in order to permit the defendants to prepprc their
defense. The defendant irSTTLER did not present his defense
until 16 July 1946, and the defendant IvSERL not until 11
August, Each had msre than amole time "'within which to
prcaare his c^se, Eo defendant suffered, or couid have
suffered, any surprise or disadvantage. There is no merit
in the cl^^ims which they no*.." urge.
There is no doubt, *^nd v/e so find,that the defendant
KEPPLKR knew the plan, knew what it ent^^-iled, and was one
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of the prime fectors in its successful orgp.nization
' Rnd operation.
V7e find him C3UILTY under Count Five.
KEHEL:-
From 1933 to 1938 the defendant ICEHFL acted as
' economic advisor to the Gau Brandenburg; from November
1934 to October 1936 he was a consultant for textiles
and cellulose in the KSPFLSH office then dealing with
German raw materials; from October lO-SO until January
1938 he "Was head of Main Office IV-2 in the Haw And
Working Materials De"^artment of the Four Year Plan;
from 1 February 1938 until November 1942 he was head
of the textile division of the Reich Ministry for Econo
mics, and also acted as general referent for special
tasks in that Ministry and was then promoted as the head
of its Main Department II; from November 1943 to about
May 1945 he was Chief of the Raw and Basic Material Office
in the Reich Ministry for Armament and V/ar Production,
and was director of the Control Planning Office. He
was also officer in chief of the Textile Organizations
which exploited textile industries and resources in the
occupied territories, as well as those in France, and
became a member of the Aufsichtsrat and one of the three
members of the working committee of the DTJT.
It is alleged that early in 1942 iCSHRL became a
member of the Circle of Friends of Himmler end actively
participated thereafter in the meetings of that difole;
that the activities of the BS during this period included
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participation in schemes for Germanizetion of occupied
territories according to the racial principles of the
Nazi Pa.rty, the deportation of Jevjs and other foreign
nationals, and widespread murder and ill treatment of
the civilian populations of occupied territories.
It is not alleged that the Circle of Priends, as a
body or organization, participated in any such crimes.
KSHRL was a member of the Circle of Friends, but no evi
dence has been offered which tends to establish that the
Circle, as such, had anything to do with any crimes
charged . _in Count Five, and guilt cannot be predicated
because of his membership in or attendance at the meet
ings of the Circle of Friends.
KEHHL was, however, a member of the ^^ufsichtsrat
of the rUT, representing the Ministry of Economy and, with
EEPPLER and Greifelt, was a member of the working committee
of that body. It is unnecessary to here repeat what we
have heretofore said regarding the DUT, its functions, end
the part it played in the Germanization end Resettlement
program. KEHRL admits that he knew its basic purpose, but
denies that as a member of the i\ufsichtsrat or working
committee he was ^'completely informed" of the activities
of the BUT; that there may have been five or six meetings
of the Board which he attended and the activities were
rather large, but he was by no means informed about all
of them.
The defendant was both guarded and reticent in des
cribing what he knew and whet he did, which is itself of
some significance, KEHRL is possessed of an active and
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inquisitive mini s.nd " very high degree of exeoutlve
ability. It is apparent from his testimony regarding
other matters that he has a memory of extraordinary
capaoity. His mem^bership on the board was not an acci
dent but he was chosen by KSPPLER because of his capa
bilities and the fact that he would there represent
the i^inistry of Economy, which was itself intensely
interested not only in economic development of the
Reich but the occupied territories as well.
We are quite convinced that he was thoroughly aware
of what the DUT was expected to do, what its policies VJere,
p'nd what it in fact did, /jS one of the resr-onsible officers
of the company he was responsible for its action. It was
an important component in the scheme of German resettle
ment and in the crimes charged in Count Five relating to
it, "nd we have already found the defendant KEPFLER
guilty under Count Five with regard to the charges above
stated,
e'e find EEHRL GUIITY under Count Five in view of his
'activities in the CUT and the Resettlement Program,
On £4 January 1940, by order of Funk, Kinister of
Economy, a directive was issued regarding the sale of
clothing to Jews, and of the isauance of clothing rations
to them. This directive stated that the serious state
of suprly in the field of textiles and shoes — in connection
with the over-available supply in Jewish families — made
it necessary, as in the field of food, to issue the follow
ing regulations:
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(1) Jews shell not receive e clothing ration
card,
(2) Jews, on principleshall not receive any
permit for textiles, shoes, and sole
material,
(3) Jews are reduced to self help and must make
apT^lication to the Reich /association of Jews
in Germany for the purchase of second-hand
material which was open to them vjithout pur
chase permits,
(4) The issuing agencies are authorized to give
• Jews purchase permits if they perform manual
lahor^ and. the lack of work clothing and shoes
would, jeopardize their use for labor and they
cannot get them any other way, and in an
emerg<=ncy w;here help from the Reich Associa
tion for Jews is not possible in time.
In defense KEHRL states that he did not sign this
directive of his own initiative, but that the Minister of
Propaganda, together with Hitler^s Deputy, had decided, after
the beginning of the war, that the Jews were not to get any
clothing cards and this v?as passed on to the provincial
economic officials, by teletype, on 24 November 1959, and
that finally th^is directive averted' hardships in that by
agreement w?ith the Reich Association of Jews some clothing
could be acquired and that in cert'-^in instances ration
coupons were to be issued,
While we are not satisfied that this explanation is
accurate, and in fact, the regulation shows upon its face
th^t this was not its purpose, nevertheless we do not over
look the fact that in this instance lOEHRL w;as no more than
a conduit transmitting his superior's orders and had no
voice in the matter. The docum.ent shows on its face th'-^t
he signed it by order of his Minister,
Here guilt is not proved beyond a reasonable doubt and
TPSHRI, should be and is ACQHITTED in connection with this
transact ion.
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The seizure of pov^er foiyid the defend'-^nt LAM^SRS
employed es ?. leg.=^l eypert in the Finistry of the Interior,
He hpd joined the Nazi Party in February 193?. On 30
Tanu'^ry 1933 Hitler appointed him Secretary of State in
the Reich Chancellory and in August 1934 he was appointed
its Chief. On 26 November of the seme year he was made a
Reich Minister without portfolio with the title, ^'Reich
Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory." On 14
February 1936, he was appointed as Executive Member of the
Secret Reich Cabinet Council, but this Council never
functioned. On 30 November 1939,two months after the polish
invasion, the Finisteiial Council for Defense of the Reich
v'as created, with Goering as its Chairman, and LAJilMSRS
became one of its executive members,
Among his duties was to present matters to Hitler,
sometimes with and sometimes without his aA*n recommenda
tions; to transmit Hitler's decivaions on these and othar
matters to the appro'^riate Reich Ministries and agencies;
to cooperate with the members of the Reich Cabinet and
other agencies of the Government and the Party; to coordinate
and, if possible, reconcile the vlevjs and proposals of
other Ministries with respect to legislation, and to
ex'^mine, nnd at times to preoare laws, decrees, and regula
tions which were under con<^ ideratlon; to ascertain the
view.'s and cinions of other Ministers in such matters;
and to investig''=te and renort and recommend action
regarding disputes which might arise between Ministers,
agencies, and officials*
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LAlthough as Reich Minister he hal no particular
executive functions in the usual sense, both his responsi
bilities anl powers were substrxntial. Among the reasons
which impelled Hitler to raise him to cabinet rank was
that he might become one of the highest Reich authorities
possessing the prestige and authority incident thereto, "Uid
thereby relieve Hitler of many details and decisions. He
was and continued to be one of the most important figures
in the Reich G-overnmento
On 2 May 1939 STUCKART wrote LAMliERS reporting the
situation in the Protectorate .tmd included a copy of Fr.-ink's
report from which it was apparent that even more radical
measures of reprisals were to oe used fxnd elections post
poned due to the weakness of the racial German elements in
that territory.
On 15 September 1942 the Reich Protectorate of Bohemia
and Moravia reported to LAMi;iERS that between 1 May and 1
September, 3,188 Czechs had been arrested, 1,357 shot under
court martial proceedings, and informed him of the infamous
massacres at, and the razing of the villages of Lidice .ind
Lazeky, and of the fear of the populace that they were to
be decimated by police measures and the propos/xl that Czechs
be put into the Reich Labor Service; that Czech police
battalions under German command be org.'inized, and that the
personnel at the Skoda and Bruenner Munitions Works be
assigned to man their aircraft defense,
LAIvU'ERS co-signed the Decree of 1 September 1939, which
established in Bohemia and Moravia an administration under a
' Reich Protector, and introduced the German Security Police
into that territory, giving them authority to investigate
?ind combat all action inimical or drmgerous to the state and
public, thus subjecting the people to the mercies of the
Security Police.
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The invasion of Bohemia and Moravia and their in
corporation into a Protectorate, and the attempt to make
them a part of the Greater German Reich were acts of aggression
and were crimes against peace, and the acts of terrorism and
the imposition and su'ojection of the. inhaoitants to the
Jurisdiction of the Security Police were wholly unlawful.
Poland. On 12 Octo'oer 1939, Hitler issued a decree co-signed
by LAiii.iERS, the defendant. VON KROSIGK, and six others,
declaring that that unincorporated portion of Poland occupied
by German troops should be formed into the Government General,
and appointing Frank as head of the Government. The decree
gave the Council for Reich Defense, the Commissioner of the
Four Year Pl;xn, and the Governor General the right to legis
late by decree, and gave to various suoreme Reich agencies
power to make arrangements necessary "for the planning of
Germ/jn life and the German economic sphere" in these
territories, and that all administrative decrees required
for implementing and supplementing the Fuehrer Decree would
be issued by the Minister of the Interior.
Frank issued a number of decrees, based on the
authority thus given him, which established the Secret
Police in those territories, extended forced labor to Polish
youth between 14 and 18 years of age, and ordered all Jews to
be concentrated into forced labor troops, required Jews of
both sexes to vre.ar the yellow star of Zion on their clothing;
required all Jewish businesses to be plainly marked as such,
and forbade Jews to use German names, and authorized the
Higher SS rind Police Leaders to supervise and enforce these
measures.
On 7 May 1942, LAl^.-iERS co-signed, with Hitler, a
decree giving Hlmmler Jurisdiction in Poland, not only as
-435-
Reichsfuehrer 3S but as Reich Oommissioner for the Strength
ening of Germnndom, an*! nrovlding that where a disagreement
arose between the Governor General and Himmler, Hitler's
decision should be obtained through LAMI-iERS.
In Frank's diary for 19 July 1941, he states that,
during a discussion with SS Obergruppenfuehrer Krueger and
others, he wired LAIi/liiiERS stating that in accordance with
LMLllRS'^: communication of the previous day he had started
preparations to take over the whole civil administration in
the occupied Polish territories designated by LAli/IIvIERG <-tnd
proposed to start a gig.*intlo rehaDilltatlon orogr'tjn with
Polish and other labor forces at his disposal. It has oeen
established by the evidence in this case, ;tnd oy the judgment
of others of these Tribunals, that the population of Poland
was regarded and treated as slaves and compelled to work .
as and where the government of that territory determined.
During the year 1942 a bitter quarrel broke out
between Fr;tnk, on the one hand, and Himmler and Higher SS
and Police Leader Krueger, who had been assigned to the
Government Generra, on the other. Each preferred charges
ag/dnst the other. That both the Governor General nnd
Himmler's SS and Police Leaders had committed gross and
continued outrages upon the population is oeyond question,
as has been adjudicated, not only by the IMT, but by various
othersof these Tribunals. LAU1.£RS was instructed to
investigate and report to Hitler,
He evidently o.-Lme to the conclusion that it was oest
to cooperate with Himmler and opposed Frank for reasons which
think had little or nothing to do with the merits of thewe
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controversy duIa which may he accounted for inasmuch as at
that time Himmler's star was in the ascendant .-md Frank's
position had deteriorated. 0n 17 April 1943, he forwarded
to Himmler a proposed mutual report to be submitted to
Hitler. Based on material submitted by Krueger, LARHjIERS
prepared his report, and it was submitted to Krueger and
his approv.'il obtained before sending it to Himmler. In
view of the defend.-nt's protest that he was uninformed of
mistreatment, brutality, slave labor and spoliation of
the occupied territory, and of the mistreatment of the
Jews therein, this report is illuminating. It states that
the tasks of the Government General were as follows:
''I. For the purpose of securing food for the
German people, to increase agricultural
production and utilize it to the greatest
extent; to .'illot sufficient rations to
the native population engaged in war work
and to deliver the ^rest to the armed forces
and the Homeland,
"2o To employ the manpower of the native popula
tion only for immediate war purposes ,'ind to
put at the Homeland's disposal such manpower
which is not needed for the last-named '
purpose.
"3. To consolidate Germ;m folkdom in the Govern
ment General and by me.-ms of resettlement to
create German strongholds in the Eastern
border districts by means of colonization by
racial Germans tr.-msferred from other places.
''Srt To obtain troops as far as possible out of
the native population for the fight against
Bolshevism.
The report then criticized the Frank administration
for its failure to perform these tasks in that it had failed
to deliver the prescribed quota of agricultural products, had
failed to stop all trade enterprises not essential to the war,
that although 750,000 metric tons of grain were to be delivered
to the Wehrmaoht, only 690,000 tons were actu.-tlly delivered,
-435-
.'ind th\t only 510,000 tons -remained out of the hirvest to
feed the popul-ition of 16,000,000; -^i.-Lt the bre-td r-ttion
was cut to 1050 grams per week compared to 1675 gr ans in
the Protectorate, .-ind 2600 gr.-ons in the annexed Eastern
territories; that as a result black marketing had become
prevalent ••jid the prices had risen three to four hundred
percent; that if proper coordination had been accomplished,
it would have been oossible to provide the population, work-
ing in che interests of G-ormany, with a minimum of food
and other needed commodities, which would thus prevent the
creation of a black market and would jps^ult^'in-.'tih.e-vo^luntp>ry
return of reserves of manpower to employment; beoav-ise- of
these failures the utiliz-ation of manpower met with ^greatest
difficulties; these difficulties were increased by the
elimination of Jewish manpower, but that such eliminaticrn
Was not the cause of the difficulties and had proper
management of manpower been afforded, the elimination of
Jewish manpo-i-ver would not have caused difficulties worth
mentioning, but as things were, manpower could only be
obtained by more or less forceful methods, such as catching
church and movie goers --ind transporting them into the Reich;
that instead of being strict and severe where necessary, but
otherwise acting in a big-hearted manner, granting certain
liberties, the G-overnor Genor-J inaugurz-.ted a promotion of
cultural life on the Part of the Polish populrxtlon which
knew no bounds in itself; that under the prevailing
circumstances, and particularly in view of Germany^s military
situ.ation, such measures could only be explained as a we.-ikness
and thus brought results directly opposite to those sought.
From this report several things become clear. First,
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that the sole Interest of LAMMERS and Himmler was, first,
\
that only those inhabitants who were working in the inter
est of the German war effort should receive food; second,
that the Governor General had stripped Poland of its food
supplies leaving a great mass of the population to starve;
and, thirc, that then knew that Jews were being
eliminated. His statement that this term only referred to
them being eliminated from labor shipments to the Reich is
not borne out by the document and, we believe, is wholly with
out foundation.
The report speaks for itself and contains no reference
to Jews in connection with the labor which was to be sent to
work in the Reich, LAIC'^ ERS asserts that he war in no posi
tion to ascertain the facts regi^rdinsr the charges made by
Rosenborg against Kpueger and the S3, or the ch^fp-es made by
Himmler and the S3 against Frank, although he was satisfied
that serious abuses existed in Frank's administration, particu
larly on the part of members of his famll.y — the relatives
whom he had appointed to office.
In view of his position and the fact that he had been
directed to Investigate and report to Hitler, we deem his
explanation without factual mtrit.
Frank's dia.ry entry of 5 August 1944 states that he
sent a t>.legram to LAMr^ERS that the city of Warsaw was lA
flames; that the burning down of the buildings was the best
means to prevent the insurgents from using them as shelters,
and that after the suppression of the revolt the city would
meet its deserving fate and be completely destroyed or after
wards flattened out.
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In the IMT trl-il the defend oit testified th-tt he knew
this report came to him -uid was immedi-',"cely tr-aismitted to
Hitler and in all prooaDility he oassed it on to the Chief of
the OKW as well. On further questioning he again reiterated
that the report vras received. In this case he flatly denies
thatthe telegr-am ever re.ached the Reich Ch'oicellory, and
based his deni'J. on an -illeged conversation vrith one of
Fr-tnh's subordinates .-ind on inquiries which he had made of
officials of his own Chancellory,
Frank's diary was a contempor-oieous record of events
and there he had no reason to m^ihe a f ilse or erroneous
statement about the telegr-jn. Evidently it was -n event
which at the time he thought important, and, therefore,
included it in his diary. If there had been any douot in
LAIlI^RS'o mind, or he had any difficulty in recollecting
whether he received and transmitted it, we have no douot
he would have so stated when testifying before the IliT • He
not only rememoered it, out also the disposition which he
made of it, •nd when pressed for an ansiver aS to how in fact
he could Say that he had no knowledge of the atrocities
comnitted in Poland he .•tgain testified that ho rememoered
the telegram, do not credit his oresent deni-d that he
ever saw it.
On 9 kay 1944, Liebel of the Central Office Ministry
for Armaments and War Production wrote LAIdPJRS regarding
wood suiyolies from Norway, wherein he states.
''I regret, dear Reich Minister LAld.:ERS, that you,
the highest authority on matters pert'dning to
Norw-iy, as Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich
Chancellory, had not been consulted aoout this
m-i.tter at the very beginning.'"
While this statement m-iy have be.m an exaggeration, it is
clear th it a leading responsible official in one of the
most important ministries of the Reich deemed that the
defendant's position waS one of high importance and authority
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rind it is ?ipp;irent from the evidence in this case th.*!.t such
Wls the f-ict. In the matter in question, Terooven, having
asserted that he did not have the necessary manpower in
Norway to procure this wood, arrangements were made through
LAICIERS to ship some 15,00C Russi-n prisoners of war to
Norway for that purpose. It is interesting to note tl".at
Sauckel, in his report on the matter, states that 4,050
Russi.-n prisoners were already on their w.-ty,,but that the
additional 11,000 made available- were in such a state of
health that they could not be employed for another three
or four weeks, -nd he v^ould, therefore, advance 5,000
men from the civilian sector -ind was negotiating with Sneer
regarding the matter.
Russia. On 16 July 1941 a conference ^-ts held at Hitler's
headquarters attended by Rosenberg, Keitel, LAIiCviERS, Goering,
and .'in am-oiuensis. Hitler said there that it was super
fluous for Germany to announce its aims; that where it had
the power it could do everything, and where it was lacking
power, it could do nothing; that it should emphasize that
it was forced to occupy, administer -md seize certain areas
in the'interest of the inhabit-ints to provide order, food,
t ran sportat ion, etc. Thus no one would recognize that it
initiates a final settlement, but that this need not
prevent Germ.-tny from taking all necessary measures, -
shooting, descttling, etc,, - and it would t.-ike them; that
Garm-'tny did hot want to make any people enemies prematurely
/ind unnecessarily, but, "We must know clearly that we shall
never leave those couhtrleso" Therefore, the plan must be:
(l) To do nothing which must obstruct the final settlement,
but prepare for it in secret; (2) to emphasize that Germans
are liber-.tors. In particular the Crimea must be evacuated
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%by all foreigners onl be settled by Germans only, and in
the srjjne way part of Gfilicia would become Reich territory;
that while present relations with Rumania were good,
nobody knew v/hat they would be in the future, and that this
must bo considered, and German frontiers drawn accordingly;
that the task was to cut the gi?int c-ike in order, first, to
dominate it, second, to administer jt, and third, to exploit
it,; "that the fact that Russia had ordered partisan warfare
behind the German lines hrtd the advantage tha.t it would
enable Germany to eradicate everyone who opposed it; that
there never again must be the possibility to create a ^
\
military power west of the Urals; that the entire Baltic
countries,as well as the Crimea, must be incorporated into
Germany, with a large hinterland, together with the Volga
Colony, v/hile the B-'iku must become a German military colony,
that the Kola Peninsula in Finland must be t-iken because of
the large nickel mines there.
At this conference the matter of the appointment of
governors for the E-iltic countries was discussed, -tnd Goering
emphasized that these appointments must bo based on securing
food supplies, and, so far as necessary, trade and communici-^
tions, Rosenberg emphasized his opinion that a different
treatment of the population was desirable in every district
<*md that in the Ukraine, Germany should start with a cultural
administration, awake the historical consciences of the
I
Ukraini-ins, .'ind establish a university at Kiev, but Goering
.countered by stating that the first requisite was to secure
the Germ.'in food situation 'ind everything else could come later,
Goering insisted that this gigantic area be pacified
as quickly as possible and stated that the best solution was
to shoot .-inybody who looked sideways, while Keitel insisted
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th:it the inha'Dlt.'tnts themselves ought to he male responsible
ceo.-LUse it v^as impossible to put a sentry at every shed and
railway station, and if anyone.did not perform his duties'
properly, he should be shot.
This conference clearly disclosed what German plans
were, LAMLiERS admits having been present but states that
he was absent during portions of the conference preparing
drafts of decrees which were to .be signed, this, notwith
standing the fact that when testifying before the International
Military Tribunal he stated that he assumed that he stayed
there until the end, Eut whether he absented himself during
part of the time is quite immaterial, as \ve are convinced
that he was cither there personally, or was fully informed
of what took place.
LAMIERS prepared -ind co-signed with Keitel a Fuehrer
Decree of 17 July 1941, establishing the government for the
newly Occupied Eastern Territories, appointing Rosenberg
as minister for this area, which included the Baltic States,
He Was given broad legislative poivers, subject cnly to the
competoncy of the Wehrmacht and the Reich authorities
responsible for military ooerations for the functioning
of railroads -md the postal service. The necessary
implementing ordinances were to bo Issued by Rosenberg
in agreement with LAMMERS and the Chief of the OCT.
LAllERS testifies that these latter provisions were
put in the decree so that the other ministries could
participate, and that it would be possible to ask Hitler
to intervene. In view of the fact, however, that Rosenberg
W'LS the only one at the conference who had evidenced
the slightest degree of interest in the native population in
the proposed East Ministry, and that he had further indicated
that the notorious Koch was inclined to go his own way
without regard to Rosenberg's orders, the explanation
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given by the defeni-nnt does not ring true. As cynical and
callous :is Rosenberg proved himself to be, there c.-m be no
doubt th.'it the fate of 'the indigenous population would have
been happier under him If he had full -md complete power,
th-m it Was with a division of powers between himself -ind
other agencies.
On 17 July 1941, LAMI-iER3 co-signed with Keitel the
Hitler Decree conferring on Himmler authority to give
directions concerning police security matters to the Reich
Commissioners in Eastern Territories, :ind to assign SS
police leaders to them for the purpose of guaranteeing
police security.
On 20 August 1941, LAI^IKERS co-signed the Hitler
Decree appointing Gauleiter Koch Reich Commissioner for
the Ukraine. It is universally conceded by all parties
to this Case that his regime resulted in an unparalleled
orgy of brutality, oppressions, spoliation and murder.
LAM1:iERS was not only informed of Koch's publicly
expressed sentiment that, ^'Whoever believes to find
gratitude with the Slavs for kind treatment has not made
his political experiences in the NSDAP v/hile in the East
but in some clubs of the intelligentsia; the 31'r.vs ivill
always interpret kindness for we-ikness," but he was also
informed of Koch's crimes.
LAMI.kRS states that he reported this to Hitler "ind
first asserts that he supported Rosenberg against Koch, out
later testifies that it was his offici-al duty to act as an
intermediary between the two officers .-tnd Hitler and gave
such supoort to one or the other as he could, .and he alw-iys
attempted to rem.ain neutr CL in the whole affair, -ind was
neutrd. We .agree with his st-'.tement that he had no oower
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to dislodge either Rosenberg or Koch, and that when he
reported the mutual incriminations which each made regard
ing the other, the matter was thereafter wholly in the
hands of Hitler,
Night and Fog (Nacht und Nebel) Decree, It is alleged
that LAMIvERS supervised, prepared, or co-signed the
notorious Nacht und Nebel Decree, but the record does not
substantiate this. Without question he knew of it and of
its ultimate implications, cut knowledge is not enough.
{ G-ermanization. The G-ermanization and resettlement program,
at least insofar as it involved any crimes cognizable by
this Tribunal, was initiated by the Decree of 7 October
1939, which LAIvSrERS co-signed. He admits that it was re
drafted under his directions, rardcing various modifications
in a proposed form of decree submitted by Himmler. The
defend;int asserts that at the time he had no intent to
¥
authorize the commission of any crime or that he knew
that any crimes were committed under it. He stated when
* the proposal first came up he concurred in its advisability,
but suggested to Hitler th-at the prospect be postponed until
after the war, but Hitler refused to take his advice. One
of the earlier drafts contains the recital that:
"The Pol.'tnd established at Versailles has,
ceased to exist. The opportunity, therefore,
arises for the G-reater G-erra.-m Keioh to receive
and settle In its area G-crman men and women
who had to live abroad up to now, and to
eliminate those of foreign nationality or
race,"
The pertinent recital in the decree as issued st.ates:
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"The oonseauences which Versailles huh on Europehave been removed. As a result the Greater^rman
Reloh Is able to accept and settle within Its
s-oace, German people, who, up to the present,
had to live In foreign lands, .and to arrange
the settlement of national groups within Its
spheres of Interest In such a ^.ay that oetter
dividing lines between them are attained.
LAMi-SRS insisted that he was responsible for this change
and we do not doubt It. It Is merely using less blunt
l:uiguage than did the first draft. The defendant does not
suggest that the progr-on expressed In the first draft was
ch.-mged or modified by the final draft, :ind, of course.
It was not. VTe place no credence on his statement that he
did not know that the crime of driving the Poles from their
homos .-aid confiscating their property was Intended. We are
convln0«»^ that ho was fully advised as to the precise
nature of the progr.am ;ind consciously and willingly
par'ticipu'ted in i*t«
LAMI.iERS received a copy of''^ 'Irnml'eT''s notorious
meimftrandum "On the Treatment of Peoples of Allen R,aces
In the East," which w.as submitted to Hitler In May, 1940,
wherein he proposed that no education higher than the
fourth elementary school gr.ade should be given 1he
indigenous popul.atlon. The children of v-duable blood
should be t..0.en away from their parents and sent to the
Reich, never to return, .and that the peoples of the East
should be reduced to a position of meducated, Ignor.ant serfs
of the Germ-ins, without culture or leadership.
In October 1943, LAiliERS distributed to the
Ministry for the Eastern Territories, the OKW, the Party
Ch-oiellor, .-ind to Hlmmler, the Hitler Decree of 11 October
whleh provided that the racially v.-aluable children born
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out of wellock In the occupid territories, whoso f.-tthoro
were G-ermnns an-i raothera of the loc^il population-, should
be t.'iken from their mothers and put into the custody of
the Reioh, He directed the agencies mentioned to acknowledge
the decree and t.-ike the tieCQSsary steps.
On 19 May 1943, the defend;^nt co-signed with Keitel
a Fuehrer Decree automatic^tlly cctRferring G-erman citizenship
on foreigners of G-erman origin who were then members of the
Wehrmacht, the Waffen-SS, the G-erm.-m police, or the Todt
Org.anizatlon, and providing that like foreigners thereafter
joining any of these organiirtfetions should automatio.-aiy
become German citizens cn the date of their -tdmission. In
view of the forced recruitment of ethnic Germans who were
^ nationals of other ♦ountries, it is apparent that this v/as
a part of a general pl.-in to gain absolute control .-uid
jurisdiction of such persons. It was without legal
justification or right. One v/ho is unlawfully conscripted
into the ,'trmed forces of a nation,other than his own,
o;innot be compelled to accept citizenship and oe suojected
to laws of a country other than that of his choice,
" On 28 M.arch 1940, the defendant LAJiD?ERS wrote Himmler,
tr-insmittlng a ohotostatio copy of an article entitled,
"Deportation is being Continued - Death March from Luclln
Deaths from Freezing," This article was allegedly oased on
findings of the Polish-Jewish Service Committee, which.v/as
# cooperatiftg with the American Friends Organization, as well
as with deleg.ates of the Rod Gross, It stated that in, spite
^ of the objections of the Government General, deportation of
German Jews to Eastern Pol;ind was being continued at the
order of Himmler,. It recites how the deported persons h.-id
/
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to Rbandon all their property and "vvere not even allowed to
take a euitcase and the women compelled to give up their
handbags; th«t those who had overcoats were deprived of. them;
that they were not allowed to take any cash or food, beds,
household articles, and all arrived at Lublin with only
the clothing they wore; that men, women and children were
compelled to march from Lublin to the villages where they
were to be quartered, over roads deep with snow and at
temperatures of-22 degrees Centigrade; that many froze.to
death and others, including children, were so badly frozen
that it was necessary to amputate their limbs; that on
arrival at their destination the survivors were lodged in
stables and sheds, with no food other than black bread, and
that up to 12 March, 230 Jews from J^tettin had perished.
On 3 December 1940, wrote von Bchirach, Reich
Governor for Austria, that Hitler had decided, in view of
voh Sbhiraoh»s reports, that the 60,000 Jews residing in
Vienna.should be deported ranidly to the Government General
because of the housing shortage in that city, and that he
r
and LAl '^TynCRS had informed the Government General in Cracow,
as well as Himmler, about this decision.
On 13 Decem^ber RTTJCHART forwarded to LAMMSR'^ i and to
the highest Reich agencies, a memorandum regarding the
Ibth Ordinance implementing the Reich Citizenship Law,
stating that it was drawn v/ith the following in mind:
that, in connection with the population of the incorporated
Eastern Territories, it was necessary, on principle, to
exclude part-Jews of alien stock,, and that only the portion
found capable of Gerrranization,. after careful selection,
would be permitted German citizenship; that the remainder
would be Placed in the position of proteotees which would
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be lepeni.ent upon their residence in the Reich, which would
be lost when that residence was .-ib.-mdoned; th-it the oro-
tectees, under the regulttions to be .-idooted, would receive
only :i minimum of rights; that the Jews would be included
in this new regulation; that those Jews who were stateless
would remain so, even if living in the Reich; th.-it Reich
Jews living abroad would lose citizenship and become
stateless, - that the confiscation of property might .
restrict Jewish emigration, but after the war a solution
of the Jewish oroblem could be found which would not depend
on the voluntary action of other countries.
To this memorandum LAMI.IERS interposed several oojec-
tions, first, that it made Jews in the Reich protectees;
secondly, he inquired, in view of the fact that Jews in
the near future would be deported from Germany, whether it
was worth while to create a special status for them; that
in any event they were not Reich citizens; that as to Jews
who lost their Reich domicile by emigration or expulsion,
only .rn amendment to the citizenship law was needed.
LAIwi.iERS discussed the matter with Hitler, who refused to
permit Jews to be called '^protectees."
The defendant denies any knowledge prior to 1945 of
the "mass extermination" of Jews, but admits that he heard
reports and received intimations, anonymous communications,
regarding the same, and admits that he wris aware that many
Jews were being murdered. He denies that he was a violent
or radical anti-Semite,
We are unable to give his statement any credence. He
had intimate knowledge of .-tnd participated in drafting and
co-signing m-tny, if not most, of the ant1-Jewish laws,
ordin.'.nces and regulations. According to his o^m state
ment he was the official chruinel through which information
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crjjne to an-il decisions issued from Hitler, .-aid he whs the
Reich Minister charged with coordinating the views of the
Various ministries upon this and other matters of legisla
tion, ordin.-inces and decrees, and consulted with them and
their agencies regarding them.
His own views on the subject were expressed in :tn
article which w?ts published in 1944 in which he said;
"The first oroduct of m. constructive and
organic structure on the Europe.an Continent had
hardly begun when it already faced its most
severe and most decisive test. In the life and
death struggle against the plutocratic and
Bolshevistic views led by world Jewry this test
has lasted almost five years."
While on the stand, but before he was faced with this
article, he testified:
"This question is one with which I dealt
frenuently in my reading at the time, but I
Was never able to come to any final conclusion,
I had, however, realized that the Jews oore a
considerable part in the guilt in all the wars
of the world."
LAIkC-ERS heard Hitler^ s speeches in which he spoke of
the extermination .-ind annihilation of the Jews ;tnd admits
that he heard the word "extermination" which was one which
Hitler often used in various speeches but said, "the
question w.as what he meant by it." We are convinced that
LAM;..iERS was under no illusions -as to Hitler*s meaning.
He Was advised of the .application of the G-erman
anti—Jewish laws to LuxemoourgJ en.actments which were,
/
without question, in violation of Intern ition.al Law and
the Hague Convention.
On 30 January 1941, there was submitted to his
Chancellory the propos'O. th.at all Jews of Cerm-tji citizen
ship, irrespective of their emigration, oe declared
stateless, and their property confisc.ated to the Reich,
and he thereupon stated there could oe no scruples against
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the suggestion thus mnhe oy the Minister of the Interior,
.Various proposals were offerel which finally resulted
in the Decree of 4 Decemoer 1941, which LM11.XRS co-signed,
whereoy the Poles and Jews in the Incorporated Eastern
Territory "Deoiime "oound to conduct themselves according to
German law ?;nd the regulations introduced for them oy the
German authorities; to abstain from conduct liaole to
prejudice the German sovereignty or the presige of the
Germ;tn people; made them suoject to the death penalty for
manifesting anti-German sentiments, or for -oossiole conduct'
which lowered or prejudiced the "orestige or well—oeing of
the Reich, or the German people, which suojected them to
tri'.! by special court, by the district judge or the
police courts, deprived them of 'iny right of apoeal and
"the right to challenge a Judge on account of partiality";
permitted arrests or detention on suspicion, and suojected
them to other coercive measures, foroade them to oe sworn
as witnesses; deprived them of the right to act either as
prosecutors or in a subsidiary capacity; suojected them to
courts martial at the whim of the Ministry of the Interior,
* the Ministry of Justice, or the Reich Governor; conferred
on courts marti-il the right to Impose the death sentenoe,
or to turn the victim over to the Gestapo.#
This Decree was also made applicable to Poles, .and
Jews within the Reich if, orlor to 1 Seotemoer 1939, they
were domiciled in Pol/ind, That there was no legal authority
to subject the Inhabitants of Poland, whether Poles or
Polish Jews, to German law, cannot oe questioned, and
V
these measures were adopted solely to repress and
p^jTsecute Poles and Polish Jews»
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Final Solution, We have heretofore discussel thb notorious
Wannsee Conference of 20 J.-tnu.-iry 1942, in which the "Final
Solution" of the Jewish question was discussed in the
presence of representatives of practically all of the
highest Reich agencies. Kritzirtger of the defendant's
Reich Chancellory was present, LAE/il-ERS insists he did not
know that Kritzinger was to be there, rind that he did not
instruct him to be present and that Kritzinger did not
there represent him. This we do not believe.
Shortly after the conference, Schlegelberger,
Acting Minister of Justice, wrote to LAIJIERS of certain
objections, none of which, however, related to the final
Solution, but rather to the technical details of compulsory
or simplified divorce of G-ermans from Jewish spouses. At
the conference of 6 March, Boley, one of LABM.SRS'S
ministerial counsellors, appeared representing the Reich
Chiincellory. It appears in the minutes of the meeting:
"According to information given by the
representative .of the Party Chancellory, one
of the very highest authorities expresses the
opinion, in connection with the discussion on
the question of persons of mixed blood in the
Wehrmacht, that it would be necessary to divide
up the persons of mixed blood into Jews .and
Germans .-ind that it was unwarrantable under all
ciroumst.'inces to have the oersons of mixed blood
' perm.-tnently existing .as a third small race. This
requirement would not be.met by me.-ins of steriliz-'
ing all :)ersons of mixed blood and permitting
them to rem.ain in the Reich territory."'
In July 1942, LAMIviSRS wrote to all the highest
Reich agencies informing them of Rosenberg's .apoointment
as commissioner to conduct the spiritu.al battlec against
Jews and Free Masons .'ind requested these agencies to
support Rosenberg in the fulfillment of his task.
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The record contains a number of documentary exhioits
which show that LAmiERS was fr-cnillar with and took part in
discussions relating to measures against Jews. On 20 Ju].y
1942, he stated that Hitler had repeatedly expressed the
opinion that applications by part-Jews for status equal to
that of Germans had been treated too generously and in the
future they should be allowed only if there were specirJL
reasons for exceptional treatment, that is —positive
achievements- - such as work for the Party in the early
days. LMIi.JlRS requested that future actlons^fe")Uld.be based
on Hitler^s attitude.
Notwithstanding LAMI'^ RS' deni.-as, we believe and
find that he was Informed and knew that the extermination
of the Jews v-ras proposed and that ho consciously --uid
v;illlngly participated in measures which wore intended
for and adapted to that purpose.
Judicial persecution ;ind Murder, . The orderly process of the,
courts and the comparative leniency of the sentences
imoosed by them irked Hitler and this fact w.as conveyed
to the Ministry of Justice, LAM.^ERS and Schlegelberger
conferred, and on 10 March 1941, the latter wrote LAMiERS
enclosing his letter to Hitler. Schlegelberger asked that
it be transmitted to Hitler immedi ately and enclosed a
draft of a proposed decree which would enable the ouDlic
prosecutor to intervene in civil cases, and cnaole hlra
to file application for the reopening of proceedings if
he wore of the opinion that new proceedings and a new
Judgment were necessary, in cases deemed of special
importance to the national community.
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The letter to Hitler is one of cringing servility,
in which the writer expressed his eirnest intention to
instrtll justice with ull its or-mches more .-md more firmly
within the National Socialist state; that there are still
Judgments which aid not entirely comply with the necessary
requirements, ;tnd in such cases he proposed to t-Jte the
necessary steps. He. ealls attention to the fact that
Hitler had created the extraordinary plea for nullification
of- criminal oases, and states that it is desiraole to
educate the judges more .-md more to a correct way of thinking,
conscious of national destiny, and for this purpose it would
be invaluable if Hitler could let Schlogelberger know if a
verdict did not meet his approval, inasmuch as the judges
were directly,responsible to the Fuehrer and were conscious
of their duties ^md firmly resolved to discharge thorn
accordingly, LMlLiERS was consulted by Schlegelbergcr
regarding this decree.
On 21 March 1942, after LMUIERS had consulted
with Schlegelberger -aid Borm-mn, he suggested to Hitler
the issu'ince of a decree for the alleged simplification
of the administration of the law, and with Hitler, co-
signed it. Some of the changes made in the original
draft which appear in the final decree were made by
LAIjIl'iERS himself. Under it the Minister of Justice, in
agreement with LMu.ERS jjnd the Chief of the Party
Chancellory, was authorized to implement the decree to
t;ike the necessary administrative measures, and in cases
of doubt, to decide matters administratively.
Schlegelberger made a suggestion for a decree
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giving the Ministry of Justice confirmatory rights over every
judgment passed, stating that this was a sure way to become
master of the insufficient penal measures and legal Judg
ments. LAMl^iliRS and Bormann consulted and, feeling that
Schlegelbcrger's proposal was insufficient, they determined
to hold the matter over until a new Minister of Justice was
appointed.
It is perfectly clear that both Eormann and
favored the destruction of the independence of courts, par
ticularly in criminal cases, and that the sentet|«es to be
imposed, should rest on the uncritical and arbitrary w^^im of
Hitler. The sorry history of this corruption of tVie Judicial
process has been set forth in detail in the opinion in the
Justice Case, and it is unnecessary to repeat it here. It is
sufficient to say that,after examination of the documents and
the testimony offered before this Tribunal, wc find that those
conclusions are fully substantiated, and we agree with the
findings therein made.
On 20 August 1942 the defendant co-signed with Hitler
a decree reading as follows:
"A strong administration of Justice is neces
sary for the fulfillment of tasks of the great
German Reich. Therefore, I comraision and empower
the Reich Minister of Justice to establish a
Nationa.l Socialist administration of Justicp and
to take all necessary measures in accordance with
my directives and instructions made in agreement
with theReich Minister and Chief of the Reich
Chancellory, and the Leader of t^-^e Party Chancel
lory. He can hereby deviate from any existing
law."
Thieraok became the new Minister of Justice and,on 27
August 1942, Hermann issued a circular announcing
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Thiernck^s appointment, an'l also that the latter hai. oeen
appointed Chief of the National Socialist Jurisprudence
League and President of the Academy for German Lau; and
that, by these appointments, Hitler had united the highest
offices in the field of judicial administr.ation of Party
and State, in the hajids of Thierack, and by speci.-a
decree had empowered the new Minister, in agreement \/ith
LAIJIURS and himself, to build up a new Soci.-aist almxnis-
tration of justice in accordance with the guilding rules
and directions of the Fuehrer; that the task assigned to
Party Member Dr. Thierack was, first of -tll^ politic.-a
one, and consisted in bringing justice and the judiciary
to the National Socialist idea, which could only oe
attained by closest cooperation with the Party; that
should there be complaints by the Party members -lS to
the way justice was administered, they should oe presented
to Bormann so that he could clear up the situation oy
confidential negotiations with the Ministry of Justice,
;^nd if, on discussion, it would seem absolutely necessary
that the problem be brought to the Fuehrer, this would
be done by LAB'MIjN-S 'Uid himself.
Late in 1942 Thierack was given power to remove
rec.-Llcitr;cnt ju'iges, :ml this reoeivei LAMHERS'•rpproval,
;tlthough It •tD-pe-trs th-it he did so with some misgivings
••Old •ittempted to impose oert-iin limit,'itions on Thlerrick's
authority.
It was by means of this corruption of the courts of
justice th.'tt Jews .-ind other enemies .-md opponents of
N.'ition-il Sooiraism were deprived of the ordin-iry and
commonly recognized rights to f;ilr tria al^d received sen
tences, including that of death, shockingly disproportionate
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to the offenses committed.
LAMHERS was a rGsponslole Reich Minister.
neither a glorified messenger boy nor a Notary Puolio
TTA -t-n or»' s reason
certifying the acts of others. We oelieve Hitxei
in raising the head of the Reich Chancellory froni the
position of State Secretary to that of Reich Minister
a M v^1r »^Goisions»
to relieve himself of much detail work and many
• ^ -fViG defendant,
and to place these functions in the hands of ^ne
who, as Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chanoello y,
possessed sufficient rank to Interpose and exorcise
judgment and power.
We are not unmindful of the fact, which we ha
discussed before, that there was a constant, oitxer,
nf the Nazipersistent contest between the various chilis
regime to maintain what power they had, and to incroa
as far as they could, and it is likewise clear that .at
times the star of one man would rise and that of another
would sink, perhaps only to rise again. Dictators have
few friends and are notoriously fickle in their ways,
but LAI'Al^ERS climbed to power, sought power, and maintained
power as long as he could, and he exercised that power to.
Implement Hitler's designs and to maintain himself in
Hitler's good graces.
Defend;mt is, and we find him- GUILTY under Count
Five of the Indictment.
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liSEISSNER
ITrom 1925 on the defendant ivIEISSNER was Undor-
secrctany of State and Chief of the Office of tne Reich
President. In 1935 a change in name occurred ."uid he was
thereafter known as Chief of the Presidential Chancellory#
In 193V he received the title of State Minister with the
rank of a Reich Minister. He was never a memoor of the
Party. One of his functions was to deal with petitions
and pleas for clemency and present them to Hitler-
Paragraph 41 of the Indictment contains allegations
of a specific nature against liiEISSNER, namply, tis handling
of pleas of clemency to oe suomitted to Hitler. The
ev'i'^.encc de^tls with this suoject and also the transfer of
persons convicted in the German criminal courts and under
sentenccj or whose oases were pending trial, to the Gestapo,
where they were murdered.
The documents offered against him are to he largely
found in Books 74 and 74-A of the prosecution, the latter
Doing a rebuttal oook.
On 3 May 1940 von Heurath reported that a Czech
national, presumably a memoer of the resistance movement,
in attempting to .avoid arrest while engaged in putting up
posters, shot and killed a German and fired at three
German soldiers who pursued him; that he had oeon tried
before, a Speci;a Court, that a death sentence w.as expected,
and requested that Hitler waive the right of pardon.
i^lISSNER transmitted the letter to Hitler, through
Bormann, with the statement th/it if ho did not receive
any other instructions by 8 May 1940 he would inform
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von Neuruth that the right of pardon had oeon waived.
Bormann returned von Neurath's telegram with the notation
that "the Fuehrer agrees."
The -oroseoution does not suggest thr^t the state
ments made in von Neurath'^s tolegrran are not true. If
so, the acts, under any system of law, would be punishable,
and it Cfuinot be S7Lid that a death penalty would be
unjustified,
A
-| TThlle it is unusual for an executive to refuse to
receive and consider pleas for pardon and clemency, he is
not legally bound to so do. In the absence, thereof, of
other evidence that the man was not guilty of an offense
punishable by death, it cannot be said that ilEISSNER'S
failure to recommend to Hitler that von Neurath's request
be denied constitutes a crime against hum^uiitywithin the
me;ining of Control Council Law No. 10,
Weishe Affair (The Tlergarten Tatters?J.l Hippodrome), The
^ prosecution offered evidence that MEISSNER, for the purpose
of obtaining Weiske^s interest in the Berlin Hippodrome
and its f^icilities, and to turn it over to one Ssche or
a corporation in which both MEISSNER .-ind Esche became
Interested, caused '.Veiske to be arrested by the Gestapo
J ?ind threatened with imprisonment in a concentration camp
unless he should consent to the triinsuction and that, by
reason of this arrest and these threats, Weiske, under
I
duress, disposed of his property at a price far below its
actual value.
There is no evidence, however, that the alleged
conduct Was in further.*inoe of or in connection with crimes
-457-
against peace or war crimes. The transaction, whatever
-it may have been, was purely personal, between liEISSNER
anl Esche on the one hand, and Weiske on the other. It
is therefore not a crime cognizable by this Tribunal. If
IviEISSNER v/as wrong, or if i'lEISSNER committed any crime in
the matter, the case is one for the German courts. We
make no finding, and express no opinion, as to the merits
of the charge, as to do so might possibly prejudice a
proper determination by the court having proper jurisdiction.
Luftglas (sometimes referred to as Luftgas). On 20 October
1941, ti Berlin newspaper contained an item that a Polish
Jew, Luftgas, had been sentenced to two and one-h.-lLf years
in prison for having hoarded 65,000 eggs.
On 25 October LAIiHERS wrote to Schlegelberger, acting
as Minister of Justice, that Hitler wished the defendant
Luftgas sentenced to death, requesting him to see to it
and to notify LAIvUiPRS when this had been done so that he
might inform Hitler. He also wrote Schwab, Hitler's
Adjutant, informing him of the communication to
Schlegelberger. On 29 October Schlegelberger replied that
in accordance with the Fuehrer Order of 24 October, trz-ins-
mittod to him by the State Minister and Chief of the
Presidential Chancellory (liElSSNER), he had handed Luftgas
over to the Gestapo for the purpose of execution.
Schlegelberger testified in the Justices' Case th^xt
the Fuehrer Order was given to him on 24 October through
the usual channels of the Presidential Chancellory.
On 24 March 1948 he gave an affidavit on behalf of
MEISSNER that he could not "exclude the possibility that
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"tile inforniti'tion with respect to this transfer was not given
hyv DR. IffilSSNER as stated in the letter of 29 October 1941,
but was given by another office.^
On 28 April 1948 he gave an affidavit on behalf of
LAMIERS and said:
"After further investigation, I cannot
entirely exclude the possioility that the
order was not delivered by DR. I^ISSNER, out
by another office, i.e., the Office of the
Fuehrer's Adjut^int,"
The witness Ficker, called on oehalf of LAJ.ll/iERS,
testified that inasmuch as Schlegolberger's letter, in the
usual office routine, went through several departments,
including the legal department and that of the State ^
Secretary, it was highly improbaole that the mistake
would be made of confusing the Presidential Chancellory
with the Reich Chancellory or with Hitler's Adjutrmt. .
I'iEISSNER denies having had any knowledge or tfiking
finy part in this affair. The extremely guarded statements
of Sohlegelberger do not actually contradict his letter or
his testimony which he gave in the Justice Case, /ind wo
deem it more likely that as stated in his letter to LAMIiIERS
;ind his testimony, he received the Fuehrer Order from
JiEISSNER rather th?in from the Fuehrer's Adjutant. The
Fuehrer Order was based on a newspaper article .-md without
the slightest investigation by either Hitler or MEISSNER,
ixnd in the face of a substantial sentence given oy a court
which had tried the case txnd presumably had knowledge of
the facts, h.-nding the victim- over to the Gestapo to be
murdered was in cleat* viplatibn Of all law*
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other Transfers to the G-.estapo> The record is cle/ir,
moreover, that in a large number of other cases certain
persons who had been imprisoned for offenses or whose
cases were pending trial before the courts, were trans
ferred by the Ministry cf Justice to the G-estapo, These
cases occurred when Hitler, quite evidently without any
investigation of the facts and based almost entirely upon
what he read in the newspapers, concluded that a sentence
was too light or that a trial before the courts would be
too slow. In some c-ases the order included, and in others
omitted, the words "to be shot" or ^for execution."
That MEISSNER knew that these transfers meant the
death of these persons concerned we have no doubt. It is
clear that he did not protest such orders or object to
transmitting them. His excuse was that it would have done
no good.
Some of the victims were Poles or Jews, and others
were G-erman nationals. All these cases arose during the
war and some involved merely critical remarks of Hitler
and his Nazi regime, or offenses said to be aggravated
because of war conditions.
MEISSNER knew that the Ministry of Justice had
control of the custody of these persons and only it had
authority to tr/msfer them to any other agency. That he
.-aso knew that these transfers meant death we have no
doubt whatsoever. He took a consenting, even though a
minor, part In these crimes*
Blitz Exeoul:lQn8. MElSSNEH'S part in the so-o-aiel Blitz
Executions consists of the followini^# The only inst.tnce
MS to which there is axiy evidence occurred in December 1938
rincl involvecL a man wh.0, 'vh.ilG an inmate of the Buchen\v;tld
Coneentration Camp, had hilled an SS man. There is no
evidence to indicate that this case had anything to do
with the preparation, plfUining,, or initiating of aggressive
war. This Tribun<al therefore has no jurisdiction over any
'crime arising from this incident.
Nacht und Neoel (Night and Fog) Terror System. lEISSNER'S
only participation in this matter is a draft of a letter
dated 14 June 1944 which Thierach proposed to send to
Bormfinn but which was never transmitted. Therein he stated
that liiEISSNER, in submitting Hitler* s order granting
reprieve to certain women prisoners from occupied countries
sentenced under Nacht und Nebel decrees, had instructed
Thierack, who was then Minister of Justice, that Hitler's
decision was not to be made public, thus leaving the
condemned persons in suspense for an indefinite period as
to whether or not the death sentence would be carried out.
MiEISSNER does not deny that he gave Thierack Hitler's
instruction as above set forth. To permit one sentenced
to death to remain, for months or even years, without
knowledge of his reprieve and under the intolerable
anxiety and mental stress of not knovjing whether the next
* d?iy v/ould be his last dry on earth, is a trait typical of
the sadism of the Nazi regime, and if .-Lnythlng could be
considered a crime against hum;tnity, such a practice is.
I^ISSNSR'S Defense and Facts in Mitigation. IffilSSNER w.-1s
never a member of the Party and up to the last moment he
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opposed Hitler's being mr-ide Ohfincellor. The von P^pen
affidavit that l/IEISSNER made his peace with Hitler, via
Goering, because of financial scand;tls in which he was
involved, is based on hearsay and without proof. His
main functions as Chief of the Presidential Ch;incellory
were those of protocol, t/nJcing care of honorary awards,
making arrangements for and acting as escort for visiting
foreign dignitaries, and matters relating to executive
clemency. He was not a policy-maker and had little or
no executive power. He never enjoyed the favor of the
Party and was looked upon with grave suspicion and dislike
by its heads. He was kept in office by Hitler because of
his ready knowledge of protocol and ceremony, of which the
latter was wholly ignor^^mt, and his long acquaintnnce with
leading domestic and foreign personalities.
It is clearly established that insofar and as often
as he could he used his position to prevent or to soften
the harsh measures of the man hev served, sometimes at '
considerable risk to himself. He m?iy have remained in
office under Hitler because of v.-xnity, weakness, and for
financial security. There is no evidence that he
originated or implemented any crimes against humanity,
beyond what has been heretofore termed as such, and even
there his part was httrdly more than that of a messenger.
While in so doing he played an unenviable role and one which
a stronger character more alive to Ugher values would have
rejected, it is doubtful that It constitutes criminality.
We find the defendant DAEISSNER NOT GUILTY.
PUIiL
The lefendant PUHL, as the leading executive official
of the Reichsbrtnh, is charged with having directed 'Oid sucer-
vised the execution of .-oi figreement between Funk -ind Himraler
for the receipt, classification, deposit, conversion and
disposal of properties t:tken by the SS from victims exter
minated in .concentration c.-onps. These properties totaling
millions of Reichsmarks in value, included, among other
F things, gold teeth and fillings, spectacle fr-imes, rings,
jewelry and watches. To insure secrecy, the deliveries
from the SS were credited to-a fictitious account ^tnd the
transaction was given a code name. The proceeds were
credited to the account of the Reich Treasury under the
defend;(nt SCHIHIRIN VON KROSIGK.
PIJKL'S entire career has been that of a banker. He
Wfis first employed In the Reichsbank in 1913, and except
for ^his service in the Army during the First World War,
; he remained in that org?inization. He became a director
in 1929 and was a senior director in 1932; he was appointed
as Vice-President on 8 August 1940 and remained so until
the G-orman surrender in 1945. Prom 1935 to 1945 he was
a member of the Aufsichtsrat (which is, roughly, the
P •* supervising board as distinguished from the executive board)
r '
of the German Gold Discount Bank, He joined the Nazi Party
as early as 1938 although his membership record gives the
year as 1937, The defendant asserts that his membership
record was antedated.
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H© servB'i un^er Schacht, who whs acquitte'i, as well
as Funk, who was convicted by the first International
Military Tribunal, during their respective oerlods as
President of•the Bank.
The primary function of the Belchsoank was that of
issuing notes; it also had the power to regulate the move
ment of currency and money transactions, internally as
well as abroad, and to insure that the availaole funds of
the German Economic System were utilized for the common
good and in the interest of national economy; it was
under the direct authority of the Fuehrer; it was a
public corporate body under corporate law which had a
oapit.-d of 350,000,000 Relchsmarks and its presidents and
directors were under the supervision control of Hitler,
who appointed .-ind could, at will, discharge them. Such
was the legal position of the Dank under the Reichsbank
Lav/ of 1939, which covers the period with which we are
here concerned.
On 11 February 1939 PUHL was apoolnted Funk's Deputy
for all business in the latter's absence, with the same
power to rpike decisions which Funk possessed under the
Reichsbank Law, a position which was superior to that of .
any other official of the bank. He was the m.-inaging Vice-
Presldent, while Lange, the other Vice-President, was in
charge of personnel matters and of safeguarding National
Socialist principles in the Bank.
PUHL had the comparative rank of a State Secretary.
In addition to being a member of the Aufslchtsrat of the
Gold Discount Bank, in 3944 he beo.-une Deputy President,
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This bank was owned and wholly controlled by the Reichsbank*
Aktlon Reinhardt. No chapter in the law and record of
crimes committed during the history of the Nazi regime
is.so revolting and horrible as the coldly calculated
extermination of Jews. Not content with depriving them
of the opportunity inherent in all human oeings to study,
to practice professions, to engage in business in accord
ance with the individual's nature and talents, they were
deprived of their rights of citizenship, suoject to sense
less degradations, humiliations and insults, their property
in many instances destroyed by Party organized moos, and
finally stolen from them under the euphonius term of
"confiscations"; they were deported to the Gaus, In the
East and finally to extermination Cf-imps where they were
slaughtered by the million through starvation, shooting,
and finally by mass extermination in the gas ch.-imoers of
Auschwitz and Maidenek, where men and women, girls and
youths, the tottering grandfather -and the oabe in arms met
the same fate. But the Nazi Government was not content
with this. There were large financial gains to be derived
from wholesale murder which could be and were used to wage
Germany's wars of aggression. Currency, coins, securities,
Jewelry, gold watches, gold spectacles, clothing from
their bodies, were carefully -ind systematically collected;
the hair was shorn from the heads of the women and fln;xlly
the gold from the teeth of the corpses was meticulously
removed. The best of the clothing was used to cover the
bodies of the members of the master race, - the hair for
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mattresses on which to 3ay their heads, and the coins,
bank notes, Jewelry and gold stored in vaults of the
Reichsbanh, sold through Berlin pawn shops by the Reichs-
bank, or sent by the Relchsbank to be melted into bullion.
The defendant contends that stertling the personal
property of Jews and other concentration camp inmates is
not a crime against humanity. But under the circumstances
^ which wo have here related, this plea must oe and is
^ rejected. What was done was done pursuant to a governmental
policy, jmd the thefts were part of a program of exterraina-
*' tion and were one of its objectives. It would be a str.-uige
doctrine indeed, if, where part of the plan ^md one of the
objectives of murder was to obtain the property of the
victim, even to the extent of using the hair from his
head and the gold of his mouth, he who knowingly took
part in disposing of the loot must be exonerated and held
not guilty as a particip.ant in the murder plan. Without
/• doubt all such acts are crimes against humanity and he who
participates or plays a consenting part therein is guilty
of a crime against humanity. The only question we have to
decide is whether the defendant PUHL was such a consenting
participant as to render him liaole to conviction and
punishment
As early as 26 September 1942 Fr.-mk, S3 Brigade-
fuehrer and Brigadier Generrd in the Waffen SS, by order of
Hlmmlor (SS-WVHA), issued instructions to the Chief of the
SS Garrison Administration at Lublin and the Chief of the
Administration at the Auschwitz concentration c.-unp prescrib
ing procedure for the disposition of property of
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\executed Jews.
(a) Germ.'in Reichsb?m3£ notes were to be deposited
with the Reiohsbnnk to the credit of the SS
Economic•and Administrative Main Office,
(b) Foreign Exch/mge, coined and uncoined, rare
metals, jewelries, precious and serai-precious
stones, pearls, gold from the teeth and scrap
gold to be delivered to the Main Office and
by it immediately to the Relchsbanlc.
4^ * *
(h) Gold frames of spectacles to be handed in
with the rare metals.
Albert Thorns, an employee of the Reichsbank, deposed
and later testified that, by a decree of 21 February "1939,
all Jews were rec^uired to deliver personal property to
the governraent.-a authorities, and coins and gold bars
resulting therefrom were to be delivered to the Reichsbank;
that in the summer of 1942 he was c-illed into the department
of Director Frommknecht and informed that the Bank was
going to handle a special transaction of which the latter
knew little but that all the details of which were f?tmiliar
to PUHL, who w.'inted to see the witness; that he went to
PUHL'B office who explained that the Bank was going to act
as custodi;tn of the SS for the reception and disposition
of deposits which would include not only gold, silver and
foreign currency with which the Bank usually de.-dt, but
other kinds of property such as Jewelry, and that a way
must be found to dispose of them; that he suggested to
-467-
PUHL that the latter, items he trkhsmitted to the Rrlch Haupt
Kasse (Pawn Shop) or that they he giVeri by Himmler directly
to the pawn shop in order that the Bank would have nothing to
do with the matter; that PUHL said this was out of the ques
tion and that the Bank must arrange for a procedure in order
to keep the whole thing secret. This conversation was within
two weeks of the first delivery which was made in August 1^42.
Thoms was further instructed hy PUHL not to diacuss the
matter with anybody, that it was highly secret and it was for
bidden to speak about it. He was further instructed to get
in touch with.Brlgadefuehrer Frank and Obergruppenfuehrer
Wolff (the same Wolff who appears in this case so often as
an affiant in behalf of the defense), for information; that
he telephoned Frank and was told that the deliveries were to
be made by truck and that they would be in charge of an 53
man, Melmer; that, after discussions, it was agreed that
Melmer should, not appear in S3 uniform, but in civilian
clothes and that he was to receive a onnditlonal receipt for
the property; that 'Thorns would be later informed of the
account to which the proceeds of the items were to be accre
dited; that although ^'^elmer appeared in civilian c-lothes,
there were two S3 men on guard and -ost of the people in the
pawn shops and in Thom's office and In the Bank knew about
the S3 deliveries. He says that the goods were sorted,
handled and disposed of in the appropriate departments of the
Bank — stocks, securltleB and bonds to one department, and
coins, gold and jewelry to the precious metal department. On
delivery a short statement of the goods was made and signed
by the Bank.
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Later the contents were itemized in detail and a final
receipt given in detail; that on the occasion of the first
delivery Melmer told him to credit the proceeds of the
account to Max Heiliger; that he confirmed this with an
official of the Ministry of Finance; that a few months
later PUHL iiquired how the Melmer deliveries were coming
along and suggested that they might soon "be over, but that
he informed PUHL that it seemed as though they were growing
^ larger*
The source of these items was known from the fact
^ that the register stamp "Lublin" appeared on packages of
some of the bills and some items carried the stamp of
Auschwitz, both sites of concentration camps. This was
early in 1943.
In November 1942, being the tenth delivery made,
dental gold appeared and eventually this item became
unusually great. The Berlin pawn shop disposed of the
4 Jewelry for the Bank, and the proceeds were credited to
"Max Heiliger." The witness did not know how the savings
^ books were cashed in, the first of which was delivered on
24 April 1943.
Thorns Was c.-illed as a witness in the International
^ Mlllt.-iry Tribunal, confirmed his affidavit, and further
testified that he kept PUHL advised of these transactions
and of the kinds of items, including dent.-a gold and wedding
•f
rings that the Bank was receiving; th.at four or five
people were employed at the Bank to sort and classify the
material, which action was carried on in the corridor of
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the v.'LUlts rind much of the materlnl lay quite openly on
the table; that all persons involved were under strict
Instructions that this secret matter must not be talked
about even with one's own colleagues and that this secrecy
was not ordinary secrecy that attended bank trrmsactlons;
that he had seen the material shown in evidence .-md it
Was typic^a of the Melmer deliveries. The witness further
testified that there were more th-in seventy deliveries
made by the SS to the b;ink.
On cross-examination he testified that the nrane
Melmer was given for this deposit, because of the specific
direction from PUHL that the matter was a oartlcularly
secret iiffair; that the gold teeth were sent to the
Prussi;th State Mint where they were melted down into
gold .and the bullion delivered to the Reichsbank. He
further testified that when the articles were sorted and
cl.assified at the bank they were put in bags with the
word "Reichsbank" printed on s;tme.
On 3 M.-ty 1946 the defendant himself was interrogated
.and made -"n.offif^pvit th-at in the summer of 1942 Funk had
.a conversation with him .-md Friedrich Wllhelm, .another
member of the Board of Directors, and said that he h.ad made
an arrangement with Hlmmler to have the bank receive on
safe deposit gold and Jewels for the 35, and that Punk
directed him to ^vork out the .arrangements with Pohl, head
of the Economic Section of the SS in charge of the
economic aspects of the concentration c.'onp program; th.-tt
he inquired of Funk the source of the e-old Jewelry and
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bank notes that were to be turned over and Funk replied
that it was confiscated property from the Eastern Occupied
Territory and told him to ask no further questions; that
he protested against the Reichsbank h.andling the raaterical
but was told to go ahead and to keep the matter absolutely
secret.
He thereupon made arrangements with one of the
officials in the cash and vault department to receive the
material and himself reported the matter to the Board of
Directors of the Bank at its next meeting; that Pohl, on
the day of the defendant's conversation with Funk,
telephoned him and asked if' he had been informed of the
tr?insaction, but PUHL refused to discuss the matter over
the telephone whereupon Pohl came to see him and said that
the SS had some jewelry to deliver to the Bank for safe
keeping and arrangements had been made for delivery
starting sometime in August 1942, and continuing over the
following years; that the material deposited oy the SS
included jewelry, watches, eyeglass frames, dental gold .and
other gold items in great abundance from Jews, concentration
camp victims, and other "oersons; that this was brought to
his knowledge by SS personnel who attempted to convert
this material into cash and who obtained, in this connec
tion, the assistance of the Bank personnel with Funk's
approval and knowledge; that he had been informed oy Funk
that Himmlcr and SCH'-VERIN-KROSIGK, the Minister of Finance,
had reached an agreement that the gold and similar material
was to be deposited for the account of the Reich and that
the proceeds resulting from their sale should oe credited
to the Reich Treasury; that from time to time he visited,
the Vaults in the Bank and observed what was in storage.
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PUHL explains this affidavit on the ground that
he was ill at the time and confused, and offered as
corroooration the testimony of Binswanger, who was then
one of the internment camp physicians. The latter* s
testimony should he received with great caution as it Is
clear that he did not tell the truth with respect to his
rank in connection with the SS. Moreover, his statements
as to the physical findings from his ex;:iralnation of PUHL
do not reveal 'iny facts which would .-iffeet either PUHL*S
mind or memory. The defend.'int is a mrm of vast business
experience, wide culture and high intelligence. There is
no evidence that, he was under duress, other than the fact
that he was then confined in an internment camp. It Is not
claimed that he was threatened by the Interrogators, and
the evidence clearly shows that he was not. The ;4Xfld,avit
Is replete with details which only he could have hnown and
which could not have been supplied by anyone else, We
believe that the affidavit relates the f.acts.
In the B.-xnh's files is a memor-indum dated 31 March
1944 which recites that, in accordance with un or-al,
confidential agreement between PUHL -Lnd the Chief of one of
Berlin's public offices, the Reiohsbank took over the
soiling of local and foreign currencies, gold and silver
coins, precious metals, securities, Jewels, watches,
dl.amonds .-ind other objects which were to be processed under
the code n.-one Melmer; that a large number had been turned
over to the Municipal Pawn Shop for utiliz.atlon; that on
29 March 1944 the pawn shop refused further accept-mce
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and declined to process items alrendy in their possession;
that the question of uniform utilization was important,
not only bec;iuse the bank should be given the opportunity
to sell unprocessed jewels, etc,, from the Melmer deliveries
as it had been before, but also because its equivalent
belonged to the Reich and if the pawn shop sold the articles
above the world-wide gross price the surplus went to the
benefit of the Reich; that through s.-lLes to foreign
countries a considerable amount of foreign currency must
be acquired and that among the goods still in the possession
of the pawn shop were di;.imonds to the amount of 35,000
carats, and small rose diamonds of very high value.
There is another communication in this document of
14 September 1943 from the Berlin Municipal Pawn Shop to
the Relchsbank likewise dealing with the utilization of
this property,
Karl lYilhelm, a former director of the Bank, gave an
affidavit that in 1942 PUHL told him that SS Oborgruppen-
fuehrer Pohl had visited him and st.ated that he desired
that the gold and jewelry deposits then in the collar of
an SS barracks should be put under the care of the Rcichs-
bank; that Wilhelm told PUHL that those things didn't
concern him 'ind warned PUHL against taking such deposits
with the words, "They will kick back against thoReichsbank
some day," whereupon PUHL replied, "Kou are right, it is
none of your business, I just wanted to inform you of
these deposits. I will de.-a with this matter raone." PUHL
showed no reluot.-moe but approved the project.
PUHL denies themetters deposed by VTllhelm, but on
the second day of November 1946 he gave a statement that
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he consi^erecL Wilhelm to oe thoroughly reliable anl that
complete faith could be put into the statements he made
and that he never considered Ifilhelm was sympathetic to
the Nazi program,
Walter Bay.rhoffer gave an affidavit in which he
stated that he was a director of the Reichsbank and
a member of the Aufsichtsrat of the G-old Discount Bank;
that at the end of 1942 Frommknecht told him that, without
his knowledge or that of the affiant, jewels and valuables
of the SS had been deposited with the Bank; that Frommknecht
was somewhat annoyed that these deposits had been handled
by PUHL, since cash transactions were actually 1he respon
sibility of E^ey-rhoffer's department; that Frommknecht
informed him that the matter was classified as secret and
top secret, and that he himself had misgivings about the
trrmsaction because it seemed to be outside the competency
of the Bank,
On 15 July 1946 Oswald Pohl, Chief of the Economic
and Administration Main Office of the SS (WVHA), gave an
affidavit deposing, ;wong other things, that In the year
1941 or 1942, after larger quantities of articles of value,
such us jewelry, gold rings, gold fillings, spectacles,
etc., had been collected in the extermination camos,
Hlmmler ordered him to deliver these things to the Reichs-
bank, explaining th.it he had already entered into the
negotiations concerning the matter with the Bank and Funk;
that as a result of this agreement te discussed the m^mner
of delivery with the defendant PUHL and in this conversa
tion no doubt remained that the objects to be delivered
wore the jewelry and valuables of concentration camp
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Inmntes, especi.-illy Jews who had "oeen killed in extermina
tion c:anps. There was u gigantic qu.-mtity of valuables
thereafter delivered which continued for months .-Lnd years#
He further stated that he saw a part of these v-auables when
Funk and PUHL invited him to inspect the vaults and there
after to dinner.(this took place in 1941 or 1942),and then
that PUHL took them to the vaults of the ReiQhsbank, showed
them gold bars and also various trunks of objects t;iken
from concentration camps were opened.
Pohl gave a subsequent affidavit on 2 April 1947
which subst;intlates many of the details heretofore mentioned.
Pohl was called as a witness in this Case for cross-
ex/onination, and in a measure attempted to repudiate the
fiffidavits which he had given, -an analysis of which will
be hereafter made. Likewise both Wllhelm and Thorns were
'Called for cross-examination and their testimony will be
similarly treated.
\Vhen PUHL testified before the International Military
Tribunal, he confirmed the statements of his affidavit of
3 May 1946, stating specifIc.-aiy that the statements in the
affidavit were correct. Thereafter he recanted, stating
that he did not know that there was dental gold or gold
spectacle fr'jnes in "the loot. August Frank of the SS here
tofore mentioned testified in the pohl Case that the con
ferences between Pohl and the defendant PUHL took pl-xce in
July 1942, having been preceded by a conference between
Himmler and Funk and between Himmler and the defendant
SCHWERIN-KROSIGK; that these deposits were not deposits
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of the SS anl for its benefit, but were for the benefit
of the Reich; that the foreign exchange was immediately
utilized by the Relchsbank and its counter-value credited
by the bank to a special account with the Reich Minister
of Finance, This account was called the Max Heiliger
account•
On 26 May 1948 Albert Thoms gave affidavit in
which he testified that there were seventy-six separate
deliveries by the SS to the Relchsbank which were listed
under the name "Melmer"; that of these a part was not
utilized but evacuated to the salt mines in Merkers because
of War conditions. He identified the receipt book of the
Metal Purchasing Office of the Relchsbank, which is the
record of the smelting cf the gold. The rem/tlning Melmer
deliveries in 207 containers in which were stored gold,
foreign exchange, jewelry and precious stones, pearls, and
dental gold were likewise sent to Merkers. Attached to
his affidavit are photostats of pages 14 and 15 of the
Relchsbank Receipt Book and they relate to 21 deliveries
which commenced with the 40th e-nc^efi w-itlf the' 76.th.-' i.
Page 15 relates Id eleven deliveries of ivhich the
26th Was the first and the 72nd the last. Also, as a part
of this exhibit is a memorandum of 24 November 1944 from
the Relchsbank to the mint, directing it to molt down
something over 100,000 kilograms of silver and g)ld (a
kilogram is the approximate equivalent of two pounds), a
substantl:il portion of which was dental gold.
While we have little doubt that the articles shown
in the film were delivered by the Army to the Relchsbank
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Br?jjich in Frrtnlcfurt .'xnd were pnrt cf the loot which the
Reichsbank had stored in the salt mines at Merhers, the
chain of proof is not entirely complete, \7e shall there
fore disregard the film but the facts are proved
independently by the evidence which we have heretofore
outlined.
The defendant PUHL asserts that the Reichsbank was
by law compelled to accept this loot, particularly with
^ respect to the gold, silver, and currency, and quotes
Article 15 of the Reichsbank Law of 15 June 1939,
There is nothing in this section which can be
construed to require the Bank so to do. Article 15 merely
provides that the Bank must effect all banking tpcrations
f
for the government "insofar as they are within its compotonce
in accordance ^vith the provisions of the present law"; it
is also required to act as intermedi<ary for all p;i;i''ments
by the financial establishments of the Reich, the G-aus,
%•
the provinces and the communes, and the association of
^ communes. The receipt, re.'ilization and disposition of
stolon goods Can hardly constitute a brinking operation,
nor is it to be presumed that when the law was drafted it
had reference to any transaction such as we are here
f discussing.
Article 14 of the same law contains the clause that
f the Bank is required to purchase bar gold ,at its Berlin
headquarters at a fixed rate. This, however, only means
that if and when the Bank purchases gold it must do so at
the specified rate.
The !fegal opinion of Hans-Joachim Caesar, a Jurist
for the Relohsbrink, cites both articles and the "pertinent
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provisions of the foreign currency laws," and "according
,to those provisions all the gold and foreign currency had
to oe turned over to the Reichsoank, and as a result the
Reichsbank could not reject gold rend foreign currency
confiscated by order of the Reich.
We reject this contention- If it had oeeh the
"Durpose of the law to include therein property stolen from
the inhabitants of occupied territories or from those of
German nationals, pursutint to an execution of aggressive
war, it was void as a breach of International Law rxnd
affords no defense. We do not assume and we do not believe
that any such purpose existed at the time the Reichsoank
Law or the Foreign Currency Regulations were promulgated.
That this was not looked upon as an ordinary transaction
within the scope of its corporate purposes or official
functions by the Reichsbjink offici.-ds, including PUHL,
is evidenced by the extreme secrecy with which the
trrcnsaction was handled, the fact that the account was
credited in the first inst-uice to a fictitious name,
Max Heiliger, ixnd the contempor:jneous misgivings expressed
by officials and employees of the B.'ink at the time.
Our views are confirmed by the testimony of Karl
Friodrich Wilhelm, namely, that the Bank was under no
obligation to accept gold or foreign-currency but it
was the duty of holders to offer it. Nor was it bound to
accept and dispose of jewels or unrefined gold or act in
the capacity of a second-hand or antique dealer.
PUHL testifies that he first lercrned of the transac
tions in question from Funk, in accordance with an
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n.greeiaeri"t mai® between Hiimnler and Funk* This was in "the
surnmer of i94:2» Ke fui'ther •fces'tifies "fchrilj Funk told him
that Himmler intended to deliver indoming gold and foreign
currency into the Bankc&oause of the legal provisions
requiring such delivery, and asked him to inform the
competent departments to be helpful in fulfilling the
form.alitios concerning the delivery of the stuff. Funk
mentioned not only foreign currency and gold, out also some
articles of jewelry, but said nothing of gold teeth, gold
•v teeth fillings, spectacle frames, etc.; that Funk stated
that those things had been seized or given up in the East and
he, PUHL, did not assume that the seizure was in violation
of Internation;!! Law; that there was no mention of
concentration citmps or Jews. Funk told him not to ask
any more questions; that his protests aoout the Reichsojank
t;iklng over the property were not because he thought they
wore illegally acquired objects, but because he did not
desire to have any dealings with the SS, He rememoers the
^ call which Pohl made and states that it was very short and
that all Po.hl told him was that he was the delivering
agency for gold and silver currency collected within the
^ fr.'uiiowork of the SS scheme ;Jid emphasized that this was
property belonging to the Reich.
^ Pohl did, however; men-^:ion that there might be some
Jewelry and asked the ReichsoanK to pass- it on to the
competent pavm broker's agency; that as a result of his
conversation with Pohl, he informed Froramknecht. He
denies that he gave Thorns the Instructions or heard the
conversation mentioned in the latter's affidavit, out
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merely said so tar asproperty other than gold and other
foreign currency was concerned, it should oe passed on to
the competent pawn "oroker's house. He admitted that he
may have said that the matter *should he treated in a
confidential w,*xy, hut that applied to all oanking transac
tions, and that Pohi had talked of secrecy and made a lot
of fuss about everything and he may have told Thorns some-
^ thing to that extent..
He denies, however, that the matter was to he treated
as a top secret matter. He denies Wilhelm^s affidavit and
testimony that he had informed the latter thatte (PUHL),
would handle the matter himself. He claims that these
I ,
matters were never discussed in the meetings of the direc
tors and that he never received a report from the
subordinates in connection with these deposits; that he had
never made ?iny inquiry of Thorns as to the status or progress
of the Melmer deliveries and that he was never notified that
a*
gold teeth were supposed to have shown up in connection
with the deposits, or savings bank books or twelve kilogr;ans
of pearls; that if Thorns had ever mentioned these matters
he cert.-iinly would have done something against it; that he
never saw, in the Reichsb^^ink v;ailts, items such as were
sho^vn in tho film ,m-l th.-it he never knew tti.-it that class
of items wt're- ever turned in by the SS, and does not oelieve
* it possible that they could have been turned in to the
Relchsbank,
However, the testimony of Thorns and the records of
the Bank to which he heretofore referred show that the
defendant is entirely mistaken with respect to this last
^ -480-
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stutenento He remembers only one visit of Pohl to the Bank
Vaults, namely, on 27 Hay 1941, before these deposits were
oeing made, and remembers one luncheon with Pohl immediately
after he visited the vaults.
He claims that at the time his affidavit was taken,
he was and had been ill; that he was, at that time, still
oedrldden and unable to grasp the sense of the individual
statements.
The witness Oswald Pohl was administrratlon chief
of the SS from 1934 to 1945. He was tried and condemned
to death. He was called for cross-ex;-unlnation with respect
to Exhibits 3477, 2826, 2862, 2827, 2865. He says that
while a prisoner of the British he was badly mistreated,
although he mrikes no claim that he was mistreated while
in Nurnberg, either before, during, or after his Interroga-
•^ions here. He attempted to state that he did not know
that the material c.'ime from concentration c.-unps, or from
extermination c.-imips and dead Jews, or that it contra ned
such items as gold rings, gold fillings, glasses and gold
watchesd
August Prank testified, in the Oswald Pohl Case,
that .as early as 8 October 1942 he had Informed Himmler
MDout this dental gold and suggested that further collec
tions be sent to the Relchsbank and further that he knew
that much of it came from concentration camps. We deem
it highly unlikely that Pohl would rot have at least as
much definite information as his deputy, Frank.
We have carefully reviewed Pohl's testimony before
%
a Commission of this Tribun.-JL, It is our opinion that
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he gave false oral testimony in an ^tempt to exonerate
himself as well as lefenlant PUHL. Certainly Pohl's
cross-examination shows that he would go to any lengths
wholly without regard to the facts in order to avoid the
effect of the affidavits which he had given.
From the records we draw and make the following
findings of fact:
i
That PUHL was the managing director and Vlce-
Presldent of the Bank, and that in Funk's ahsence he
exercised all the powers of Funk;
That Funk was seldom in the Bank and comparatively
seldom exercised his powers as President;
That PUPTfj, at the time he received the direction
from Funk ;ind after he t.-aked to Pohl, knew that what was
to oe received and disposed of was stolen property and loot
t?jken from the inm.vttes of concentration camps.
We do not oelieve that at that time he was Informed
that the grisly dental gold and wedding rings were part
of it. However, we think it is fairly estaolished by the
record that long before the deliveries were completed he
was informed of this. His part in this transaction was
not that of a mere messenger or businessman. He went
beyond the crdinary range of his duties to give directions
that the matter be handled secretly by the appropriate
departments of the B.'ink, It is to be said in his favor
that he neither originated the matter and that it was
proDaoly repugnant to him. He had no part in tie actual
extermination of Jews and other concentration camp inmates,
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ctnii WG havB no d-OUDli "that h.G would, notij evsn under orders >
have participated in that part of the program.
But without doubt he was a consenting participant ^
in part of the execution of the entire plan, although his
participation was not a major one.
We find him GUILTY under Count Five.
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RASCHE
The defend.-Liit RASCHE is a banker by profession and
after many years of banking experience in the Rhineland he
joined theDresdner Bank, became a member and finally the
spokesman for its Vorstand. He was one of the most able and
active executive officers of the Bank.
The evidence clearly establishes that the Dresdner Bank
loaned very large sums of money to various SS enterprises
which employed large numbers of inmates of concentration c,.mips,
and also to Reich enterprises and agencies engaged in the so-
called resettlement progriiins.
It is unnecessary to recapitulate the evidence in this
case or the findings of others of these Tribunals to the
unlawful nature of these enterprises.
Exhibit 2825 is a draft of a letter of recommendation
which RASCHE prepared or c;u sed to be prep.ared for the
signature of SS G-ruppenfuehrer Pohl, which contains the
statement;
"DR. RASCHE is ?tn old fighter for the
Baltikun, and as a member of the Delegation
of the Reichsfuehrer SS (Himmler) he also
participated in the decisive measures con
cerning resettlement.^
The defense that Pohl did not sign this letter and that
it was never used is of no materi;aity, as they are RASCHE'S
own words praising himself and not those of Pohl.
The record, however, does not disclose that RASCPIE was
ever a member of any delegation of the Reichsfuehrer SS, nor
what tho.delegation.did, if it ever existed, or what the
decisive measures consisted of; nor are we able, from other
evidence, to determine my relationship with Himmler or the
SS from which any conclusive inference can be drawn.
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RASCHE was a member of Himmler^s Circle of Friends
.'•md the Bank, with his knowledge, acquiescence and approval,
even in part at his insistence, made large annu.al contribu
tions to a fund placed at Himmler^s personal disposal.
There is no evidence, however, that matters relating to
the resettlement program were ever discussed or acted upon
in the meetings of this Circle, or that it was in any way a
policy-m;^ing body. Nor is there any evidence that RASCHE
knew that any part of the fund to which the Bank made
contributions was intended to be or was ever used by Himmler
for jiny unlawful purposes.
His participation in the loans made by the presdner
Bank to various SS enterprises which employed slave labor,
and to those engaged in the resettlement program, presents
a more difficult problem.
The defendant is a banker and businessman of long
experience and is possessed of a keen find active mind.
Bankers do not approve or make loans in the number and
amount made by the Dresdner Bank without ascertaining,
having, or obtaining information or knowledge as to the
I
purpose for which the loan is sought, and how it is to be
used. It is inconceivable to us that the defendant did
not possess that knowledge, and we find that he did.
The real question is, is it a crime to make a loan,
knowing or having good reason to believe that the borrower
will use the funds in financing enterprises which are employe^
in using l<aDor in violation of either national or international
law? Does he stand in any different position than one who
sells supplies or r.aw materials to a builder building a house
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knowing that the structure will be used for an unlawful
purpose? A bank sells money or credit In the same manner
as the merchandiser of any other commodity. It do«s not
become a partner in enterprise, and the Interest charged
Is merely the gross profit which the bank realizes from
the transaction, out of which It must deduct Its business
costs, and from which It hopes to realize a net profit.
Loans or sale of commodities to be used In an unlawful
enterprise may well be condemned from a moral standpoint
and reflect no credit on the part of the lender or seller
'In either case, but the tr.-msactlon can hardly be said to
be a crime. Our duty Is to try and punish those guilty
of violating International law, and we are not prepared to
state that such loans constitute a violation of that law,
nor has our attention been drawn to ,'uiy ruling to the
contrary.
The defendant RASCHE should be and Is found NOT
GUILTY under Count Five.
RITTER
The defendant RITTER, now In his sixty-sixth year,
entered the Foreign Office In 1922 after a career as a
civil serv.'uit In various other governmental agencies which
commenced In 1909, He was a recognized expert In matters of
commerce .-und economics, and represented the Weimar Republic
In negotiating and drafting m.-my commercial agreements, rmd
In questions of reparations and economic matters arising
within the League of Nations. In these capacities he
exerted a significant politico! Influence. He became Chief
of the Commercial Policy Division of the Foreign Office
and remained there until 1937 when he was appointed
Ambassador to Brazil.
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As Ambassador he received a greatly increased compen
sation and thereby became entiTiled to the rank of State
Secretary. Prior to his appointment he claims that he was
less and less consulted by von Neurath, then head of the
Foreign Office, ;ind that his appointment to Brazil was not a
promotion but rather a means of ^'putting him on the shelf,*
In 1938 while Ambassador to Brazil he received an un
solicited invitation to join the Party and testifies that he
was faced with the dilemma of so doing or falling into comple"^e
disfavor which might result in his inability to return to
Germ/iny and in any event would have injured his career. He
thereupon Joined the Party.
HITTER was recalled in 1938, and on his return attempted
to retire, but was put off. by Ribbentrop until the outbreak of
the war, notwithstjuiding the fact that von Neurath had promised
him that he might do so. He received only occasional assign--
ments in the Foreign Office upon his return from Brazil, among
which were the negotiations leading up to the commercial agree
ment with Russia after Ihe conclusion, in August 1939, of the
non-aggression pact between Germany and that country.
In October 1940 he was appointed by Ribbentrop as liaipon
officer between the former find the OKVf (which corresponds to
the General Staff of the German Armed Forces), a position whiph
he retained until the end of Jmuary 1945, when he become ill..
While sva attempt has been made to minimize the importance
of his functions and the influence xvhich he could exert, we can
not accept this ^ toto. The functions of a liaison official
or agent between two such important departments of a government
as the Foreign Office and the General Staff are too well known
and recognized, and -anong them is the duty to inform himself pf
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the purposes, pl.-tns .-tnl activities of the department to which
he is assigned, report them to his superior, give advice witi^
respect thereto, negotiate, on the latter's behalf, with the .
agencies to which he is assigned, adjust differences which
arise, and gener?illy implement policies determined by his
chief. These are not the duties of ixn err;ind boy or a
messenger. They require a high degree of perspicacity,
industry, intelligence, tact iuid adroitness, and the evidence,
including that of the defend.-uit himself, indicates that he
possessed ;ind utilized these qualities and performed these
functions, htunpered, it may be, by the almost psychopathic
peculiarities of his chief, Ribbentrop.
With regard to the fate of the Jews who were deported
to the East, and with respect to the policy of the Nazi
Government toward them, he was under no illusions, although
it was quite likely that he had no direct knowledge of the
extent, technique, or m,-inner in which the Jewish extermina
tions were carried out. We shall consider the documents
and the testimony which the prosecution contends proves his
guilt.
On 24 September 1942 RITTER wrote and signed a memo
to be used by Hitler in de.-iling with Mussolini on varied
questions, including that of the Croatl/in Jews, but here he
was only transmitting Ribbentrop's ideas and did not purport
to express his own. Our attention has not been called to my
instance where he had any responsibility or took my action
respecting this matter.
ifianish Jews, ^he prosecution contends that RiTTER coordinated
military and civilifvn measures for the persecution of Danish
jews, when the civilian forces complained that they could not
{Carry out the deportation without military help, We have
ex-unined the exhibits cited in the brief but while RITTER
received information that such measures were under considera
tion and that the military commander in Denmark objected
thereto, ;ind while he was on the distribution list of certain
of the documents, the only evidence which the prosecution has
presented to show that he took -iny action with respect to the
s-'irae is a quotation from- his cross-ex.-iraination, wherein he
/
had denied that he had anything to do with the Jews being
taken from Denmark, He was .asked the following question:
"Q, Do you remember that you had to mediate
between the military agencies who did not w.-oit to
participate in this particul.ar instance in the West?
"A. I do not remember such a general activity
of mediation, but I remember one particular case,...
"Q. That is quite sufficient.
For some reason the prosecution did not see fit, and
in fact stopped the defendant from testifying as to what
activity ;vas involved" in the particular case which he
remembered, and the matter was not ag;tln discussed. The
Tribunal is not informed as to what he did, .and the term
"mediation" is entirely too indefinite ,'tnd subject to too many
shades of meaning to be used as evidence of guilt. It might
Include .an .attempt to ameliorate rather than to Implement the
action,
With respect to Denmark the prosecution h.as failed
to prove its case,
Jews in Fr-xnce. The record discloses th.at RITTER was informed
of the .'ictions .against Jews in Fr.-tnce .-tnd Rumania, but there is
no evidence that he participated in them, Knoxvledge that a
crime has oeen or la about to be committed is not sufficient
to warrant a conviction except in those instances where an
affirmative duty exists to prevent or object to .a course of
/
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action• In this instance he had no such duty and he is
therefore ACQUITTED with respect to them.
Hungary. During the course of Gennany^s persecution of the
Jews, several hundred thousand emigrated to Hungary where,
although subject to certain restrictive laws, they found,
what was to them, a haven of refuge.
While there was a vigorous anti-Semitic movement in
Hungary, neither the Regent, Admiral Horthy,nor the Cabinet
then in power, showed any desire to follow the pattern laid
'1 down by the Nazi Government.
To the Third Reich it was, of course, unbearable that
Jews in any country, within reach of its power or influence,
should live the life of free men. Constant effort and
pressure were put forth to destroy all opportunity for even
a meager existence outside of concentration and slave labor
Camps. And this is what they finally brought about in Hungary.
^ As early as 1943 Hitler had become dissatisfied, not
only with the military efforts of the Hungarians and with their
Itack of vigor in enacting and enforcing anti-Semitic legisla
tion, but bec.'tme suspicious that Hungary was war-weary .'ind
desired to make peace. It was determined to obtain the control
1
^ of the Hungarian Government, Thereupon the Geimi;tn envoy,
von Jagow, was replaced rind VEESENMAYER, who had no previous
diplomatic experience, was put in his place,
Ribbontrop detailed ^TTER to t.-Jte charge of Hungarl;jn
affairs, and included VEESENMAYER'S activities at Budapest.
VEESENMAYER became Minister and Reich Plenipotentiary to
Hungary on or about 19 M-aroh 1944, On that d/^ RITTER telepli^bned
}
him giving the following Instruct ions, viiBt that on the erMe dcy ,
von Jagow should inform Horthy, the Hungarian Regent, that
he had been rec.-dled, and would talce leave the same morning,
then introduce VEESENIMYER as the new I'iSlnlster and Reich
Plenipotentiary; that VEESEMUYER was to Introduce himself
.ind inform Horthy of the new Hitler order concerning Imredy
^tnd others, whom VEESENIIAYER would n.-ime, and whom thereafter
he should immediately contact; that none of the Hungarians
who were in Klessheim (where conferences between Horthy and
4 Hitler had t.-Ocen place) were to be arrested, not even K/dlay;
that in accord'Oice with Riooentrop's order, VEESSNMAYER,
* until further notice, was to direct lO.! information for
Ribbentrop to RITTER,
On 4 March 1944 RIOTER instructed Legation Councillor
Vogel to rush-wire all top agencies concerned that Hitler's
written authority to VEE^^ENilAYER provided "civilian German
agencies of any kind which should be activated to Hungary are
only to oe established with the consent of the Reich
Plenipotentiary, thnt they were subordinate to him .-ind
t would operate under his directions"; that the establishment
{ of German civilian agencies in Hungary was not intended and
that .:ai proposals pertaining to trips of officials of top
Reloh agencies with a view of attending to current war
, efforts In Hungary must be addressed to the Foreign Office,
attention Legation Oounclllor Krleger.
5 On 19 March 1944 Grote m.ado a memorandum with regard
to Operation Margarethe (the seizure of Hungary by German
troops), which contains the following language:
'Aftor* ponsult'tflon with Amb.'issddor RITTERit is superfluous to inform the Rum.mi.-m, '
_ • w a. waaw iUUlU<iIlX ' ul ,Oroatirui, nnd Slovriki.-in Governments regnrdlnff
diplomats or submit a request to them,"
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On 20 March RITTER, by teletype to the Embassy at
Budapest, stated that Ribbentrop requested VESSENMiAYER to
discuss the Kallay affair with Kaltenbrunner, and to arrange
to have all exits to the castle watched by the Germ-m Security
Police with instructions to arrest Kallay if he attempted to
leave the castle.
On 23 March 1944 VEESSNI'iAYER reported to Ribbentrop,
via RITTER, regarding his instructions to the Security Police
to t;ike the necessary steps to arrest Kallay when he left
the sanctuary of the Turkish Ministry,
On 25 March 1944 VEESENMAYER reported to Ribbentrop,
through RITTER, of a conference with Sztojay and members of
the Kungarirtn Cabinet, stating that, jimong other things, the
Jewish question was being tackled ' energetically and that he
had left them in no doubt that the Reich Government was at
present still skeptical :ind could only bo convinced by
practical deeds, and the more quickly /ind energetically
and thoroughly reforms were carried out the better was
VEESENI.LAYER' S chance to convince the Reich that the new
government was beginning to get ready for an alliance,
VEESENi'/LAYER, on 2 April 1944, reported to Ribbentrop,
through RITTER, that Winkelmann's subordination (to VEESENMAYER)
had been carried out in every respect thus far and the coopera
tion Was functioning smoothly in a comrade-like manner.
On 3 April 1944 VEESENMAYER reported to Ribbentrop,
through RITTER, that after the next air attack on Budapest he
would have no scruples against having ten suitable Jews shot for
every Hungarian killed, and inquired, in view of Ribbentrop's
suggestion to Hitler to offer all Jews as a present to Roosevelt
and Churchill, whether this Idea was being followed up or
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%whether he might, after the next attach, start with the
retaliatory measures lescrihed. This was distributed to
STEENGRACHT.
On 5 April 1944 VEESENBAAYER reported to Ribbentrop,
through RITTER, respecting his conference with 5zalnsl,head
of the Arrow Cross Movement, and a subsequent one with
Pztojay, the puppet head of the Hungarian Cabinet. He sali
of Szalasi;
"On the whole I was disappointed in Szalasi^
I consider him insincere, a clever technician, and
not particularly intelligent^ How far I can use
him for my political purposes depends on further
development s»
VEESENIviAYER, on 34 April 1944, reported to Ribbentrop,
through RITTER, that Sztoj?iy had given a binding promise that,
by the end of April, 40,000 Jews fit to work would be placed
at the disposal of the Reich, that a drive had been started by
the SD and Hungarian Police, ?ind all Jews between the ages cf
38 :tnd 45 hitherto not liable to the labor service would be
registered and drafted, thus providing ,*xnother 50,000 during
the month of May, and had promised to increase the number of
Jews organized in labor battalions in Hungary to 100,000 or
150,000 at the same time.
On 14 April 1944 VEESEHMAYER reported to Ribbentrop,
via RITTER, that he had urged Sztojay to see to it that the
Hungarian press and radio offer much stronger opposition to
K-tllay and his Party,
On 15 April 1944 VEESSNMAYER reported that, upon his
demajid, the Minister President, Sztojay, had agreed to place
at Germany's disposal 50,000 Jews by the end of the month,
that he would receive 5,000 forthwith -ind thereafter 5,000
every three or four d-tys until the number of 50,000 was
reached.
On 23 April 1944 VEESENBAAYER reported to the Foreign of-
ficej and also to RITTER, that 150,000 Jews had already been put
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Iinto ghettos and that when the action was completed the number
would approximate 300,000; thiat an additional 250,000 to
300,000 were yet to be dealt with; that negotiations for
transportation had been str.rted and that the shipment of 3,000
a d^ty vjould begin on M.*Ay 15, and that Auschwitz had been
designated-as the receiving station.
On 27 April 1944 RITTER, from S.olzburg, wired the
G-erm.'in Legation in Budapest that the Chief of the Security
Police and Security Service stated that the deportation of
50,000 Hungarian Jev/s, on an open labor assignment to plants
in G-ermany, v;as out of the question because it would m.-ike
"Illusory" the complete evacuation of Jews from Reich
territory and the effected exclusion of Jews" from the plants
in the ibich, but that there was no objection to bringing
Hungarian Jews in to Reich labor o-jnps under the complete
control of Himmler; that the SD would issue a separate
directive concerning their transportation. HITTER further
suggested that in case of further delay in transportation the
Embassy at Budapest, in its telegraphic reports, m.-ike clear
that the German Embassy had done everything possible and
necessary to carry out the operations as quickly as possible,
and that the delay in deportation was due to the fact that
the authorities in charge of deportation and placement of
Jews did not make the necessary arrangements,
^ The term "labor camp under the control of the Reichs-
fuehrer SS" was a euphemism for the extermination camp.
On 28 April 1944 VEESENMYER, as per HITTER'S earlier
instructions, reported to Ribbentrop through RITTER concerning
the successful efforts to remove nineteen of the Hungarian dis
trict presidents, stating that he would shortly dem.and the with
drawal of more; that the successors to those already removed
-494-
represented a substantially better category and that increased
opposition from Horthy was to be expected,
VEESENLIAYER on 50 April reported to RITTER relative to
the arrest of Jews and the proposed persecutions of Catholic
priests for mrthing anti-German remarks.
On 2 M;<y 1944 VEESENMAYER reported to Ribbentrop,
through RITTER, that in accordance with Korthy's wishes SS
Obergruppenfuehrer Winkelmann and Gruppenfuehrer Keppler (not
^ the defendant KEPPLER) were presented; that Horthy insisted
on the integrity of Kallay and the other ministers ,-ind that
f
^ Hitler's reproaches in 1943 were unjust, but that VEESENMYER
left not a single point unanswered, as the result of v/hich
Horthy said it would be better to talk about the weather.
On 5 May 1944 VEESENMAYER reported to the Foreign Office
and also to RITTER that in Zone I, in the Carpathian territory,
approximately 200,000 Jews had oeen placed In ten camps and
ghettos, ?ind, in Zone II, the work of placing an additional
* 110,000 Jews in concentration camps .-aid camps had begun :tnd
that their evacuation to Germany was to start on 15 May at the
j rate of 3,000 per day.
On 8 May 1944 VEESENIi^AYER wired RITTER that Count
Bethlen and Dr. Janos-Schilling dis.-pproved of the action
against the Jews which was under way in a certain district,
and that they had both gone on sick leave and that Bethlen had
declared that he would not rtnd did not want to become a mass
murderer rtnd would rather resign. VEESENMAYER stated; nj gh-ai
dem'.nd that Count Bethlen -jid Dr. Schilling be called back."
Subsequently both Count Bethlen and Schilling were removed
from office.
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On 10 May 1944 VEESSNHAYER relayed reports to
Ribbentrop, through HITTER, that the purge of Hungarian
provincial sdministration was oroceeding satisfactorily, and
that 41 of the 62 governors had been dismissed r-ind that 38
new ones had been appointed.
On 26 May 1944 von Thadden of the Foreign Office
submitted a report, a copy of which went to HITTER, regarding
the situation of the Jews in Hungary. He stated that the
estimated number of Jews in Hungary was 900,000 to 1,000,000,
350,000 of whom lived in Budapest, and that, except for those
who were concentrated in ghettos, an action was planned to
start in Budapest between the middle and end of July to be
a "tremendous one-day action"; that according to present
information, about one-third of the Jews so far deported
were able to work and on arriv.'tL in concentration camos
would be distributed to the agencies of Sauckel, Org-'-iniza-
tion Todt, etc,
VEESENJjIAYER made periodic reports of the number of
Jews who had been deported to the Reich or to the East, most
of which went to RITTER or to Ribbentrop via HITTER.
On 3 July 1944 Ribbentrop Instructed VEESENl^lAYER to
tell the Hungarian Government that it was not opportune to
t;ike up the various offers from abro;.Ld on behalf of the
Hungari.-in Jews. VEESSNI '^iAYER on 6 July 1944 reported to
Ribbentrop, through RITTER, on the Jewish question In Hungary
and the appeals made by the King of Sweden and the Pope on
behalf of the Jews; that the Hungarian counter-intelligence
had deciphered code messages from the American and British
Governments to their ministers at Beme which oont.-ined
detailed descriptions of what had been happening to Jews
from Hungary; that 1,000,000 had .already been exterminated
and that a majority of the deported Jews were suffering
the B^^me fate, ,
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On 6 July 1944 "VESSEKIvlAYER reported to Riboentrop,
through RITTER, regarding the conference with the Hung.-trlan
Regent, Horthy, In which the latter urgently requested that
Hitler speedily close down the G-estapo, in order to restore
Hungari.-tn sovereignty, and spoke of the protests he was
daily receiving from the Vatican and the King of Sweden, also
from Switzerland and the Red Cross and others, concerning the
Jewish question, together with the determination to intercede
in favor of the Christian Jews; he stated he told the Regent
•{
that, as long as Hungary did not totally disassociate herself
from the treacherous policies of Kallay, the 5S and SD
agencies could not be discontinued; that the solution of the
Jewish problem could not have been completed without Germany's
support; that the Hungarian people increasingly recognized
the burdens which the Jews made for Hungary, VEESENi.lAYER
also demanded the removal of the Hungarian Minister Gsatay
and his deputy Ruszkicay-Ruediger,
^ On 20 July 1944 Ribbentrop^s office wired VEESSNJaAYER
asking for a report on 1he British radio charge that "Germany
^ wants to transact business with Jewish blood" and that two
I- Hungarian delegates had appeared in Turkey to submit an offer
from the Gestapo and the Hungarian Government that all
Hungari.'ui Jews In Hungary would receive exit permits on the
condition that British and Americans supply Hungary with a
certain hmount of medicaments and tr^Lnsportation.
On 22 July VEESENI/IAYER reported to Rlbbentrop, through
RITTER, that from some confidential information given him
the British report was' correct, and w/is the result of a
secret order of Himmler,
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On 24 October 1944 VESSENMAYER reported to Ribbentrop,
a copy of which was listributel to RITTER, that he hal hanled
a note to the Hungarian Foreign Minister regarding the Jewish
situation and the Regent^s decision not to permit any
Hungarian Jews to be deported to the Reich, and that it was
onlj'' after 16 October, under the advisory cooperation of
Gorman agencies, that new negotiations were started with the
aim to find a final solution for the Jewish question in
Hungary.
An examination of the alleged incriminating documents
with respect to Hungarian Jewish affairs under Count "Five
S presents a somewhat puzzling picture. Except in the very
early days of VEESENIiiiAYER'S incixmbency as Minister and
Plenipotentiary, there is nothing to indicate that RITTER
took any action, gave any advice or any directives. It
appears that, for a number of months, VEESENMYER almost
invariably sent his reports to Ribbentrop through RITTER,
or made reports bearing the marginal note, "Also for Herr
r
RITTER," But that is as far as the record goes.
No witness has testified that RITTER took any action
yj whatsoever with respect to these reports. A plausible, and,
we are inclined to believe, the truthful explanation of the
situation, is given by the defendant. At the time VEESENLiAYER
was sent to Budapest, there was in contemplation, and there
after put into execution, a plan for the German armed forces to
i invade Hungary, intern its armed forces, .'And secure the country
against any attempt on the part of its Regent or Government to
conclude ;.in armistice or peace. Insofar as Hungary became /in
operational area, VEESENMAYER, as Reich Plenipotentiary, had
no jurisdiction, under the Fuehrer Decree, to interfere with or
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direct military oper.ations« During that stage cf proceedings,
however, involving as it did the invasion of the lands of .•;in
ally, the Foreign Office was deeply interested inasmuch as it
intended to use this invasion to force the Horthy Government
to appoint a pro-German cabinet. Therefore, the need of
close liaison between the German Minister in Budapest, the
Foreign Minister, and the Chief of the Wehrmacht, was imperative
RITTER was the liaison officer, and, under the circum
stances, it Was entirely natural that Ribbentrop should have
instructed him to give attention to Hungarian affairs so that
•the work of the Wehrmacht ruid the policy of the Foi-eign Office
j might be coordinated and work toward the objectives in view.
This would account for Ribbentrop*s instructions to RITTER,
and it ^aso accounts for the fact that, apparently, RITTER
ceased to interest himself in the situation after the ^Vehmacht
withdrew in April 1944. A realization on the part of Ribbentrop
(
that cooperation, thus compelled, was not likely to be wholly
•4 satisfactory, ;ind that the Hungarians might attempt to regain
sovereign power and pursue their own foreign policy and thus
the use of the Wehrmacht might ag;jln become necess.ary, readily
explains why the instructions given to VEESENMAYER to report
to the Foreign Minister through or via RITTER were not rescinded,
HITTER'S knowledge of the situation, from the receipt
of VEESENIAYER'S reports, may be reasonably inferred, but
RITTER is not to be convicted because of what he knew. He can
only oe found guilty for what he did.
The evidence is not sufficient to warrant his conviction
under Count Five so far as Hungary is concerned, and he must "dq
)And is exonerated and found NOT GUILTY with respect thereto.
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STUCKART
STUCKART wuB born in 1902, He stulled nt the
Universities of Munich tmcL Frunkfurt and passed his state
law ex.-onination in 1930. He joined the Party in 1922 and
remained a member until it v/as dissolved oy decree during
the life of the Weimar Republic. When arrested by the
French in 1923 or 1924, his membership was taken from him.
Nevertheless, from 1926 to 1931 he acted as legal officer
to the Party organization in Wiesbaden rind fonm-aiy re-
entered the Party in August 1938. He occupied a judicial
position and from March 1931 until February 1932 was a
trial judge in the local and district court at IViesbaden.
Because of continued official difficulties resulting from
his work for the Party he resigned .-tnd entered the practice
of law at Stettin, He took over the Cau law office in
Pomeranla and was Gau Fuehrer of the NSRB.
In April 1933, shortly after the seizure of power,
he was appointed the provisional mayor rind state commissioner
of Stettin and was elected to the Pomeranian Provlncira
Assembly on 17 July 1934. Hindenburg appointed him Under
secretary of the Reich Ministry for Science and Education.
In 1935 he was appointed by Hitler to the Ministry of the
Interior and placed in charge of Division I. At that time,
although holding the nominal rank of State Secretary, which
he carried over from his appointment in the Ministry of
Science and Education, he did not hold the position of State
Secretary in the Ministry of the Interior until Hlmmler
succeeded Friok, He was officially appointed State Secretary
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1In 1943, when Frlck left the Ministry and Pfundner, who
hacL been "the sole State Secretary f resigned.
Division I was divided Into appropriate sections and
had jurisdiction over constitutional and organizational law,
legislation and administrative law, citizenship and race,
new organization in the southeast, the protectorate of
Bohemia and Moravia, new organization in the east, new
orgtoiization in the west, Reich defense, military defense
statute and defense law, and war damage.
Prick appointed him staff leader for the Plenipotentiary
of Reich Administration, As Hitler's aggressive campaigns
proceeded, the defend.'int STUCKART became head of the central
office for the following countries: Austria, the Sudetenland,
Bohemia and Moravia, Alsace-Lorraine, Norway, the Southeastern
territories, - Yugoslavia and Greece, and Bi<alystok. The
function of these central offices was to coordinate and
implement all measures deemed necessary to complete the
i^tails of their incorporation into the Reich, or to the
^®eds and aims of Germany therein.
On ? December 1939, Goering appointed STUCKART, the
defend,-mt KOERNSR, and various other state secretaries as
» membersof the Gener^^GL Council for the Four Year Plan,
As its n;-ime implies, the Ministry of the Interior
jurisdiction over practically all matters relating to
order and security of the Reich and in all areas
^^^ich were attempted to be incorporated therein, and in
the Occupied Territories, as well as practically all other
^^gislation (except in very limited fields) which affected
daily life of the people.
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In theoiy, at least, all police affairs were a part
of and subordinate to the Ministry, Until he himself became
Minister of the Interior, Himmler, as Chief of Police,
Ordinary, Secret and Spociril, was the Bjllnister^s subordinate,
but in practice he became almost completely independent.
When Frich, in 1943, left the Ministry, Himmler succeeded
him ^ind thus made himself supreme in all matters for which
the Ministry was competent. Throughout the Nazi regime, few
of the measures, administrative or executive, and almost
none of the laws or regulations, which formed the foundations
of Nazi persecution, were undertrthen vjlthout the consent,
advice, and affirmative action of this Ministry. The so-
o;lLled Gsrmanization progr^jn was one in which the Ministry
of Interior was deeply involved. We shall not repeat what
has already been said regarding it. That this scheme of
mass deportation, evacuation and forced settlement was a
flagrant breach of International law and a crime against
humanity has been established beyond question of doubt. Our
only tash is to determine what part, if any," STUCKART played
therein, and the degree of criminal responsibility attaching
to him.
On 8 December 1939, the Bllnistry of Interior Issued
a decree addressed to the Reich Governors of D;inzlg, Posen,
Koenlgsborg, and Breslau, giving detailed instructions con
cerning the authority of Himmler as Commissioner for the
Strengthening of German.dom, st.atlng that his appointment made
no changes in the competency of the intermediate and lower
/»
authorities, except that they wore to fulfill Himmler's
directives. This decree merely implemented and clarified
the Fuehrer- Decree creating the Office for Germ'inlzation,
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In order thnt the governors and other lower echelons might
clearly understand their duties and responslhilities. It
was prepared in STUCKART^ S. Department I East.
On 12 November 1942, Himmler issued a gener-a order
designating the Zamosc area in occupied Poland as a settle
ment area# A copy of this was sent to STUCKART'S suoordihate,
Ministerialrat Duckart,
Exhibits 1329 to 1333 consist of correspondence' in
* the spring of 1944 concerning the return of Germans who
had been settled in the Government General to the Reich. •
y The prosecution contends that this was a part of the
Germanization and resettlement program, but we do not so
view it. By that time the rapid advance of the Russi?in
armies necessitated abandoning that area, and we think
that STUCKART'S recommendations and suggestions as to the
pl.'tce where the refugees could be accommodated, namely,
East and West PrussiajNvre brought about because of the
jf necessity of providing some place for these people to live
either permanently or until such time as they could return
to their domicile in the Government General, That the
majority of the people so concerned had been resettled
in the Government General contrary to international law
^ and th.-tt the circumstances of their settlement and evacuation
of Polish nationals was a crime against humanity we have no
doubt, but the instances in question do not constitute a
part of the crime.
On 17 August 1942, STUCKART attended a conference
at the Fuehrer headquarters at which the defendant BERGER,
Lorenz, Preutzmann and Grelfelt of the SS were oresent.
The mistreatment of 45,000 ethnic Germans, who had been
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settled in the Ukraine, and the suitability of the Latvians
and Lithuanians, was also discussed. It was then determined
that the Lettgalls must be evacuated from Latvia, that the
Lithuanians could not be considered for Germanization because
of alleged mental slowness and their strain of Slavic olood.
It was said that no difficulty should be encountered in
White Ruthenia, as the population there was not intellectuta
and had no political ambitions; that the Crimea should be
resettled at strong points so that toivns of 15,000 to 20,000
inhabitants would grow up there ftnd around them a completely
Germap agricultural population resettled. It was also
suggested that it must be kept in mind that that part of a
nation which was valuable from a racial viewpoint could not
be won over if they have been previously systematically
robbed, as had occurred in Estonia, v^rhere the so-called
German business managers were receiving 1500 marks or more
a month, while the previous Estonian owners, who looked °fter
the business, received a salary of 300 marks, and that it
was disastrous if slogans like the following should be coined:
"St€>'ling is called mania with the little
people, kleptomania with the distinguished
people, Jind Germ.-inia'with the Germans."*
It is evident that those present at that meeting were
adequately jnformed of the nature of the Germanization and
resettlement progrrtm, if they were not theretofore intimately
acquainted with it, out it is also clear that one of the
purposes of the meeting was to cure aouses suffered oy
German resettlers, such as had occurred in the Ukraine.
Not only were strong criticisms expressed but plans were
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made to correct conditions. The conference discloses
indignation concerning the strong criticism of the adminis
tration in the Ukraine, so far as the resettlements were
concerned, but did not concern itself with respect to the
wrongs and persecutions which had been imposed on the native
population.
On 26 November 1942, portions of Serbia were selected
^ for resettlement, and on 8 December 1942, measures for the
1
resettlement of Bosnian ethnic Germans were determined upon.
Copies of these communications were sent to STUCKART'S
^ subordinate, Duckart.
On 29 March 1959, STUCKART'S Division I prepared,
and Pfundner, State Secretary, signed, a directive to the
Regional Governors and Reich Commissioners for the Saar,
Sudetenland and Austria, and to the Chief of the Civil
Administration in the Protectorate, giving definitions
of the terras, Wmemberit of the Gorman people," and "ethnic
^ Germanis," and how and in what manner members of these groups
become eligible for Ibich citizenship and which were to be
excluded from such classification.
On 30 May 1942, STUCKART, deputizing for Frick, with
^ . Hermann of the Party Chancellory, and Hlmmler, signed a
' second decree on the German people's lists and German
citizenship in the Incorporated Eastern Territories, Among
other things, it excluded Jews and gypsies from the status
Of "protectees."
In this connection STUCKART insists that his original
draft provided that Jews should have the status of protectees,
and there is evidence substantiating this statement. We
have, however, carefully examined the dooumonts, and we
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do not believe that their rights or status as protectees
were intended to be greater than if not given that appellation,
On 30 May 1942, STUGKART also signed-, as a deputy,
a decree prepared at Himmler^s request, establishing a
supreme court for ethnic classifications In the Eastern
r
Territories.
STUCKART was informed in February 1942 of directions
I regarding the classification and subsequent treatment of
^ certain classes of people included in the ethnic German
list or register. They ordered that those who might be
i placed in Class IV should be deported into the Reich and
resettled there, or, if they were asocial, of inferior
heredity or of b,ad political record, they were turned over
to the police to be imprisoned in concentration camps;
that where a wife also had a bad political record she was
to receive the same treatment, and the children, in that
event, ttiken from her and resettled in the Reich; that
* persons who had previously practiced professions involving
leadershipTcre to be "re-educated" for other professions,
not involving leadership; that the children were to
be compelled to join the Hitler Youth, but not allowed
I to attend local secondary schools or universities unless
^ they had been attending a German boarding school for at
least three years, and had been designated by that school
^ for university attendance; that the property of those
who were not sent to the concentration camps was to remain
in custody of the >SS orgrtnization, and they were to be per
mitted-to receive such installments of their own property
as the 53 determined in order that they might support them-
selves and pay necessary expenses; that those who were to
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"oe resettled In the Reich were ohliged to immediately join
an orgimizatlon associated with the Party, and the children
to join the Hitler Youth movement; they were forhidden to
change their domicile during the first five years, to marry,
or to start university studies without police consent. The
Higher SS and Police Leaders were enjoined to take particular
care that the re-G-ermanization of the children was not
adversely influenced by their parents, and, if necessary,
to separate them from their people and place them with
families of proved political and ideological opinion.
In July 1943, Ehrensherger of STUCKART'G division
issued orders, addressed to the Reich Govei^nors in the East
and the heads of the Central Offices for German Registration
in East Prussia and Upper Silesia and to many regional
offices, with copies to the various supreme Reich authorities,
regarding the classification of step, foster, and illegitimate
children in the Eastern Territories. Among other things it
described many oiroumst?inces under which children were to
be taken away from their parents and sent away to the Reich
or put in German families or treated as Polish orphans.
On 22 May 1944, STUCKART'S division prepared a decree
addressed to the citizenship authorities in the Reich terri
tory, directing that care be taken that ethnic Germans ;tnd
Germ.-tnized persona did not avoid registration and recognition
of their German citizenship in order to avoid military
service-; that should ethnic Germans .-ind foreign nation,-tls,
regarded as completely Germanized, refuse to submit
an application for recognition of this German citizenship
after having been instructed so to do, they should be
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reportel to the SD, which would then t?d£e action. Under
the Himmler Decree of 16 February 1942, it stated that the
RSHA would apply this decree to ethnic G-ermrans residing
outside the Incorporated Eastern Territories ?/ho refused
to raahe this application. This simply meant that such
persons would be subjected to police measures, including
the concentration camp.
It is to be remembered that this applied not only to
ethnic Germans and Germanized foreigners who came voluntarily
into the Reich, but included those who had been brought there
involuntarily and upon whom German citizenship had been
conferred without their willingness or consent. While
conscription laws may be applied to all those who voluntarily
take up their domicile in a country, it can hardly be said
that the citizens of other nations who have, against their
will and without expressing any desire to move, been deported,
c;m then be made subject either to involuntary citizenship
or to conscription lawso
A decree prepared by Section I of STUCKART'S division
on 13 March 1941 became the basis of various Himmler orders
and directives relating to the Germanlzation lists and
arbitrarily conferred citizenship on inhabitants of various
occupied territories.
On 4 May 1942 STUCKART signed two orders, with
copies to the highest Reich authorities, the Party
Chancellory, etc., giving directions to the various natural-
iz<ation agencies as to the means, methods, and procedure to
be followed and extending the measures to former polish or
Danzig citizens.
On 15 January 1945 STUCKART wrote the OKW forvrardlng
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fcertain changes in definitions of those v/ho were subject
to Germanization, distinguishing between "members of the
German oeoplej" "Germr-d nationals," ."German nationals whose
natlonraity may be rejected," "Germans abroad," "ethnic
Germans," etc.
As early as 11 February 1942 STUCKART informed the
defend,-int WEISGAEGKEH about the recruiting of male Alsatians
for service in the army brought about by the application of
Germc-m law, ISEIoSAECKER in reply told STUCKART that although
in principle he could not relinquish his point of view, he
was prep'.red to waive his protest as "our actions in Alsace-
Lorraine had far surpassed -and overshadowed the incident
referred to here,"
On 5 August 1942 STUCKART wrote Himmler enclosing
a draft of a decree conferring citizenship in Alsace-Lorraine
and a draft of the implementing regulations- He plainly
states that Hitler, a short time before, had given orders,
for the introduction of compulsory military service there.
STUCKART not only made no objection out gave reasons for
the approv-a of these measures. There is no question w.hat-
soever that a large number of these conscriptees not only
had no desire to serve in the German army, out were
particularly averse to the compulsory change in their
nationality.
On 15 April 1944 Himmler issued a directive, prepaied
by STUCKART'S Section I, regarding the treatment of mixed
marriages between Poles and Germans, which provided, among
other things, that if, upon examination, it was found that
both spouses were unsuitaole from a political, ^•^iological,
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ideological or socisl point of view, they should be placed in
Classes III and iV, and if the G-erman partner was already in
that class, his name would be stricken from the register and,
if necessary, his citizenship revoked and the f«^jDily broken
up.
On 5 August 1944 the RSHA issued a directive stating
that under the decree of 5 April 1943, which was prepared by
STUCKART'S Section I, a male Pole could not marry before,
reaching the age of 2& years or a female before 25 years.
The purpose of this regulation was to reduce the birth rate
among the Poles.
STUCKART'S Anti-Semitism, The evidence clearly establishes
that STUCKART held strong anti-Semitic views, and that while
in office, both before and during the war, he used his offi
cial position to carry them out,
STUCKART asserts that his position in the Ministry of
Interior was minor during Prick's tenure and he was but a
glorified clerk under Himmler, We do not believe this to be
the fact. He was too often chosen by Frick to act in capa
cities requiring both knowledge, ability, experience and
strength of character. Prom the record itself and from the
defendant's own demeanor on the stand it is quite apparent
that he possessed these qualifications. His advice was asked
and given. Many of the original decrees an'^ most of the
implementing decrees relating to anti-Jewish measures were,
drafted by him, or in his department under his supervision.
When Hitler decided to enact the Nurnberg Laws, which was the
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first step in the long contin-uecL c-Hmpaign of persecution
of Jews, STUCKART v/as callel to ail in drafting them and
did so,
•The following laws .and decrees were prepared by him
or by his dep.artment ujider his direction, and some were even
signed or initialed by him:
The Reich Citizenship Law of 15 September 1935;
The First Decree supplementary thereto on 14
November 1935;
The Ninth Supplementary Decree of 5 May 1939;
The Tenth Supplementary Becree of 4 July 1939;
The Eleventh Supplementary Decree of 25 November 1941;
The Law for the Protection of German Blood and German
Honor on 15 Seotemoer 1935;
The First Decree supplementing that law on 14
November 1935;
The Seaond Supplementary Decree of 31 May 1941;
The Third Suoolementary Decree of 5 July 1941;
The law of 5 January 1938, concerning family and
Christian names;
The Memorandum of 18 August 1938 requiring Jews
to use a Jewish first name;
The Second Decree of 17 August 1938, regarding
change in nrune or Christian names;
The Decree of 20 July 1941, denying war damage
to Jews; and
The Second Decree supplementing the memorandum
concerning the revocation of nationality and
deprivation of German nationality.
In addition, the Minister of the Interior signed or
co-signed the following decrees:
The Third, Fifth, and Sixth Supplementary Decrees to
the Reich Citizenship Law, dated 14 June 1938,
27 September 1938, and 31 October 1938, respectively
The Law of 28 March 1938, and
The First and Second Supplementary Decrees concerning
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the st.'Ltus of Jewish religious congre.-ttions;
The Decree Hnl Orler of 12 November 193&, elimin tting
Jews from C-erman economic life;
The Beoree of 14 November 194C, relating to the
ex;imination .'inl checking of businesses from
which Jews had been purged;
The Fourth Decree of 27 December 1940, conGerning
the utilization of Jewish property;
The Decree of 26 April 1938, concerning the registrrt-
tion of Jewish property;
The Decree of 14 December 1938, for the elimination
of Jews from Germ/ui commercirtl life;
The'Second Decree of 18 J-inuary 1940, concerning the
use of Jewish property;
The Fifth Decree of 25 April 1941, rel.-iting to the
G?Hjne subject;
The police regulations of 1 September 1941, concerning
the marking of Jews;
The Sixth Decree of 22 August 1942, concerning the
utilization of Jewish property; and
The Decreesof 3December 1938, 16 June 1939, and 5
December 1939, concerning this same matter.
With respect to the decrees last named, it should be
said tha.t most of them were prepared by another Ministry,
because the subject matter was primarily within the
Jurisdiction of that Ministry, and submitted to the
Minister of the Interior for examination, and, if approved,
for co-signature. These dr-'-xfts went to STUCKARTS division
for ex.-anlnatlon and report to the Minister.
The following,decrees were prepared by the Ministry
%
of the Interior but not in STUCKART'S department, but he
bec.-ijne one cf the Joint co-signers as chief of the
"participating department": the Second Supolement to the
Reich Citizenship Law of 2 December 1935; the Fourth
Supplement of 25 July 1938; the Seventh Supplement of
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5 December 1938, anl the Eighth, of Janu?Lry 1939.
All the decrees in these three classes were
identified by the vritness Bernhard Loesner, who was
one of STUCKART'S referents, and in charge of the
section regarding racial and Jewish matters.
He states that, on STUCKART'S appointment as
Chief of Division I, a change took place in the ministry;
that STUCKART was active, able and ambitious, and seized
hold of the reins and to an increasing extent became the
real Minister of the Interior, due to Frlck's wez-ikness
and la.ck of interest in his work, and the fact that
Ffundner, who was not a convinced National Socialist,
had no Party backing and was not particularly fitted
for the position.
Pfundrier vanished when Frick resigned and
Hlmraler bectme Minister of the Interior. Loesner
states that !'X least up to the time when STUCKART
joined the 33, which was on 13 September 1936, he
fought a valiant fight on behalf of the Jewish
Mischlings, but thereafter it became more difficult
for the witness to approach him on this subject, rand
that in the year 1941 the final solution aimed at
Jewish annihilation was effected by the Party and
that by the end of 1941 no doubt could exist on the
part of anyone who had to deal with these problems,
that on 21 December 1941 he dem-mded and obtained an
appointment with STUCKART, and reported to him the
description given to-him by Dr. Feldscher, of the fate
of the German Jews who had been deported to Riga;
how they had been compelled to dig-,. • « mass •gi>av-e^, to
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strip themselves of their clothes, He lown n.-tked in the
gr.'tve Tvhere they were shot oy 3S men, 'jnd then the next
group w.'is compelled to disrobe, descend, and lie down on
the bodies cf those first murdered to meet the same fate;
that he told STUCKART he could no longer act as referent
on Jewish matters, and asked to oe released; that the
defend;.nt told him, "Herr Loe»sner, do you not know that
all this takes place by the highest order?" to which
Loesner reoHed, "I h.ave a judge within myself who tells
me what to do,'' whereupon STUCKART said that if Loesner
could no longer be reconciled to his own conscience he
would consider how he was to be further employed, and
the witness thereupon requested to be transferred from
the Ministry to the Reich Administrative Court; that
his request was not complied with for many months and
the rel.ations between himself and STUCKART oecame more
or less strained, although he had the impression that
up to the time he left the Ministry in 1943 STUCKART
did not reject Loesner's views about half-Jews and mixed
marriages.
With regard to G-ermanization, the witness
reports a conversation with STUCKART in 1938 regarding
the G-erraan naturalization of Transylvanian physicians,
that he expressed misgivings about this program, but
STUCKART replied brusquely, "It doesn't matter. In the
event of war we cannot have enough ohysicians ;uid
technicians." Loesner gave this affidavit on the 24th
of February, 1948. He himself beofone a victim of Nazi
persecution and was finally confined in a concentration
camp .-aid not released until after the collapse. He was
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c.'tllel to the stand and testified he had re-examined his
affidavit and with the exception of one or two minor
corrections, which related only to the laws and decrees
mentioned in the appendices to Exhibit 2500, confirmed it
and its contents.
On cross-examination, without repudiating any part
of the affidavit he had just confirmed, he was quite prolific
in his efforts,both on'behalf of STUCKART and LAI/il'.ERS, and
testified in a manner inconsistent with the conversations
mentioned in his affidavit relating to the treatment of Jews.
It is quite apoarent, as has hapbened on a number of
other occasions in this case, that between the time the
affid-'.vit had been made /ind the witness testified, he had
teen subjected to influence.
This Tribunal is not unaware of the fact that there has
grown up in Germany a crmpaign of oropaganda to discourage <-:Lnd
dissuade Germans from appearing to testify against fellow
,Germ:ins who have been charged with crimes against inter
national law. That this campaign has been successful is
equally ole/ir and it has made more difficult the task of
ascertaining the facts. We io not' suggest, however, that in
this instance either counsel or defend/mt were other than
beneficiaries of this c.-onpalgn. Nevertheless, the statements
contained InLoesner's affidavit are obviously spontaneous
and relate to matters which could not have been suggested to
«
him by the interrogator. We are here not to blindly accept
testimony but to weigh it. We believe, and so hold, that
the statements made by the affiant Loesner in his affidavit,
I
and confirmed by him under oath before this Trlcunal, are
sub.st.'intiaH.ly true.
In justice to the defendant it should be said that we
are convinced that for a long time he courageously fought
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' the measures ag.-dnst the Mlschllngs and attempted to inter
vene in favor of mixed marriages.
The draft of the letter to Himmler prepared in
Septemoer 1942 evidences his inner convictions even though
it is not entirely -clear that it was in fact sent. It is
true that this letter again reiterates the suggestion made
oy STUCKART in the Wannsee Conference for sterilization of
Mischlings, but there the story is rot clear whether it was
seriously meant or whether it was thro-.m out as a solution
when STUCKART knew that it was a orogram tvhich could not be
carried out because of a. shortage of surgeons and beds for
the thous.'inds who would oe suojected to it, and th.at STUCKART
felt that by making this suggestion he would delay and avoid
more stringent measures and the plan would finally oe dropped.
Not being satisfied as to the fact, we must and do giye
STUCKART the benefit of the doubt. However, one thing is
clear, that no one would suggest sterilization as a
"orocedure of amelioration unless he was wholly convinced
that deportation meant a worse fate, namely, death.
The extermination of the Jews was no secret in the
Ministry of the Interior. The witness Globke, one of
STUCKART'S Ministerial Counsellors, whom he called as a
witness, testified:
"A I knew that the Jews were being killed
in large numbers, find I was always of the
ooinion that there were Jews who were still
living in Germany or in Thereslenstadt or
elsewhere in a sort Oj. Ghetto*
(By Defense Counsel)
"Q You thought that there were executions but
no systematic extermination?
'^ A No, I did not want to say that. I am of
the ooinion, and I knew that at the time,
that the extermination of the Jews was
carried on systematically, but I did
know that it was supposed to apply to all
Jews,"
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STUCKAHT left the SA to become a member cf the SS
because he thought it more advantageous to belong to the
SB. His lust r.'ink in that organization was Obergruppen-
fuehrer and the witness Globke had the impression that
STUCKART liked to show himself in public in his SS uniform.
He also testified that before Himmler became Minister of
the Interior he repeatedly approached STUCKAP^-T in order
to get his suggestions adopted by that Ministry, out that
after Himmler became Minister, his rel'^.tionshlp with
STUCKART vjr.Q not so close.
We do not doubt that this is true. The fact remains,
however, that upon Himmler* s appointment as Minister, he
immediately promoted STUCKART to the position^of State
Secretary, and except as to divisions dealing with puollc
health ^md probably those dealing with sports, STUCKART
was the competent state secretary in charge of the.opera
tions of the Ministry. Knowing what we do about Himmler
and his character, it is quite unlikely that he would
have retained STUCKART unless he felt that the latter would
do his bidding and carry out his policy. This we think
STUCKART did and strangled his oivn conscience.
On 20 April 1940, STUCKART wrote to the Ministerial
Council for Reich Defense, for the attention of the
defendant LAIl.RRS, concerning a decree for the tre.atraent
of Jews un'^ ^er O-erm.-Ln labor laws, stating that he felt that
it was not permissible to pay Jews for working hours lost
on New Year's Day, Easter Sunday, Whit Monday, or Christmas
Day, notwithstanding the fact that German laoor was so
entitled under the law, and recommended that they be
excluded from these privileges.
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:
On 6 Se^.tetTiber 1939 STTJCYJJBT transmitted to the
Kiniv'^terial Council for I?eioh Defense s proposed decree
vjhich m®de sabotage of the German war effort applicable
to the inhabitants of Bohemia and Moravia irrespective
of their nationality.
on 15 July 1942 •'=^TUCKi;.RT, v-ith P.chlegelberger and
Feitel, signed an order subjecting non-Germans charged
v?ith having attacked a member of the S8 or German police
to the jurisdiction of combined S"5 and Police Courts.
This was for the nurpose of depriving the accused
of tri*='l by the ordinary courts of the state where the
crime was committed. Inasmuch as the members of these
organizations were present in Bohemia and Moravia, in
obvious violation of international law, and as a part of
the aggression against Czechoslovakia, there was no legal
basis for such legislation, and the scant shrift v'hich SS
and Police Courts gave to any non-German before them needs
no elaboration.
In /.^ril, 1944, STUCia.PT'S Department I wrote
regarding the then proposed Eleventh Ordinance
Supplementing the Reich Citizenship Law, regarding the
sterilization of Jews. It not only shows an adherence
to the measures but argues the propriety and visdom thereof,
and it speaks with apnroval of provisions by which Jews
could be declared stateless, even though guilty of no
offense.
On 7 July 1941, BTUdFi»RT'S Division I Ea^t pre
pared a. communication to the defendant Chief of the
Re i ch i •/Chancellory, a.s well as to the highest Reich agencies
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concerning the dr^ft of the Sleventh Ordinence Sup-Ele
menting the Heich Citizenship LavJ v;hiGh contains the
follo' ing illuminating language:
•"Ehe legal effects of the draft pre tied to the
permament residence of the Jev , . . , This
meana that for the establishment of the perma
nent residence only objective points of view
pre of importance; the free vdll of the person
concerned is immpterial in this connection.
Therefore, all the Jews evacuated into the
Government General come under this regulation."
(Emphasis furnished)
Thus not only lev/s Y>ho lived abroad or should thereafter
emlgpate of their ovjn choice, but the hapless ones who
were deported, not only lost their citizenship and became
stateless, but suffered confiscation of property. A more
heartless provision can hardly be ime.ginec ,
On the same da.te, in connection with the same com
munication, STUCKhHT wrote to LZ-M'-IERf. stating that he did
not contemplate including in the decree the provision
contained in the previous draft that the permanent place
of residence in the Government General is equal to a
permanent place of residence abroad, because it seemed
inappropriate to ,devSign^te the Government General in a.
decree as a foreign country.
On 2 June 1942, STUCr/.BT wrote the Supreme Reich
/.gencies and others regarding the payment of pensions to
jewjs V'lho were deported to Lodz, stating th®t the Eleventh
Decree did not apply to them because Lodz vjas still a
part of Germany, but that because of the confiscation of
their property the payments of pensions woulc. be suspend
ed. STUCr/.RT had attended the w^nnsee Conference on 20
Jpnuary, 1942, where the program of deportation and ex
termination -"'as made clearly apparent.
-519-
on ?9 November, 1941, T '^lien Heyerich sent out invit^^-
tions to ettenc" the luncheon V'here the final solution vias
to be diecuFsed, oioe. of "which Trent to the ^efenc'.snt
STUCIC-.HT, end the other to Kritzinger of the defendant
L/jMiSRS' Reich Chancellory, he said:
"Concerning the extraordinary importance which
has to be conceded to these questions and_the
interest of the achievement of the same view
point by the central agencies concerned^with
the remaining v-orlc connectec. v-Jith this iinal
solution, I suggest to make these problems the
subject of a combined conversation, especially
since Jews are being evacuated_in continuous
transports from the Reich territory, incluc.ing
the Protectorate, Bohemia !=nd Moravia, to-the
East ever since 15 October, 1941,"
On ?1 September, 1939, "Heydrich v^rote to the Chiefs
of the Einsatzgruppen, copies of which went to STXJCKi'jRT, in
which communication he said:
"Subject: Je"wish question in the occupied territory.
* '^J'ith reference to today^s conference in Berlin
X am once more stresaing the entire measures(ergo the final aim) are to be strictly secret.
It has to be discriminated betvjeen (1) the final
aim (which will take some time) and (2) the
sections of fulfillment of this final aim which
will be achieved in short term."
In 1958 STUCF5RT published a monograph entitled, "The
Care for Race and Heredity in the Legislation of the Reich"
in which he said:
"The aim of racial legialafcioa has
and racial legialation can, therefore, be regard
ed. as eseLtiflly complete, p
above,. . to a preliminary solntion of the Jevish
problem and at the same time helps to prepare a
definite solution. ?fpny of ip thalose their importance "S the final solut^^
Jewish rrcblem in Cerm^ny is approached.
The prosecution in-ists that in the use of the term
"finpl solution" STUCIV.RT me«nt the extermination of the
Jews.
The first edition of this monograoh was nublished
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in 1938, !^s we h^ve ;^scertp.ined pfter conference with coun
sel for the prosecution snc^ the defense, Lt the time it
wes written the plen v:p.s not e:xtermination, but emigretion
or expulsion from Germany. It was not until at least two
years later th=it the "pl^n to murder the Jews en masse was
adopted, ^fhile this monogranh, therefore, does not refer to
mass exterminations, it does throw light upon STUCITjjRT'S
attitude toward anti-Semitism. His present excuse is that
he could not publish his actual viewse We do not, however,
believe th^t he had any feeling of tenderness for Jews,
or of repulsion against anti-Jewirh messurev'^ , and that
the efforts which he made on behalf of the Jf'isohlings
v;c-redue largely because he accurately foresaw the psycho*^
logical effect in Germany ^^^hich would arise from the
breaking up of m.arriages and the condemnation of those v?ho
had at least 50 per cent of Germ^^n blood in their veins,
We are convinced that STrJCF/.RT was fully «ware of the
fate which awaited Jews deported to the Hast and there can
be no doubt that the legislation »nd regulations, which he
drafted and approved, v^ere a component part of the program
"'hich was intended to and did result in the almost total
extermination of Jews, If the commanders of the death
cp^raps if'ho blindly followed order.s to murder the unfortunate
inmates, if those who im.plemented or carried out the orders
for the deportation of Jews to the East are properly tried
and convicted pnd punished - and of that we- have no question
whatsoever, - then those i^ho, in the comparative quiet and
peace of ministerial departments, aided the campaign by
drafting the neceappry decrees, regulations and directives
for its execution are likewise guilty.
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In all of there metterr the rkill, learning and
legal knowledge of PTUCiaET was placed at the diaposal
of those who originated the plan of extermination. The
fact that his conscience may have been troubled and the
fact that he saw not only the wrong but the folly of the
proposals with respect to Mischlings, cannot excuse or
condone what he did,
We find the defendant STUCFnET GUILTY under
Count Five,
#
In c^xpcupsing the chargee against EITTSR under Count
Five, v-'e- have a/^erted to much testimony •'which is applicable
to the defendant VEBSEMhYFR, and except vjhere necessary
we will not again refer to it. TSBPEm^YEE was a prote'go'
of the defendant KSPPLER and war employed in w'hat was then
kno^^n as the iTEPPiEB Office. He 'twas an enthusiastic and
convinced Nazi, He was detailed to pccoi!i"apny KKPPLER whan
f
the latter was sent to .Austria shortly before the /jnschluss,
end 'later •v^as given STtecial assignments to Danzig immediately
before the Polish invasion, and. to Croatia shortly before
the invasion of Croatia, and «galn when fighting broke out
there, ^^nd in 1943, was sent tv;loe to Hungary to conduct
secret investigations regarding the political situation
there. He v?as also sent to Slovakia in connection with the
anti-lewish campaign in that area. He was selected for
these and his final mission as Minister and plenipotentiary
to Hungary because of his ability, courage, and devotion
to the Nazi program.
Hungary. By the Fuehrer Decree of 19 March 1944, the
defendant BOTiAYER was appointed Minister and Plenipoten
tiary of the Reich to Hungary, then an ally of Germany, By
it he v?as m'^ dfe res'^'Onsible for *^11 political developments
in Hungary, and was to receive directives through Ribbentrop
regarding s«me. He was given the specif'l task of paving the
way for the formation of new national government, which
would carry out the will of Hitler and obligations imposed
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by th© Ttir©©—""^owsr hs V78S olisrge^- to keep tlie
IvTpzi governineiit edviFed of 811 idportent datters and
rerresent its interests — to insure that the entire
p.dniinistration of the country, as long as German troops
remained there, was managed by the new government under
his guidance in accordance vdth German directives, i*
Higher SS Leader was to be appointed to carry out duties
in connection with the Jewish problem, and to act under
*S political directives. The German troops in
Hungary were to remain under ;,rmy Command and "VEESENM'.TER
was ordered to meet their requirements. The /irmy was
under obligation to support "VEEP-ISsTM/jYER in his political
and administrative duties.
Paragraph 4 of the Hitler Decre'e contains the
following language: "German civilian offices of no matter
what nature ... may be established only with the corsent
of the Reich Plenipotentiary and they will be subordinate
to him and will act in accordance with his directives."
That Ribbentrop placed great importance on this paragraph
is clear from the fact that he ordered RITTER to inform
all top Reich agencies of it.
• The defendant strenuously contends that this clause
became a dead letter# The facts concerning it will be di^
cussed in consideration of the defense, YEESENMiiYER S
instructions, given him by RITTER were to cause himself to
be presented immediately to the Hungarian Regent, Horthy,
inform the latter of Hitler's order to form a new govern
ment, which was to include-Imredy, and in addition
was to nominate other members, in whom he had
confidence.
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On the follovdng day, £0 March 1944, RITTSR wired
hijn to confer v;ith Faltenbrunner and. arrange that all exits
of the castle be watched by the German Secret rollce, who
were to arrest the former Minister President, Kallay, if
he attempted to leave the castle.
imong the reasons which induced Hitler to thus shear
Hungary of most of its powers as a sovereign nation v;as
the fact that its policies towards the lews were unsatis
factory. It had become the great refuge of European lews,
who fled from territories which were oocupied by the Germans
and its satellite countries, and while, as we have hereto
fore stated, there was strong current of anti-Semitism
there, and numerous restrictive I'^ ws had been enacted,
nevertheless, in comparison with what they suffered else
where, the lew»p fate in Hungary was at least bearable.
Pressure was brought on Hungary to change its lewish
policy at least as early'^s /,ugust, 194£, when Luther dis
cussed the matter with the Hungarian Minister" to Berlin,
and on 6 October 194'2 again brought the matter up and
insisted that all Hung^ri^n lews in oocupied territories
must be evacuated, urging Hungary to deprive lews of their
citizenship, so th^t the deportation measures could be
carried out against them, offered to permit Hungary to
participate as a trustee in the legal measures pertaining
to their properties which confiscated.. He further
urged th°t Hungary t-ke the initiative to solve the lewish
problem within its o-wn borders, by adopting measures to
eliminate all lews from the cultural and economic life,
marking them, and evacuating them to the East.
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The Hungarian Minister, .» "while purporting to show
understanding of the German position, insisted that
Hungarian Jews in territories under German control "be
treated according to the principle of the most favored group,
and inquired as to whether other countries such as Roumania
and Italy had agreed to the program with respect to their
own Jewish nationals. He further stated that the Prime
Minister Kallay was particularly interested in knowing
whether a continued existence in the East would be made
possible for the Jews after their evacuation; — that there
were m^ny rumors in this connection which disturbed Kallay
somewhat, and the latter did not want to be accused of
having exposed Hungarian Jews to misery or wors£ after
evacuation. Luther assured him that the Hungarian Jews
would be fir-t used in the East for road construction and
later settled in a Jewish reserve.
The defendant weIZBLECFSR on £0 October 1942 also
aisoupsed the matter ^vith the Hungarian Minieter and stated
that "the ^-ay Hungary treated the Jewish problem has. so far,
not been in acoordanoe with our nrinoiples." This interview
was brought about by the then existing Tripartite Tact and
the agreement between Germany and Hungary, and,on the seme
day •vrEIffi/.EOITi! reouested that on hia return from Budapest
the Hungarian Minister give him a report of what the people
there thought of the German proposals oonoernmg the treat
ment of Jews.
on 16 January 1943 I.uther conferred with the Hungarian
Minister and expressed his surprise that the Hungarian
Offioe for Jewish Affairs had been dissolved effective
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1 194-3, reminded him thet Hitler VP'S deter
mined, under ell circunstJ=»ncev'=', to remove p11 Jevjs from
Europe pnd th"t Germeny vps much ccnoerned thst Hungary,
e friendly country, should shelter j^pproximj^tely 1,000,000
Jevs, «nd sold fchst Germany could not, in the long run,
look upon thl'"-' d^^nger v?lthout taking action; that Sztojay^s
excuses vere so unccnvincing- that one could ref=dlly see
^ th°t he did not himself believe them. Luther, in his
re''~'ort, oppressed the hope th'^t *'our constant urging"
•^^^ould fineliy be successful«
The situ^^tion did not mend and VEE-S '^^ 'iYER vas sent
to Hung'^ry to make an investigation, and on 30 i.pril 1943
ho rendered a long report to Ribbentrop, a copy of "Which,
on 19 May, v'ap received and initialed by Himmler. In this
report ^TEESEHTL'.TER asserted that the failure, during the
winter, of the Hungarian -troops in the East was the
necessary conseauence of the attitude of the Hungarian -tate
and its people; that the key to the defeatist '^ •ttitude of
i the Hung'^ri^n authoritative circles v/as to be found
primarily in Hungarian Jewry, which amounted to almost 10^
of the entire population, and 35^ of that in Budapest;
^ that the Jewry's influence was much higher than the numerical
percentage indicated; he confirmed th'^'t Hung'^ 'ry had made
itself a refuge for European Jews in the hope that the
benevolent treatment extended themi Viiould constitute a
guarantee of protection of Hungary's interests at the end
of the war, and that this explained Mini'^ter President
^p]_lpy!c pttitude in expressing his intention to correct
the injustices inflicted on the Jews by hia predecessor.
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ITSEiZWlfihYFj'R VJRS severely critical of Horthy, stating
thrt the only point he h^d in common vith the Reich was his
h?=>tred of Bolshevism. Fe pictured vSz^lasi and his movement
as weak and ineffective; that the Archduke Albrecht could
only be valued insofar as he could be utilized, either
used or abused; that Imredy and Bardossy were the only men
who could be seriously considered-" for a nationalist govern
ment, but that they could do ao only if Germany gave them
the necessary backing and agd^istance; that the opposition
to the then government had not been able to create in the
rising generation any permanent resonance which would
make possible an effective fight against the Jews and
the system which VJas created by them; that there was nothing in
Hungary comparable with the TJst^chi of Croatia; that the
situation was such that it would, present a greater danger
for the Axis the longer the war existed; that the Hungarian
police and the gendarmerie VJere most effective, but
ar^pprently devoted to Horthy and the existing government,
that its undermining was practically impossible; that it
must be recognized that one was dealing with an op-^-onent
'd'ho was very cunning a^d knev*? how to wield his authority
in a masterful way; that Fall'='y "was pro—Jewish and, in
addition, held an antagonistic «ttitude towards Germany on
other questions, including the Reich drafting of Ethnic
Germans into the SS; that any change in the then Hung'='rian
Government could only be successful if Eethlen, Ifallay, and
the Jews, Ohering and Goldberger, not only disaopeared from
•positions of authority, but vanished completely; that
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pfter Hcrtiiy^p vi^it to Fuehrer Heedq.up.rt3rp, the
Je'wish nrobleiT- h^d been dlecassec^ energetically, never
theless it had not moved the Hegent to permit the necessary
measures; that Fallay^s tenure in office was uncertain;
that after the first shock the Hung^ri^n regime was planning
an appropriate substitute for Eallay, ••ho would insure
continuous maintenance of the old practice; that the fear
eyisted that German trooas would be stationed in Hungary
and would demand severe measures against the Jews and
that everything must be done to oppose this; that the
presence of ^n ^division in Budapest would mean the
beginning of the end of the present Hung'^rian regime.
In conclusion recommended a thorough
shake-up in the government, through, but not without or even
pig^^inst the person of the Pegent; th^t the top clique
be removed and supplanted by persons capj^ble of exerting
a permanent ^nd beneficial influence upon the Regent from
the viewpoint of the /;yis, and th'-^t, in case Imredy or •
Bardossy were contemplated for leading positions, it m-ust
be recognized that these men represented a red flag to
Horthy, and anpropriate preparatory r.ieasures m.ust be taken
or other considerable pressure on the part of the Reich
V"Ould be necessary. Finally, that the initiative, execu
tion and safeguarding be directed by persistent influence
frnm the outside, in other words, from the Reich.
On 10 December 194d, after a second trip to Hung^^ry,
VEF^HlTImYBR made f^nother reoort of some Z8 p^^-ges.
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t^'Ttiese th3 deep-rooted links, and
at the sane tiir.e the reason why Hnngary is
not an «nt.i-Seniite.. The Jews know this very
wellr It is for this reason that this race,
with its ch'^'racteristic instinct succeeded in
gaining refuge in Europe, Undermining of the
ancient Danube monarchy was, to my mind, not
accomplished by the other nationalities such as
Czechs, "^oles, Creates, etc,, but rather the
internally infected Hungarians whom the Jew
rules predominantly today, not only in the
economic, but f '^lso in the "nolitical field.
The Jew ie enemy No, 1, These one and one-
half million Jews amount to so many saboteurs
of the Beich and an identical, if not double,
nuniber of Hungarians are followers of the Jews,
their auxiliaries end their camouflage, in
order to accomplish the comprehensive plot of
sabotage and espionage.
"For the colicy of the Beich, a rewarding
tut pressing task presents itself in the tack
ling and the strengthening out of this oroblem.
This policy holds all the more good since not ®
military but almost exclusively a. political
nroblem is to be dealt with. If fear and
cowardice govern the opponent, plain talk and
toush demands are sufficient, supported by
thehint of German divisions end fighter squads.
a
"To sum up, even a Hungarian government
reoresented by the relatively top m.en of the
ocposition today can be viewed as a temporary
solution, and a realistic expediency. It will
only g"ln full vlue for the Reich if besiaee,
or rather in addition, a German cuetodian will
be placed in an api^ropriate manner.
"If these men are honest and
op-onents of Bolshevism, they can be lined up
wdth a. ♦liberated^ peichsverv/eser «nd might
amount to an important relief for the Beich y
fighting Bolshevism and Jewry.
"Of all the personalities of the national
opposition, former minister President Imre ypppears to me still the fittest Q'^ ajrac-
mentally most alert, his personality certain
ter are well integrated; he
refutation and his followers in the country
also well organized.
"For reasons of transitional expediency
parts of the present Government J^prty couia
be enlisted either for cooperation or or
liquidation of their own past.
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"The objection of the Heichsverweser
(3esign='ting Imredy "S insupi^ortRble is correct.
This objection-reoults from Imredy's efforts
in his nrevi':^us cpppcity Minister President,
especirlly in the field of the Tewish question
snd the Isnd reform.
"I 8,0 definitely convinced th^t the Peichs-
verv^erser will scceot =^-ny Minister President
without ndo if the Fuehrer demsnds or even
desires it, just to ssve himself 8nd his dynasty
1 and to live to see his dream fulfilled to become
' a duke.
keen tackling of the Fev-ish nroblems appears
> for various reasons to be the order ofthe hour.
^ Its solution is the prerequisite for irtegr^^ting
Hungary into the fight of the Heich foh defense
®nd existence."
The dempnds of space forbid further quotation from
this illuminating document and its conclusions, and we content
ourselves with the foregoing and the following excerpts
i'rom his proposals snd su.''gestions:.
*^rompt action is imperative.... The German
press should pursue e. systematic policy of hammer
ing on the morale of the op'^onent, Including
distinguishing between system of the government
'^nd the people ... current and ever-growing
^ criticism with regard to the Jewish question ...
talks between the Hungarian dinlomats and rress
men from the Foreign Office ... concentration of
troop movements on various points of the Germen-
Hungarian frontier ... invitation to Horthy to
* attend a Fuehrer conference or a visit to
Budapest by leading Germ-sn personallties such
as^Goering or Himmler; anplying to Horthy the
method of the kid glove and the iron fist ..,
outright demand for the removal of the present
- government without giving detailed reasons ...
^ ^^P'^olntment of a new Prime Minister ...
reorganization of the German legation at
Bud.ar)est ... eventual delegation of a political
^ representative fixed with f^r-rc.aohlng powers
lor a certain duration ... eventually^ the
delegation of a special, high-ranking German
permanent miilit'^ry advifor to the Peichs-
vervjeser; selection of the most suitable
• members of the new government to be carefully
selected v-iith the new Prime Minister ,,, the
ap'^ointm.ent of vsuitable commissars with far-
reaching powers for five districts to be
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forned, who must be blooc'hounds immediate
notion in the field cf the Jewish question
nfter s oreviou^ly coordinnter! plp.n ...
notifying the enemy thnt for every Hungnrip.n
killed by bombs,one hundred wealthy Jews
would be shot end their rroperty used for
restitution of dsnpges."
The recommendations which outlined were
cerrled out elmost to the Is.st deteil, end its author was
selected as the one best fitte'""' for the task of executing
them. It was only in the Intter pnrt of the year 1944,
when Horthy attempted to break the bonds imposed upon
him by Y^R that he was d-eposed and ijr.prisoned.
VEEPENT^AYER insists thnt these exhibits do not represent
the original reports made by him, and that after heated
discussion with Rlbbentrop they were abridged and somewhat
changed . while it may well be that Rlbbentrop required
the reports to be abridged and even insisted on some changes
therein, nevertheless- YEEr'ENl.^AYEE signed them. It is far
too great a strain on our credulity to believe that had
VEE-'^ 'HW^YER been in opposition to the changes, he would
have been selected as the m'^ n to carry out the recommenda
tions appearing over his signature.
While the defendant is entitled to all reasonable
doubts, they m.ust be reasonable and not f^^^nciful,
VEESE^T:.^YER had no diplomatic experience, although he had
been detailed on several occasior'.s to do work in which the
Foreign office was interested, notably in Serbia and Danzig,
It Is idle for the defendant nov" to assert that he
was other than a radical anti-Semite, or that he did not
advise or take an active part in the horrible mass deporta
tions which took place in accordance with and in execution
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of the very plp.n "which he fatherecl. Nor are "we impressed
by the insinuations, "Which he made while on the witness
stand, in his final statement and in his brief, that
Horthy was in fact sympathetic with the Germ.an prc!=?ram of
the deportation of Je'v:s and their subsequent extermination.-
It is contradicted by the attitude consistently shown by
him and quite generally by the Hun'^arian government,
^ excent .the few vjho were creatures of the Third Reich; by
the fact that it was found necessary to bring continued
* pressure on him to olDtain an even apparent consent to the
proposed, treatment of the Hunrtarian Jews; that he con
tinuously sabotaged this apparent consent; that numerous
obstacles, real or fancied, were placed in the path of
deporting the Jews; and finally, by TOESmi/iYER*S own
estimation of Horthy^s attitude which is shown by his
reports. We recognise th-t there may be some inaccuracies
in Horthy's recollection and testimony, but we find that in
the main it states the fact.
t
PHIr^ENM/iYSH was the de facto ruler of Hungary.
His main role was to outline for the Hungarian Government
the policies which it must follow, and to put into power
persons who provided sufficient guarantee that these
» policies would be carried out with the utmost energy.
It was through pressure exerted by him that the Minister
of the Interior Jarosz was ap'^ ointed, and his two State
Secretaries, lazlo Sndry and iazlo Baky, were put in
office, the last two having command the gendarmerie
and the police, and the first having the mandate to solve
the Jewish question. Both Hndry and. Baky h«d long been
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k:nov:n -'^s NRzis completely loyel to the Germen
peich.
The defendant contend? that he cannot be held guilty
because he could not commit v;ar crimes against Hungarians
inasmuch as Hungary was a military ally of Germany. He
relies u^on a statement made by the prosecution in Case I
(The Medical Case), ofe have examined the record %^'herein
the following" languajze is found:
"The laws and customs of w^r apply between"
belligerents, but not domestically or among
allies. Crimes by Gerimon nationals against
other German nationals are not ••'J'sr Crimes,
nor are acts by German nationals against
Hungarians cr Poumanians,"
This lana-uage has been taken out of its context.
Counsel for the prosecution was, at the time, discussing
/.rticle II (b), "Jar Crimes, °nd not .Article II, sub-paragraph
(c), Crimes J.gainst Humanity (Control Council Law Ho. 10),
The latter declares criminal ''atrocities and offenses, in
cluding but not limited to murder, extermiinations, enslavement,
deportation, imprisonment, torture, rar^ing or other inhumane
acts comjnitted against any civilian population, or persecu
tions on political, racial or religious grounds, whether or
not in violation of or 'Against the domestic l^ws of the
country where neraetrate^!^. "
"/e readily concede that acts committed by German
nationals against other German nationals or German nationals
against the nationals of one of its allies do not constitute
^ violation of the lav/s or custo s of war, but Count Five is
not concerned with those, it deals with Crimes .'.gainst
Humanity, irresneotive of the nationality of the victims.
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The question here is whether or not the defendant
wps a prlnoippi or an accessory t®, took a consenting part
in or was connected with plans or enterprises involving
the commission of a crime against humanity. The deporta
tion of Jews from Hungary, either for slave labor or for
purposes of mass extermination in the gaa chambers of the
concentration camps was directed to a claas extinction,
not by reason of individual or mass action, but solely
because of their religion, it may well be, and indeed it
would be surprising if it were not true, that many Jews,
who had suffered the tortures and persecutions of the Nazi
S f resented such treatment, and, wherever opportunity
arose, fought back with all the means at their disposal.
It may be conceded that, insofar as such individuals were
guilty of espionage or sabotage or other offenses cognizable
under the rules and customs of war, they were subject to
prosecution and punishment, but no attempt was made to single
out or prosecute the guilty, end mass action was taken with
out distinction against both the guilty and innocent. Men,
women, children, the babes in axms, school children, the
aged, the invalids, were deported to slave labor and to death.
No Justification or excuse en be offered for such action.
It W..S carried on as a cart and in ait? pf German aggressions
and crimes against peace.
Moreover, it is clear that, among the Jews deported
from Hunaary, there were refugees from territories occupied
by Germany in the course of its numerous aggressions, in
Case III (The Justice Case) a number of the defendants were
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convicted for crimes comiritted by then upon Gerne.n nationals,
because such crirres were committed pursuant, to and in
connection with crimes against peace. In our opinion
this defense is without merit and v?e so hold.
On 14 /»pril 1944, within a month after he had taken
over Hun-ary^s affairs, reported to Ribbentrop
that Sztojay had given him a binding, promise that by the
end of the month 50,000 Jews fit for work would be placed
pt the disposal of the R6ich; that all Jews between the
ages of 36 to 48 not liable to labor service in Hungary
would be registered and drafted, and that by this means
another 50,000 Jewish laborers would be deported by the end
of.May; that from 100,000 to 150,000 Jews would be organized
in labor battalions in Hungary at the s«me time.
On ?3 loril he again reported that in the Carpate
area, the work of putting Jews into ghettos had begun and
150,000 Jews had been evacuated and that by the end of the
week the number would probably be 300,000; th«t the work
would, then proceed into other districts and finally into
Budapest; that the Jews would be transported at the rate
of 3,000 per day beginning 15 May, and th-t Auschwitz
(the notorious extermination camp) was their destination;
that the transport by marching was impractical, because of
difficulties of food, shoes, and guarding.
On 25 May 1944 von Thadden of /the foreign Office
reported to Wagner a visit which von Thadden had made to
Budapest and where he conferred with , Hezinger,
Bichmann of the SS, and others. He reported that SiehmaBia
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:
iinfornLec' hir. th"t up to neon on the PAth pp-'roximetely
116,000 Tevis hpt?. been deported to the Reioh, POO,000
nore vjere esrembled awaiting deportation, coiLing rooetly
froa the northeastern parts of Hungary; that siailar
concentrations had been executed in the south, southeast
and southwest, and on 7 June concentrations would start
in the provinces north and northw'est of Budapest, and
that by the end of June they hoped to begin the concentra-
ti'^n of the Jews living in Budapest; that the round-up
would a£Ticunt to about 1,000,000, possibly even more,
one-third of whom should be able to work and would be
taken over by Sauckel, Organization Todt, etc,, in Upper
Silesia; and only 80,000 Jews, able to work, would remain
in Hungary under Honved guards and be employed in the
armament industry there.
The defense that these deportations were being made
in order to out the Jews to vjork in the Reioh is effectively
dispQaed of when from the report itself it appears that
only one-third were those oapeble of worko
The report is further illuminating upon the relati.n-
ship existing between VBESBM/.YHR and Hezinger and Eiohmann
of the SS. The Roreign Office had T>roposed to recall
Hezinger, who was the Jewish expert from the Foreign Office
attached to the Embassy, Sehicr Councillor of Legation
Felne informed von Thadden th°t Hezinger was indispensable.
told him that, while he realized that Hezinger
was only loaned to him, he must .make clear that he, the
Minister, h'=^d an extremely difficult Job, that cooperation
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v-'ith the SS cffice tf-id not V'ork smoothly, pnd thet
Hezinp:er not only kne^iv how to c^,rry out hie pssiGiHr.ent to
oerfeotion, but he h'='tl estP:blished such friendly relations
with the office of eyecutive euthcrities th^t he was the
only one who gave complete satisfaction and in
.whose field of work no trouble had thus far occurred; that
ho was afraid that Hezinger's recall might also cause
trouble in this field, and would be very if
Hezinger ccuid stay with him for another three or four
weeks, but if this was impossible, he would first use Grell
mainly for the work on the Jewish problems.
It further appears from this report that i;ichmann
was anxious to have Hezinger remain so that no really
serious mistakes would occur in the treatment of foreign
Jews, The attitude thus expressed by "\rsSS"©'1''nT5H is in
direct contradiction to the testimony which he gave,
nprrely, that Hezinger was not subordin-'^ ted to him and that
he was not informed, in detail p'bout his activities.
If, as now claim-S, these actions were
originated and carried out by Eichmann and "ankler of the
SS, it seems most extr^^ordinary that beTiartment Inl'^ '.nd II,
which at th^t time was the competent^department in the
foreign Office for Jewish affairs, should find it necessary
to inform Eichmann, the alleged originator of the plumed
deportation, of 7EESMM;.THR'S reports. But such was done.
The oeaiousy and bad feeling growing up between
VEEJ-EHMoYEK and. the SS -^nd Security Police tenders in
Bud^-rest may well be true, and. there are strong Indications
of the fact. The latter had often, as far as they were
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ptteEoted to assert Independent puthority p.nd power
v'hich, in fact, they did not possess. This wss character
istic of the SS- The figrht for power and authority; the
attempts to keep all jurisdiction one had pnd to constantly
reach out for more, even at the eypense of another pf^ency,
was the comcion, alir.ost accepted thinf^ in the Nazi Eeich,
But it is also true that in almost every case it was not a
contest over objectives, or ''n pttempt on one side to* defeat
pnd on the other to furthei the savage pro^.rams of Nazi
policy, but was one for personal prestige, and increase of
influence ^^nd power, and authority to implement and carry
out those plans.
On 13 /.oril 1944 V^"irSt:^M'iYEE submitted to Ribbentrop
p draft of the address he proposed to make when he presented
I
hip credentials, P.rrogantly it referred to the unusual
circumstances which had c«used his ap-^ointment; that "to hold
back the enemy, German troops were on Hungarian soil" and
thus many questions, unknown in peacetime and insoluble
by m-ethods theretofore used, had arisen and "new ways will
have to be found"; that he was convinced that the Hungarian
people, after elimination of hostile and seditious elements,
v'ould be faithful to its glorious history and conscious of
the common fate which it had shared with the German people
f-^r hundreds of years, and gather all the powers of the
ptate under the leadership of his Hxcellenoy, and fight for
the comm.on victory, in its proven oom.r'^deship of arms,
"I consider it my t'^sk to help Hungary according to the
best of my ability on this road, carrying out the intentions
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of r.y ^'uehrer, pnd I went to express the hope th«^t Your
;H;xcellenoy will supnort me fully end completely in the
execution of my tesks,"
This,, epperently, wss too much, even for Ribbentrop,
who was not noted for delicacy or finesse in diplomacy,
and the offending phrases and sentences were eliminated.
It is now asserted on VEESBNt/^LYER^S behalf that he
did not nrepere the objectionable address, but it was the
work of his deputy Feine, a particularly experienced civil
servant well versed in international law. One of two things,
however, is obvious. Either Feine was not the ^^uthor, or
he was not an experienced civil servant versed in international
law. The proposed address follows the procedures and
policies expressed by VEESElTMiiYER in his previous reports to
the Foreign Office too closely to permit us to believe that
he did not have at least a guiding and controlling hand in
its authorship. In any event, he signed it.
On 20 Faroh VEE^ '^TOl'^ 'yER reports a lengthy conference
with Horthy, who apparently had refused to appoint Imredy,
but said that a government headed by Szotjay or Csatay
would be "tolerable" for him, but that he must leave open
the question of how long such a government should remain in
office; that had pointed out to Horthy that he
considered an interim solution to be politically unwise and
impossible in point of time; that the period of eternal
compromising was pest and that he, "VEEf^EW.jYER, was under
the impression that the Regent was trying to gain time,,
whieh not in accordance with the will of Hitler and the
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Peich Government. His report charges Horthy with lying
an(^. that he was no longer physically able to keep up his
duties,
It appears that on 22 March 1944 VHEF!3ICM..jYHR
reported to PITTER that;
.• aiprm occupation the castle with
distribution of trocps will take three
hours according to /.rmy Group reocrt. It
is hardly possible to surround the castle •
effectively in vievv of its sub-cellars
and unknown secret exits,"
This does not evidence a decision to work with Horthy,
as the defendant now claims, but a search for means to
compel him to do the defendant's will. One does not dis
cuss the seizure of surrounding of a castle occupied by
the head of state when intent upon peaceful negotiations
and cooperation.
The final selection of Sztojay as Prime Minister
fepresented a compromise brought about by the belief that
the time was not yet ripe to take the final step of
remioving Horthy from office, which came later, and hope
had not yet been abandoned that Horthy would become
entirely subservient to VESPE^T!7TER'S wishes and be
dependent on German sup'^ort for continuance in office,
/^.Ithough f^ztojay was a tolerable appointm.ent to the Regent,
the Minister of the Interior and his State Secretaries
were pro-Nazi and wholly comipliant to the demands for the
deportation of the lews. The Ministry of the Interior had
dem.anded comjnand of the Hungarian Police and Gendarmerie,
and it was through the cooperation of these officers with
the PS that the Jews were seized, concentrated, and finally
deported, to slave l^bor or death.
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It is appRrent from 'S testirony ^nd
from the eociiments th'^t, throaf?hout the time he was in
HunoRry, p straggle for power was going on between
Ribbentrop and Hinmler; th^t Ribbentrop*s foreign rolicy
involved retaining Horthy the nominal head of state
and Rohieving Germian Rim.s throu '^oh the subservience of
the Hungarian Ministers, who had been selected and approved
by the German Reich, in order that tie outside world should
not realize that the real governing powers lay in the Nazi
Government. On the other hand, Himmler cared nothing for
finesse or outward appearances.
TOSi^NlW-'iT^R endeavored to carry out Ribbentrop's
policy and from time to time clashed with Himmler and the
SS, who desired to oroceed with greater speed,without
regard for the reoercussions which would arise if Horthy
finally rebelled.
In July 1944 Horthy forbade the further deportation
of lews and proceeded to reproach him for this
and informed him that dismissal of the Sztoja.y government
and the nrorosed arrest of certain of its members, who
had carried out anti-Iewish measures, would be regarded as
a breach of Hungaryobligations to the Reich, and that
Hitler would Immedlately recall the Reich Plenipotentiary,
"VEESNNM'YEE, and take measures which would preclude a
repetition'of such events in Hungary once and for all.
The ultimatum thus presented by the defendant was
in accordance with the detailed, graphic instructions
which he received from Ribbentrop, The defendant insists
that he omitted Informing Horthy of the threats which
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•'were conteined in his instructions. This, hcwever, the
Regent denied vjhen on the vatness stend, p-nd we heve no
doubt thPt either read his instructions word"
for wotO. or geve the substance of them. He m.ade perfectly
clear what "would be. the result if Horthy attempted to carry
out his plans.
These threats were effective for the time-being,
but on .25 /..ugust 1944, the day Eoumanis signed an .Armistice,
the Regent thought himself strong enough, and Germany's
position sufficiently weak, to enable him to dismiss
Sztojay and annoint General X'akatos as Premier, /.gain
intervened and attempted to have pro-German
elements included in the Cabinet and Governm.ent, but, to a
large extent, he was unsuccessful. The Lakatos government
remained in office until about approximately 15 October 1944,
when it was ousted by force, the Regent deported from Hungary
and imprisoned in Germany. Szalasi, head of the /rrovj Cross
•V -V
movement and a rabid anti-Semite, vas appointed in his place.
After Szalasi became Prime Minister, about 16 October 1944,
f^ deportations were restarted tens of thousands of Jews,
k
mainly women, were forced to march on the highways leading
from Budapest to the German border in r^in and snow, and
without food -^nd with no sleep. Thousands cf them died
t
% on the way or were shot because they could not continue
the march.
X.akatos gave an affidavit with regard to the
events of these times. He was not submitted for cross-
examination and we therefore give the statements in his
-543-
affidavit little effect, e::ccpt In so far as they may be
corroborated by other evidence in the case. This corrobor-
ation is, in rart, furnished by the testimony of Dr. Reszo
Kastner, a Hunf^arian Jev/ish lav/yer v/ho, throughout all this
terrible period, was President of the Zionist organisation
of Hungary, and vtioae organisation kept itself currently
Informed of the political and racial developments in Hungary.
Checking- his story with what is revealed by the documents
of the Torelgn Office, including TZESSITLIAYEH'S own reports,
'the essential accuracy of his information is verified and
substantially corroborates the essential parts of G-eneral
Lakatos's affidavit. He makes clear that vfith the'appoint
ment of Szarosz as I-inister of the Interior in the Sztojay
government, and the appointment of the tro State Secretaries,
Endry and Eack^'", and their cooperation with the S3, the
deportations became merely routine, administrative work.
Hastner aptly describes the situations
Do you mean by that, witness, that
the defendant VEDSDHI.'JDZZFl, was not concerned
v/ith the execution of the Jewish deportations
which (I will leave open for the moment) was
carried out by Jarosz, Pacl':y, Lndry, Eichmann,
or Winkelmann?
"A. "ily dear colleague, I do not suppose
that you \«'ill imagine that a man as intelligent
as VHESEIIT.'IAYER would formally carry out his
mandate as Plenipotentiary and Minister of the
cOrerman Reich in such a way as to transgress his
limits by interfering v;ith the executive. He
could not and should not have done it under any
circumstances and he did not need to. As I said
this morning, by appointing a suitable govern
ment in Hungary, and laying'down the general
political directives for it, further activity
and closer activity concs" ned with greater
details of the executive v;as no longer necessary.
Ho was, if I may say so, the spiritual author
but he;vas certainly not the executor.*'
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iTo one reading the record of this case can he imder
any douht hut that v;.^£ a conscious and consent
ing participant in the deportation of Jev/s from Hungary,
that he Imev; vhet their fate ^.^nuld he, and that hev.^as a
willing, zealous and leading participant therein.
Alleged Diplomatic Immunity. VEHSHin'AlTH asserts the
legal defense that inasmuch, as he as actually accredited
as I.'inister and Plenipotentiary G-eneral for the Qreater
Gorman Reich in Ihmgary, his actions were privileged and
he is exempt from punishment.
It has been s long rccogni.zed rule that v-ithin
certain well-recognized limits o diplomatic representative
is immune from prosocutlon "oy the country to which he is
accredited. The rationale is well stated by riaclu'/ortht
"The resaon of the Immuunity of diplomatic
agents is clear, nsmelyt that Crovernmcnta ma
not be hampered in their foreign relations bg^
the arrest or forcible prevention of the exor
cise of a dutg- in the person of a governmental
agent or representative. If such agent be
offensive and his conduct is unaccGptable to
the accredited nation, it is proper to rcquGsSt
his recall; if the request be not honored he
map- be in extreme cases escorted to the boundary
and thus removed from tl.ie country, /aid rightly,
bocauso self-preservation is a matter peculiarly
within the province of the injured state, with
out which its existence is insecure,..,"
(IiaclavortlT, Digest of
Tntcrna !:icnal Lav.', Vol. IV,
1D12, p. 51C.)
This doctrine, hovovcr, has net rcriained wholly vai-
questloncd, (.gee Stanhope, "LUstcr:" of Dngland," I, p. 171.)
"A foreign m-inistcn v.iio conspires against
the very Government at v/liich he- is accrGditcd
has clearly violated 'bho lav; of nations. He
is, therefore, no lon'-.er entitled to protoction
from the law of nations."
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In any event, the immunity continues only so long
as the diplomatic agent is accredited to the country, plus such
additional time as may "be. necessary to permit him to leave
its boundaries.
The rule is thus laid dovm, on the authority of
professor Binding, himself a German?
"...The incompetence of the local courts
is rationc personao and ceases when the person
concerned loses the status to which immunity
from jurisdiction is attached,
"Exterritoriality results in freedom from
court process; it operates rroccdurally, not
substantivoly; in principle it does not result
in freedom from punishment, nor exemption from
the rules of law, but in non-liability to
prosecution.*.,. The former (person enjoying
exterritoriality) are immune from prosecution
only for the duration of their exterritoriality
and certainly during the same period, also, for
all earlier acts falling under the criminal laws
of the state of residence; after conclusion of
the exterritorial relationship they arc liable
to prosecution for all crimes committed by them
while enjoying exterritoriality and previously,
in so far as legal action has not yet boon out
lawed by the passage of time."
In the ''Draft Convention on Diplomatic Privileges
and Immunities of the Harvard Research in International Daw"
(1932), is foimd the following;
"Art, 29 — Termination of Privileges and
Immunities. V/hcn the functions of a mombcr of
a mission have boon terminated, a receiving
state shall continue to accord to him and to the
members of his family the privileges and
ivmiunities provided for in this convention,
imtll such persons have had reasonable oppor
tunity to leave the territory of the receiving
statL,, "
In its "Comment" upon the subject, we find the
following;
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"Comment t Article 16 undertakes to a
time for the. "be^innin-j of immunity and rrotection.
This article undertakes to determine the time at
Y;hich immunities terminate. Both are hased uyon
lonp; rractice.
"The functions of a member of a mission maj'"
be terminated (a) by the termination'of the
mission; '(b) by the death•of'abdication of the
soverei.^n, "in case thb sendinc state is a
m.onarchy; (c) by revolution in the sending state,
as a result of v/Iiich a nev government is estab
lished; and (d) by the recall of a member. It is
intended that the present article apply to each
one of these situations."
Acain, in the "O^mbrid^e Draft of the Institute of
International Lav;," 1095, the follov^ih^ proposed codifica
tion of the recognized practice is founds
"Art. 5 — It (the privilege of inviolability)
shall continue to be effective as long as the
minister or diplomatic official remains, in his
official caprcity, in the country to v.hich he
has been sent.
"it shall hold good, even in time of war
between the two Po'"'ers, for as long a time a s is
necessary for the minister to leave the country
with his staff and his effects."
Finally, it was 'leld in the case of the former
Japanese Ambassador, Cshima, thatj
"Oshima's special defense is that in
connection with his activities in Germany
he is protected by diplomatic immunity and
is exempt from prosecution. Diplomatic'
privilege does not import immunity from
legal liability, but only exemption from
trial by the Cotirts of the State to which an
Ambassador is accredited. In any event this
immunity has no relation to crimes against
international law charged before a tribunal
having jurisdiction. The Tribunal rejects
this sr ecial'defense. "
Here, as v;ell, the defendant is charged with violations
of International Low. The evldeioco establishes he is guilty
of such violation. He Is not being tried by Hungary, the
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Istate to v/hich he was accredited; his ter^m of office has
lori';; since expired; he -surrendered himself not to the
Hungarian authorities, hut, to the American military author
ities. ITone of the for exemption .upon which he
bases his plea here exist, and his special defense v/ith
respect to his diplomatic exemption is without merit.
Slovakia. On 15 June, 1944, VhESAmiAYER requested the
i^oreisn Office to brinq pressure on the Slovakian Govern-'
ment, demanding that they indicate their f undamental_ dis
interest in Slovakian Jews in I-unqary, The reason for t his
t
request was that the Slovakian Legation in Hun^iary, asvrell
as the Slovakian Ifinister of the Interior, had informed the
Hunta^i-'i Government end the 3D Referent of their special
interest in the repatriation of Jev/s of Slovakian national
ity who,V'''G^® then being evacuated from Eunqary.
stated that this not only disturbed but also complicated
the evacuation of them from Hungary, but also.gave the
Hungarian Government the impression that Slovslcia had
adopted an attitude fundamentslly opposed to the solution
of the Jev.'ish problem.
Hans Ludin, the Gormon Hinistcr to Slovakia, deposed
that in Deccmbor, 1945, the defendant VELSLllI .AYSR calleo on
him at the Lmbascy and informed him that, by special order
of the Reich Poreign Minister, hev'as to visit the Slovak
State President with tho object of deliberating with him
upon the further deportation of the Slovak Jev.^s; tnat ax cor
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his visit to Dr-Tlsoj VlJESEl-Jl.!AY^R reported the result
namely, that the Slovakian State President had agreed to
the proposed date, the 1st of April, and until tien, all"
the remaining Jevrs, not having special status granted "by
the State President, neve to he deported.
On 22 Decomher, 194-o, VllI3oi;iJI.LAyER reported to the
Foreign Office the result of his negotiations with T.iso,
that of the remaining Jer-s in Slovakia, 10,000 to 18,000
^ould he sent to Jewish camps v;ithin the next few months;
that Ilinistor Ludin v/as to come to an agreement with Tiso
during the next few days with respect to the execution of
the entire operation; that Tiso did not and could not, at
the moment, fix any definite date, so VEPSglTr.iAYER suggested
s
completing the operation hy 1 April 1944 at the latest, and
was assirrod hy giso that he could make great efforts to ad
here to that date; that' for reasons of expediency, VFFSEIT-
IIAYAR refrained from mentioning the question of the baptised
Jews, hut in talking the matter over with Minister President
Tuka, the latter said he .would insist that the question he
dealt v;ith anew, with the stipulation that the baptized
Jcv/s must he accommodatGd in a special camp in order to
avoid difficulties with the church, and promised his full sup
port to the measures agreed unon hetv/oon VLEogllLtiYdR and 'Also,
^ Dieter Yisliceny deposed that ho met VFI]3;.Ari..-..PYJR
in Bratislava in Docomhor, *194d', and on that occasion
VEESElTIi'AYSPi paid a visit to President fiso; that in the
conversation with VLBSBU.IAYYl in the antc-room of the
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German I.Iinistry, hev;as inxormcd that was to
t" •*
sec Tiso on Hitler's orders, and would then take the
opportunity of "broaching the subject of Jews in Slovakia;
that asked for a statistical report as to hou
many Jews were still living in Slovakia, and hov: many of
those had a special 'permit, and ^•"isliceny handed this re
port over to that after the letter's visit to
_Tiso, './isliccny saw vnLSlllTIliyHH, A-ho reported that Tiso had
promised to screen 'all special permits by the end of April,
1944, and settle the Jewish question finally, and that
VIi]I]32NI.LllT^R said that he would put his foot down A^ith Tiso
on this question.
vnSSTlHIiAYER'3 explanation is that his visit to Tiso
and Tuka v/as not primarily on the Jewish question, but with
respect to other politicol events, particularly the channels
which the Hungarian Government ''had through Slovakia into
Russia, with the idea of making peace and that the Jewish
mission vfos a- camouflage'' of his real objectives. lie admits
hcnYover, making the report before-mentioned, and does not
«
deny that the matters therein contained were in fact dis
cussed and agreed upon. He claims, however, that the
proposed deportation did not take place, and v.-e have been
able to find nothing in the record to indicate that it ivas
actually carried out.
There is evldenco that a^tcr the Slovakian revolt
in September, 1944, many of the remaining Jevrs in Slovakia
were killed, -but this apparently has no connection v/ith
VnESTKlMttR'e visit in l^occmbor, 1945. Therefore the documents
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relating to Slovakia, v/hilo thoy tend to prove knowledse
•of the plan and throw some li^ht on VEESr.NLIAYIIR ^s attitndo
towards Slovaklan and Hungarian Jews, cannot constitute
a 'substantive offense.
Serbia. On 0 September, 1941, the Foreign Office received
G wire from Belgrade, signed by irBBSBi-ITiAYnR and Bonsler,
stating that it had been proven that Jews v^ere accomplices
in numerous acts of sabotage and revolt,'and therefore it
was urgently necessary to see to it that at least all male
Jov/s be quickly placed in custody and removed, suggesting
that they be deported, sent down the Danube and unloaded
in Rumanian territory. The Foreign Office determined that
this could not bo done and.Luther so informed the Pleni
potentiary of the Foreign Office at Belgrade.
On 10 September VBBSblllliijIBB. and Benzler again wired
the Foreign Office that ""a quicker and draconic solution of
the Jewish question in Serbia is a most urgent and practical
necessity'' and requested dlroctivos from the Foreign Office
in order to bo able to put the utmost pressure on the
military commander of Serbia, saying that it v/ould be
most advantageous if Ilimmler would issue an identical'
order to the Chief the Binsatzgruppe of the Security
Police and Fuchs of the Security Sorvicc.
Irf.-the final analysis, PLadcmachor was sent to Belgrade
I to ascertain v/hethcr those *Tov;s could not be tv'^ kon care of
on the si::iot. He found that 2000 had already boon shot as
reprisals for attacks on G-crman soldiers, and states "in
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the coursG of the procticol executions of this order, at
first the active Communist loaclers of Serbian nationality, -
about fifty of thorn, - and then alv/ays Jev:s vere shot as
Communist instigators; that there v/ore not SOOO to be^in
with, but only 4000, and only 5,500 could bo shot as the
remainder arc needed by the health police to keep up the
health service and discipline in the ghettos which had been
established",
As the result of Rademacher's nef^otiations with
the experts on the Jewish auoation, Sturmbannfueliror V/eimann
and Fuchs, it was agreed that the male Jev's v/ould. be shot
by the end of the v/ook, which would solve the problem, and
that the rest of about 20,000 Jews, v^omen, children, old
people, as well as about 1500 gypsies, except the males
who were to be shot, would be concentrated in a ghetto in
the gypsy sector of Belgrade, where a minimum of food would
bo guaranteed for the winter, and as soon as the question
of the final solution of the Jewish .question was reached,
and the tochnical means were available, the Jews \YOuld be
deported by water to tho reception camps in the Bast, Thus
the quicker and more draconic solution mentioned by VEESBIT-
MAYSR: and Denslor became an accomplished fact.
VBESENI.IAYGRtS excuse is that he had been sent to
Belgrade to make an investigation of the partisan movement
which ha.d started there, and tho advisability of organizing
a Serbian Government to alleviate tho situation, and that he
was only called in by Benzlor because of his investigation
aiid Imov/lodge of the nartisan movement.
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This excuse is without merit. He signed the
telegrcms, ho consulted v;ith Ijonzlor rogcrding the proposed
deportation.
Hov/ovor, it did not t akc place; other agencies
intervened, and, as we have seen, adopted measures even
more liarsh. For those he cannot bo held responsible.
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3CII3LLE1TDERG
SCHELLEITBERO joined the Party xr l?o3. In 1934 he
became "a member of the SD and r/as assigned to the Office
of Tjomeatic Intelll'^enco Sorvice. In 1939 ho became Chief
of AIIP IV-E, which had charge of domestic counter-
intolligence. In 1941 hev; as transferred to and became
Chief of ART VI, R3EA, which dealt with foreign intelligence.
The prosecution contends that SCIELIEIIBERG tool: an
active part in the preparations for the work of tbo
notorioxis Einaatzgruppcn of the East. The record reveals
that in the discussion botwcon llucllcr. Chief of AI.IT IV,
RSIIA, and •luartormastcr Cenoral V/agnor of th: •^"olirmacht,
an impasse arose regarding the use of those Corps in the
East and their jurisdiction and c ompotoncG, and SCITELIElEIdRG,
who was a. lawyer by profession, was detailed to take up
these discussions and atts!;ipt to compromise the difference
between the "chrnacht and the RIIIA; . This ho'did, and when
his final draft of the a greemenl: had been completed
Ileydrich and Vagnor signed it. Vc assorts that v-hon the
t\70 men came to discuss the details of the plan, hc'wcs
notified to leave the room, and tlio rcfor c a s not informed
of the full scope of the activities of these groups, namely,
to engage in mass exterminations of the local populabion
^ and the lews.
He admits that some time later he attended a mooting
in fiGrlln at v^hich were present countcr-intclligonco officers
of hie V/ehrm"eht, but states that this meeting continued
f
over a considerable period and ho left several days before
it concluded, and he assumed that after ho left persons then
present were probably informed of the I'Tork. v'hi oh t;"..c
Einaatzgruppcn vrerc to carry on.
Ii/vhile we doubt that SCRi. Li.i-.NBEKG- was as i.^norant of
the mission of the hinsatzgruppen as he now asserts, the
proof that he had knov/ledge does not convince us to a moral
certainty. Ve therefore give him the benefit of the doubt
and as to this incident we ACQUIT him.
It is also contended that he was deputy to Mueller,
Chief or AMT IV, RSFA. «»hile on one or two occasions he
signed in t>at capacity, the record discloses that Mueller
had no regular deputy and only when he was absent from his
office did one or another of his section chiefs sign communi
cations in his name.
The prosecution further contends that SChErrLhbKHG as
Chief of AMT VI '-^ImEelf dispatcied an Einsatzkommando to
'/i.Tilte Ruthenia, but we are satisfied that this rroup dealt
with geological and other scientific research and had no
connection with crines against humanity.
Serbian Jev/s. «*hile SCHELLENBERG'5 office was informed of
the slauglter of Serbian Jews, it does not appear that
SCl-'fLLENBERG took any part in this other than possibly
informlne: iT^ther, at tie latter's request, of Reydrich's
return to Berlin, as Luther desired to have a conference
f with I!cydrioh regarding the deportation or other disposition
of Serbian Jev/s, The evidence of SCFT Lf} NLEi.G' S guilt is not
sufficient, and v;© AC^uIT him v;ith respect to thfs incident.
Llnsatzgruppen.' uoples of Operational Situation iieport,
ho. 12B, of the Elnsatzgrupr en, dated 3 November 1^41, urere
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diatrilDuted to SCHELIElTIjIlHG'o and to "both AI.ITS IV
and VI. It covers appro?:imately four months' operations.
There the prpc;ram of murder and extermination 3s set forth
in detail. It callously states that approximately 80,000
persons had been liquidated, describes the objections raised
by certain commanders of prisoner-of-war camps, how they
were overcome, and of the plans for further operations freed
from interference by officers of the V/ehrmacht. These and
the other reports of the Einsatzgruppen were distributed to
SCHELIENBERG's office. His claim that he did not see or paid
no attention to particulars in which his office^-as interest
ed cannot be believed,
Te have examined the reports and even the most casual
glance would bring out the horrible detarx-t.,-- Furthermore,
unless we are to assume that his division was so inured
to reports of mass murder and that these were no longer
deemed \Yorthy of notice and cotmuont, it is inconceivable that
his section chiefs would not have called his attention to them.
His claim of innocence is wholly incredible. But there is
no evidence that he participated directly or indirectly
in these atrocities.
Operation Zeppelin. On 13 October, 1941, Ilueller, Chief of
AMT IV. confirmed his telegraphic order regarding the uae of
Soviet Russians in concentration camps for labor and for the
execution of designated Russian prisoners-of-war.
On 25 October, 1941, he issued a directive stating
that for the purpose of selecting suitable informers of the
Russian Intslll-^entsia, delogatos of ALIT VI, SCKELIEHBERG*s
Division, would be assigned to the Einsatzkommsndos of the^
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IoIPO and SD and'during thoir activities in the prisoner-
of-v/ar camps, these delegates v/ould be subordinated to
the leadership of the Pinsatzkommandos. In addition, the
order made it the duty of these delegates to collect
information about political, economic, and cultural condi
tions in Russian areas not yet occupiedi and that Soviet
functionaries who v/ere deemed suitable were to be trans
ferred to Berlin and put at the disposal of AKT VI. Both
of those documents were distributed to A!,IT VI AlTD AI.IT IV,
This operation was known as "Operation Zeppelin".
The counsel for prosecution contends that the use of
prisoners-of-war for espionage and other liku purposes
ao^Insc oheir own nation, even if voluntary, is a violation
of Inuorncitional Law ana of tiic Hague Convention respecting
ohe Rules and Customs of Rbr. (Article 6 of Chapter II, and
Aroicle ul of Chapter VI of the Gh.neva Convention.) IIo
other authority other then the ^irticles themselves has been
ited to us, ano we have boon unable to find any. Ordinarily
a national of a country, whether or not lie is in military
vice, who gives aid or c oiiifort to the onergT', is a traitor
his country. But wo have never before heard it suggested
t the v^nemy who takes advanta",o of his treasoi. is guilty
of a breach of International Law. He hold* that the cited
p ohioitions of the Hague Convention prohibit the use of
prisoners Oj. vsr m connection Tvith v/ar operations, and apply
only .yhen such use is brou^iht aoout b3'' force, threats, or
dur>.ss, and not when the person renders the services volun
tarily.
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VJG com© nov/ to tnor© serious evidonco against
SCIIdLKHKBERCr v;ith respect to Operation Boppelin. In a
num"ber of instances persons, who volunteered, were hiereafter
oxecuteC^ apparently v/ithout trial or notice of any offense
of which they were alleged to he guilty. If true, this \/as
a flagrant violation of International Law. It appears from
the testimony of the v/itness gchmolen that he v;as a political
prisoner at the Auschv/itz Concentration Camp from June, 1940
to 1941, and v: as emnloyocJ as a "responsible prisoner" in the
^ reception office of the political department of the camp
v;hich v/as not under the jurisdiction of the Camp Commander,
t and that this political department had jurisdiction over
Block 11 of the camp; that approximately 200 Russians xjqvq
executed in that Block; that those prisoners arrived under
escort of 3D mon; the normal entries regarding them vjero
not made in the records; they v/ere not given the usual
prison numoers and tiiat the documents which they carried,
hearing their personal data, were immediately delivered to
the 3D unon their arrival; that these men gave no informa
tion ahout themselves and did not have the slightest idea
of the fate vjhich awaited them; that they were killed hy a
n
f shot in the neck within a few days after their arrival;
that the papers for their commitment horc the entry
"Zoppelin Gcheimnistraogcr'', - the latter terra meaning One
in posspssion of secret informa'cion".
Bxhihits 2065, 206G, 2068 and 2069 are the record
of some of the men thus executed. V/e are satisfied that the
fifty men mentioned in Bxhihits 2063 and 2064 are identical
and refer to one operation.
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17ith regard to the cases of Plev/aV:o, Kopyt, and
KoschilcY;, the reports state that as a result of varldis
things v;hich happeped in the meantime at special camp
nissohojo they ere given "special treatment" on 25
novembor "by order of SS Drigadefuehror Kaumann of Einsatz-
gruppe B. tlorc can be seen from the reports of SS
Obersturmfuehrcr Sakuth to the RSHA, AIIT VI, Department
6-C-2, In the case of Kosin, it appears that hevns sent,
by order of Ain VI, to Einsatzgruppe E-B for special troat-
f ment, "Special treatment'* in the jargon of Hazi Germany
meant death, as has been fully established before these
f Tribunals,
Ilaumann testified in the Ohlendorf case that in this
camp there -as a house put at the disposal of AET VI which
was not subordinated to him; that ho -had no right to order
the executions of tl:ie inmates thereof, but that Itias up
to AlIT VI to do so.
SCTiELLE"MBERG first-testified thafc he knew nothing
about these executions, but later, when faced with the
documentscontended that the men were killed because they
were traitors to Germany, The first three menw ere^executed
• ' '
rt on 25 November, 1942, and Eosin on 5 December, 1942, and the
' reports were all riodo on 5 Docera::Dor, 1942, The reason given
for Iiosin's death was that he had run away v/it'hout reason
t
from the 33 Special Gamp ^'/issokoje.
Exhibits 3465, 3466, 3467, and 3468 disclose that
two Russian prisoners of war i/ho v/ere activists employea by
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AtlT VI and who w ere hospltslizeu for tuberculosis ?;ere
thereafter ordered "by "leiss^erher of AI/TT VI to he given
''special treatment".
SGHELIENEERG- insists that he had no knov/led-:5e of
the.'se last sentences hut that V.'eissgerher was one of his
/
assistantsas was Grafe. Thus v;e are ashed to believe that
responsible officers of his division, on their own initiative,
issued orders for the execution of large numbers of people
v/ithout his knowledge and without his orders, general or
spec5.fic. The defense attempts to explain this by affidavits
that the head of Operation Zeppelin, although a subordinate
of SCIPZLIhilTBERG *3, acted independently and did not often
f
consult with him, but w e view such testimony with suspicion
and with great cr^ution. It does not square with
SCilZIjjIIilTZhnG *3 oharacter and temperament as disclosed on
the witness stand, or by the proof offered in this case.
If "'eissgerber and Grafe ordered these executions, their
action can only be accounted for if the defendant had per
mitted an utterly callous attitude towards human life to
grow up and become established in his division, or if it
v;as a practice so usual that it v^as unnecessary to consult
p him. It must be remembered that these were not isolated
^ instances, but at least 200 men were thus executed. In
neither case can he avoid responsibility.
^ With respect to the Woshilevi/' case, the defendant
offered parts of Document I:T0-5<;46, vhichwere not offered
by the proseci^tion, as part of Exhibit 2068 and others, to
prove that Koshilew was a spy, 'and, furthermore, that this
mas a matter which AI.'T IV handled and not AKT VI.
f
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We have considered these documents. It appears that
on 16 January 1942 Eoshilev/ was picked up by the Army as a
suspected spy, hut thab the "jehrmacht was not certain whether
he was a Russian or a German spy. Hev/as interrocjated at
least twice and maintained that hew as not a Russian spy, hut
that ho worked with the Gestapo. The Army made inquiries of
Einsatz^ruppe- B, the Secret Police, and the Gestapo. This
was reported to AI-,IT IV, where it was received on 28 January
1942. On 27 T.Iarch, 1942 AKT IV-l-B informed Sinsatzgruppe B
^ that neither AIITS IV nor VI knew of this man cr his alleged
contacts. If true, then obviously the man was a spy and .
subject to the penalty of being caught as such. But it as
not.
Bxhibit 2068 plainly shows that Koshilew had v/orked
for Referent IV Einsatzgruppe in Smolensk since January
1942. Nofcwithstending the denial of 27 March it also appears
that at least as late as 1 July 1942 he had been trained at
Special Camp WissbkoJe,which was an AMT VI ostablishmont,
and that he vr&s convinced that Bolshevism must be desuroyed,
and tliat he voluntarily reported to the German otaff oh lo
January, 1942. Obviously if in March, both AMT VI and AIIT IV
were convinced that the man was a spy, that his explanations
were fabricated, and that he had never worked for the Gostapo,
he would not have been placed and trained in,the Special Camp,
nor would there have been the slightest occasion to v/aib
until December 1942 before executing him. The documemits may
prove other facts, but they do not prove or tend to prove
that Eoshilew was a Russian spy.
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ThePG is no direct evidence that SCESLLSITBERG had
laiov'led^e of those incidents, "but it is clear that his A!.?!
VI had loaov/ledge of all of them and at least in one instance
ordered the murder of these Russians. It^s intended that
these men should be used in the foreign intelligence work,
that is, work behind the Russian lines, and this came within
the jurisdiction of AI.IT VI, which s elected these men and
determined the field in which they should be employed.
This is clear, not only from the documents, but from
SCHELLISlTBIilRCj^S ovjn testimony. V^hen a question arose as to
whether or not they were acting in good f aith or were, in
fact,Russian counter-spies, AI.IT VI 7/ould have been (^eply
interested in the matter because it lay in their field. It
is most unlikely that it would not have been consulted and,
in the first instance, determine the question of their
loyalty to G-ermany and v;hat their fate should be in the
event that disloyalty was established. True, once the fact
was determined, AIH VI might well bJ2vo turned them over to
AliT IV or some other agency for execution, but this does not
lessen AlIT VI*s responsibility or exonerate it from complicity
in the execution.
It is significant that vh.en turned over for executions
the records merely show that they were "persons in possession
of secret information" and not that they were disloyal and
had been found to bo spies or counter-intelligence agents of
the Russians. Purthermoro, they were totally ignorant of any
accusations against them. It is a fair a ssumption that if,
at the time they were turned over for execution, they had
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"been regarded as spies, the words "persons possessod of
secret information" would not Iiiavc been ris ed', and the v/ords
='spy'" or "Russian agent" would have been inserted in their
place. Ihcir execution, under these circumstances, v/as
merely cold-blooded murder.
A principal cannot be hold criminally responsible
for isolated criminal acts committed by his criminal
subordina'tcs in the execution of the latter s duty, but
Yhere there is evidence that this v/as an official practice,
he cannot escape rcsiponsibility on the plea pf ignorance,
inasmuch as such ignorance v/as in fact-non-existent,
r/e hold that SCIISLLEI.BRIRG in fact'lmev/ of those
practices and is GUILTY of the crimes as -set forth.
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The defend-int SCH-;7ERIN VON KRCSIGK, during the entire
Nazi regime, was Reich Minister of Fin-mce and a memrer of
the C'lDinet. He was educated at the University of Oxford
as a Rhodes Scholar and he spent m.any years in the Ministry
of Finance as a civil servroit. He faithfully .*ind with
complete loyalty served the 'Veimar Repuclic under several
of its oresidents. As time passed, his' talents were
recognized and he finally recame director of its cudget.
While von Pqcen was Reich Chancellor, 3CHV-T]RIN VON
KROSIGIC was ap'oolnted Minister of Finance. This appoint
ment was not made due to any political or party
aff ili-'.tions.
Upon Hitler's seizure of oower he was retained in
office solely because of his expert knowledge of govern
mental fin-'.nce, and not because he was looked upon either
as a Party man or as being devoted to or convinced of the
principles cf National Socialism, but we believe because
Hitler felt that it v;as necessary that the Ministry of
Finance be put in charge of one who was divorced from
the inexperienced, ignor-tnt and predatory characters
who had flocked to the Party and he desired one who was
incorruptible and would be content to carry out the
functions of his office without Interfering in matters of
politics.
Irres-oective of our evaluations of his subsequent
official actions, in Justice it must be said that SCH"VFRIN
VON KROSIGK'd private life was above reproach. He was
aad is a man deeply religious in character, devoted to his
wife -and family, simole in his tastes in life and wholly
free from any desire or ftmoition to use his official position
to enrich himself, a decided contrast to many who held high
offices in the Reich,
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The eviderxce cle/trly shows th-tt he was not a memoer of
Hitler's Inner Circlej that he was not one of his confilants
anl that he came in touch with him out seldom before the war
and even less often afterwards. Turing the course of the years
he suffered many conflicts of conscience and was fully aware
that measures to which he put his name and orograms in which
he played a part were contrary and abhorrent to what he
believed and knew to be right.
It is difficult to understand what motives or what weak
nesses imoelled or permitted him to remain and play a part,
II in many respects an import/uit one, in the Hitler regime. It
is one of the human tragedies which are so often found in life.
That he could have found or made.an opportunity to retire and
avoid being made a party to what was done, vie have no question.
In fact, he is one of the defendants who refused to avail him
self of the claim that he was bound to remain in office and
could not have retired or resigned had he so desired. He
testified that at the time of the Crystal Week Pogrom against
the Jews in November 1938 he then and always considered it
and. the measures which followed it to be a disgrace to the
char.acter of the C-erman people.
He states that he remained in the cabinet to raise the
c voice of reason and justice; that the events of the Roehm
»
Putsch of June 1934 were a shock to him rxnd emphasized in his
mind the dangers inherent in the Nazi regime, out that many
t
people urged him to remain in office so that he could act 'is a
brake to the regime; that among others who held the same idea
were some of the chiefs of the bourgeois ministries and old
civil serv.'ijits; that .as head of the, fin'-tnce administration he
desired his officials should keep their integrity; that the
tax administration and other divisions should carry on tbeir
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tasks with ao^olute just-ice; an-i that he felt as a minister
he could influence laws as they were drafted and after their
promulgation exert a "defeating" influence; that in the
suDseauent years he was aole, in certain instances, to help
those vrho were threatened by injustice; that by staying in
office he was able to save civil servants from the so-called
"purge" law; that in the matter of the billion mark Jewish
fine, he was able to have the funds paid out by the insurance
companies for losses incurred during the Crystal Week, and
which could not be oaid to the Jews themselves, applied upon"
their respective sh-ares of the national fine.
He testified that he served the Hitler Crovemraent
^ initially, because it was his duty as a civil servant so to
do, and later because only from that position was he able to
prevent injustices so far as his powers extended, and finally,
because he thought it was a manifestation of cowardice to
desert ,a sinking• ship; that us he views the matter today in
the full -'VlevT of what he then did net know he deems his
behavior politically erroneous, because under a dlct-atorshlp
all decent and respectable wo:ck and all honest efforts must
be fin,Tilly brought under the service of the dictator; but
I
all this comes from after-knovrledge, and from the consldera—
tions then apparent and known to him, had he ,again to malie
the decision he would do as his duty commanded and in the
same way.
s - ^ .
He'asserts that there were no financial considerations
which impelled him to remain in office and that had he resigned
he v^ould undoubtedly have had opportunities to obtain positions
in the commercial rmd fin-mcial field which v^ould in fact have
been gre.-..tly to his financial advantage; that while he never
bec-ime associated with any of the resist,-ince groups, because
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he felt he could be of more service in the capacity in which
he served, he was perscnally and well acquainted v;ith many of
its members I that it was not until 1938, when the Crystal Week
and the Sudeten crisis arose, that the resistance groups first
came into being, and that after the outbreak of the war it
was out of the question to resign as everybody hod to work in
some position,
We arc not inclined to bo captious in considering and
giving weight to his testimony, although we deem it altogether
likely that 'ihat he says does not supply all of the lights and
I' shado¥;s regarding his then reactions.
As to many of the decrocs, laws and regulations which
bore his name as cosignator, he relics upon the so-called
"Poderfuehrend" doctrine which may be succinctly stated thus,
that whore one minister ha.d jurisdiction over the major problem
of the legislation or regulation involved and other departments
v/cre more or less incidentally concerned, the legal responsi
bility rested upon the first and the other coslgnators assumed
no responsibility for the measures other than those provisions
v/hlch might imriEdiatoly affoct their jurisdiction, and, finally,
thr.t the ri^t to intervene or object ?/as limited to questions
relating to the propriety or practicability of the measures as
r it affected their sphere of action.
%
-Lhat the principle as thus stated is oversimplified, and
the responsibility of cosigners undercmphasizcd, wc have no
question, as we find in the record instances where the doctrine
w.^s rejected and whore the proposed cosigner refused to put his
name to the document.
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There is a further limitation to this doctrine» Cabinet
ministers hac the right to and in fact did. freely express
their views as to proposed legislation. In the early years of
the Hitler regime cabinet meetings were held, in which the same
right in principle existed, ^ven when the cabinet meetings
were discontinued., it was the practice, and in fact the invar
iable rule, that all proposed Reich governmental laws, regula-
tions and decrees were circulated among the cabinet ministers
for their objections or suggestions. The defendant LAM "EHS
testified that, as to t.his type of regulation and decree, had
a majority of the cabinet expressed a negative view, Hitler
would not have gone contrary to the viev7s of the cabineto
LA.I€fSRS stated, further, however, that negative views were
never expressed an'^, therefore, the Reic.h G-overnmcnt laws
were adopted without dissent, %ere the right to ob.leot or
dissent exists, a majority dissent can only be ascertained, if
some responsible minister is the first to register his objec
tions. Under these circumstances one cannot sit suoinely by
and await the voice of another.
Our attention has not been directed to a single Instance
in which SOHlvjCRIN-KRD SIGK filed his objection or dissent to
any proposed Reich Government law, regulation, ordinance or
decree w ich, if enacted, would constitute a crime within the
Jurisdiction of this Tribunal. Sven were we inclined to
accept the bald doctrine as of universal application, it could
be applicable only to responsibility under G-erman law and is
unavailable as a defense to a crime under international law.
Furthermore, it cannot be forgotten that, as to the offenses
charged under this Indictment, we do not deal with the ordinary
processes or policies of national law nor even thnge where
there is room for reasonable differences of opinion on polit.i-.
oal policy.
The offenses charged in this Indictment deal with poli
cies which fundamentally violate the common law and understand-
inp: of nations, and measures ^^jhloh shocked the consciences of
mankind, from which there Y/aiS and is a common rcviTlsion, not
limited to those who were or thereafter became political or
armed foes of the Third Reich, but among poO[los who by choice
or necessity remained neutrals. As to those offenses the doc
trine of "Pederfuehrend" cannot be applied although it may be
ccnsidcred vdth other circumstances in mitigation.
In our examination into the defendant's conduct wo havo
endeavored to state and concede as far and as fully and as
fairly as possible the foundations of his defense, ho nov/ pro-
^ ceed to ascertain and analyze the particulars of his conduct,
that we may weigh profession against performance and general
benevolence with specific acts, a, troubled conscience is not a
defense for acts which arc otherwise criminal. Nor can wo hold
that iio who signed, cosigned, oxccutcd or ndm.inistored measures
which violate International law, because he thought that
acqulosccncG would enable him to maintain and safeguard the Integ.
rlty of his department and the cafoer of his officials or oven
the lifo or liberty of individuals whoso oases camo to his atten
tion, but vho by his actions condemned the great inarticulate
0 mass to persecution, mistreatment, brutality, imprisonment,
deportation and extermination, escapee responsibility for hie
conduct,
!•
SCHVfflRIN-KKOSIGK was present at the infamous conference
of 12 November 1938 when Goorlng proposed to levy the billion-
mark fine against the Jews. This v/as shortly a.fter the assassi
nation of von Rath in taris and the riots and plunderlnga of the
Crystal Week, 'ihcn the question arose of adopting measures to
-569-
ifi |-« li. B 11'iri 'il irifiir^iiiirtrtrffiT
prevent Jews from realizing on their seciirities and disposing
of their assets, the defendant said:
"They have to he taken during the next
week at the latest."
"When Goering saids
"I shall close the wording this way, that
German Jewry shall, as punishment for their abomin
able crimes, and so forth, have to make a contribu
tion of one million — that will v:ork. The piecs
won^t commit another murder. Incidentally, I like
to say again that I would not like to be a Jew in
Germany."
SCHVvERIJJ-KROSIGK remarked;
"Therefore, I Vi/ould like to emphasize what Mr.
•^•^eydrich has said in the beginning* That \w v/ill
have to try to do everything possible by way of
additional exports to shove the Jews into foreign
countries. The decisive factor is that wo don^t
want the system Proletariat here. They v/ill always
be a terrific liaibility for us (Frlck: ''And a
danger,"). I don't imagine the prospect of a
ghetto is very nice. The idea of the ghetto is
not a very agreeable one. Therefore, the goal must
bo, like Heydrich said, to move out vdiatcver we can."
It is difficult to reconcile this language and the
attitude which the defendant now claims he then took. •
It was SCHl/i/EKXN-Kl\OSIGK who issued the ordinances of 21
TTovembor 193B and of 19 October 1939, the first of which levied
an assessment of 20 percent and the second an additional 5
percent on all Jewish property, by means of w^hich the billion-
mark fine was extracted, and it is be viho issued the detailed
instructions to the various Reich offices as to how and by
what moans payments could and should be made.
Regarding the billion-mark fine two things are to be
observed. First, it was not a fine or penalty for any act done
or committed by the individuals who were compelled to pay it,
nor was there the slightest ground for the charge that the
assassination of von Rath v/as the result of a general Jewish
plot. It was a deliberate confiscation of property and
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a typical piece of the persecution to which German Jev;s were
subjected. Second, this fine and the proceeds of other confis-
cations of Jewish property wero intended to be and v;ere used
for the purpose of re-armamont and aggression. This statement
was made at a meeting of the Keich Defense Council on i^ovember
18, 1938. There Gocring said; •
"Very critical situation of the Reich ex
chequer. Relief initially through the billion
mark fine imposed on Jev'Ty and through the profits
accruing to the Reich in the Aryanlzatlon of
Jev/isb. enterprises,"
ThQ defendant offers, and there is no justification or excuse
for those measures.
Financing Concentration Camps. As iviinister of Finance the
defendant furnished the means by which the concentration camps
were purchased, constructed and maintained, but it is clear
that ho neither originated nor planned these matters, and the
funds were provided by him on Hitler^s express orders. They
were Reich funds and not SCIR'JERIII-t^ROSlGK'S, and ho had no dis
cretion v;ith respect to their disposition. His act In disburs.
Ing them for these purposeswjie actually clerical, and vje can
not charge him with criminal responsioility in this matter.
Deportation of Jer7S to the East. V'Jhen the cruel deportation of
Jews to the East commenced, the defendant caused the necessary
instructions to bo given to the senior finance presidents through,
out the Reich, vho v/ero his subordinates, to confiscate the
Jewish property. The Jews wore only permitted to havo 100
Marks and 50 kilograms of luggage apiece. These instructions
stated that the administration and utilization of the ccnfis-
cated property was within the defendant's competency, and he
transferred it to the senior finance presidents to perform.
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The defendant asserts that by his orders an accurate
record of all property thus confiscated was kept, so that
at some future time, the owners might be able to reclaim it
or bo reimbursed therefor. Ins^smuch, however, as the coniis-
cation was complete and "final, the possibility of reclamation
or reimbursement could only occur as and when the Nazi regime
ceased to exist, deem his contentions in this respect to
be an afterthought and v/ithout reality in fact or intention.
His instructions spoke not only of deportations which were
then imminent, but of deportations v/hich had already taken
place and further .of deportations which were to follow. The
confiscations included not only money, securities, jewelry,
furniture, clothing, works of art, but also real estate owned
by Jews•
In March 1942, the defendant's deputy, by his order,
instructed the Finance Presidents concerning the seizure of
Jewish literature, cultural and artistic works and ordered
that they bo turned over to the Operational staff J^osenbcrg
which was the collector and holder of this kind of loot.
On 23 November 1941, the defendant's state secretary,
Koinhardt, co-signed the 11th Supplement to the Reich Citizenship
Law, which deprived all Jews living abroad of their citizenship,
as well as tbos e who might in the future t^ke up ordinary resi-^
dence there, Th® decree confiscated their property, together
with the property of all those Jews who at the time of the
enforcement of the decree were stateless if they wore formerly
Reich citizens, ThXs decree wasis sued as a result of a conference
in the Ministry of lihe Interior lAhich the defendant attended.
Various other implementary decrees and regulations for
the confiscation of Jewish property were from time to time
issued or co-signed by the defendant's Ministry of Plnance,
including those v;hlch forfeited the property of Jews who had
committed suicide to avoid deportation. This latter regiilation
was made retrospective to 15 October 1940, The defendant pleads
ignorance as to the issuing of some of those documents, particu
larly the last, and it is not unlikely that in some instances
this was true, but that such measures were taken independently
by his subordinates without knowing that they were in accord
v/lth the policies of his department is, wo believe, highly un-
^ likely, if not v^holly impossible.
The defendant SCfiwLivIN-KhOSIGriv with the defendant STUCKAfLT
-r
signed the decree of 2 November 1942 forfeiting citizenship and
confiscating the propcrt"^ of all Bohemian-Moravian Jev/s \h.o had
established domicile abroad, and the defendant approved the
draft of the Terboven Ordinance containing like provisions as
to Norwegian Jews.
On 3 October 1939 the defendant SCHVffiRIN-KROSlGK, to
gether with Prick and Ribbcntrop, signed a decree providing
for the forfeiture of citizenship of all citizens in the Pro
tectorate who may have "acted in a manner detrimental to the
interests of the ^>^eioh or which damaged its reputation", as
^ Vi/oll as those who did not return home when" ordered to do so
by the Minister of the Interior and the decree included a
forfeiture of their property as well.
On 4 October 1939 the defednat with I'rick signed a
decree v/hich authorized the Roich Protector to sequestrate,
for the benefit of the Rdch, tbc property of individuals or
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or associations who fostered tendencies deleterious to th©
Heich, and the Protector and the Minister of Interior were
authorized to determine vjhat tendencies were, to De so con
sidered.
On 24 October 1942 Reinhardt, for the defendant SQEWERIN-
KROSIGK, and the defendant STUCKART, for the Minister of the
Interior, signed a decree conferring jurisdiction on the
Protector, so far as nationals of th© Protectorate were con
cerned, and on the Ministry of the Interior, in all cither cases,
to determine v\4iat activities should be declared "deleterious".
The occupation of Bohemia and Moravia and the formation
of the so-call3 d Protectorate were, as we have held, acts of
aggression and in violation of international lav;. The enactment
of these decrees was unlav;ful and was a part and parcel of th©
original unlawful act and scheme and plan.
It is, apparent from the record that the defendant's
Ministry of finance was continually engaged in the work of
taking over, disposing of, and realizing on Jev/ish confiscated
property. The number and. importance of these transactions
and the fact that those engaged therein were responsible
officials holding hi^ office in the defendant's ministry,
forecloses.any possibility that they could have taken place
without his knov/lodge and consent or subsequent confirmation
and approval. They v;ere a part, and an important part, of the
Jewish persecutions carried on in the Reich and constitute
violations of international lav/ and agreements and crimes
under Count Five.
Not only were these ccnfiscations carried on in the Reich
and against Jews of German nationality, but they were extended
and came to include Jews of all nationalities living in -belgium
or the Netherlands, or having fled from thence to occupied Prance
and those who were residents of occupied France. Th© use to
which much of this property was put was to realize foreign
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exchange for the Reich, They were all without justification,
excuse or legality. The officials of the defendant's ministry
/
participated actively therein. These acts constitute viola
tions of international law and crimes against humanity under
Count Five.
V>ihen in June" 1944 Hiramler mde application for the allo
cation of many millions for the demolition of the V/arsaw Ghetto,
the defendant SCHVyERIlT—KROSIGK expressed a willin/s'ness to make
necessary installments on request, but coupled with it the
stipulation that Himmler first use the values represented by
goods found in the ghetto and inform him how many goods were
to be utilized or had been so utilized, Himmler replied that
the movable goods thus confiscated had been realized upon and
the proceeds paid into the Reich's Main Pay Office in favor
of the Ministry of Finance under a special account "Max
Heiliger." Into this account was deposited the money and the
proceeds of the dental gold extracted from the exterminated
inmates of concentration camps and the jewelry and precious
stones of vhich they were robbed. The defendant testifies
that he had no knowledge of this account and does not know
why it was given a fictitious name. It is to be remembered,
however, that approximately thirty-three tons of dental and
other gold alone were shipped to the Reichsbank and credited
to this account. That such an acquisition to German gold stocks
should not have come to the attention of the Minister of
Finance we find it difficult to believe, although it is quite
possible that he was not advised of the fictitious name
under which the account was carried.
Part of the jev/els, gold and works of art which were
seized in Paris from the Rothschild family were turned over to
and accepted by the defendant and utilized by his department
-575-
for Reich purposes. He made some objections to this but these
were overcome and he accepted the proceeds ^ich amounted to
1,800,000 marks. This was stolen property to which neither
.the Reich, the Reich agencies whiqh stpl© it, nor the Ministry
of Finance which accepted it, had the sli^test legal claim.
It was seized not because of any wrong done by the owners but
merely because they were Jews.
Final Solution. The defendant was co-signer with Frick, Minis
ter of the Interior, Bormann, Chief of the Party Chancellory,
' and Thierack, Minister of Justice, of the 13th Regulation under
the Reich Citizenship Law. By its provisions criminal acts by
Jews were to be pvinished by the police and not by judgment of
the courts; the provisions of the public penal law were no
longer applicable to Jews; on death, the property of a Jew
was confiscated to the Reich, and only his non-Jewish heirs
residing in Germany became entitled to compensation for the loss
of their inheritance; the Minister of the Interior, with the
concurrence of the higher authorities of the Reich, was empowered
to issue the necessary administrative and enforcement regula
tions and to determine to what extent those provisions should
apply to Jewish nationals in foreign countries, and finally the
regulation was made applicable to Bohemia-Moravia and to all
Jewish citizens of the Protectorate.. This regulation was enacted
>r'
in the midst of the extermination program and by it the bare
^ shadow of legal form was thrown over the confiscation of prop
erty of Jews who "were done to death in the East.
The defendant asserts tnat his only part in the program
was to take possession and keep record of the property thus
acquired; that Fimmler told him the process had been in exist
ence for some months and that he, VON KROSIGK, thou^t there
itfrii • '•
was nothing he could do and he "was convinced that the official
promulgation would guarantee greater protection under the law
than if the police, as heretofore, had handled it anonymously."
This is an explanation which does not explain and a
justification which does not justify. It is difficult to
say what comfort it would Oe to a Jew v«ho was aoout to be
murdered, or to his heirs who were about to be disinherited,
to knov^r thrt he v/as belnp!: robbed according- to a tidy eovern-
mental r^ulation and that the receipts of the robbery were
to go to the credit of the Reich rather than into the hands
and pockets of the executioners.
Germanization Frogram and D.lT.Ti The connection of the defen
dant SCmERIN-KfiOSIGK in this program CQnsists almost entirely
of setting aside Reich funds for the purposes mentioned, and
which we have heretofore discussed with respect to the defen
dant KEFPLER, We find no instance, however, v/here these
things were done at his instigation or other than at a direct
order of Hitler, Here again he did not provide or dispose of
his own funds nor was he in a position to say whether or not
they should be so spent.
It is inprnctlcnble, -.itbin the compass of this opinion,
to recite all of the aotlvitics in vhloh the defendant in his
department engaged within the purview of the charges alleged
in Count Five. It Is clear, however, tha; notwithstanding
the conflicts of consolenco v/hich he suffered, and of them
we have no doubt, he actively and consciously participated
in the crimes charged in Count Five. Neither the desire t
10
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be of service nor the desire to help individuals nor the
demonds of patriotism constitute a Justification or an
excuse for that "which the evidence clearly establishes he
did, although they may be considered in mitigation of
punishment,
m find the defendant SCKWiilrtlN-KirLOSIGK GUILTY under
Comt Five in the particulars set forth.
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